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Smart cards are examples of advanced chip technology. They allow information 
transfer between the card holder and the system over secure networks, but they 
contain sensitive data related to both the card holder and the system, that has to 
be kept private and confidential.  
The aim of the research is to conduct a risk management programme on the 
smart cards systems that are employed in e-business systems, suggest the best 
safeguards to be applied to better secure the smart card systems depending on 
the services and applications the smart card serves, and produce a simulation 
tool using a high level of abstraction programming language to be able to test the 
robustness of the proposed solutions. 
The study contributions are producing a Risk Analysis Guide specifically on 
smart card systems to support managerial decision making, modelling the 
current and proposed smart card systems including modelling the possible 
attacks using the Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagrams, and developing 
an executable model using SystemC and Transaction Level Modelling (TLM) 
extensions, which is a new way of modelling and testing smart card systems 
security. 
The security objectives have to be considered during the early stages of systems 
development and design; an executable model will give the designer the 
advantage of identifying vulnerabilities at an early stage, and therefore enhance 
the system security. The developed model is used to examine the effectiveness of 
number of authentication mechanisms with different probabilities of failure. 
Numbers of probable attacks on the current security protocol are modeled to 
identify vulnerabilities. The executable model shows that the smart card system 
security protocols and transactions need further improvement to withstand 
different types of security attacks.   
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
1.1 General Background 
The advances of information technology in this digital era have created new 
opportunities to improve the data and information transmission, implementation 
of new applications, and enhancement of communications over the networks. 
Exchanging products, services, and information, plus collaborating with other 
business partners via computer networks are known as electronic business [4]. 
More specifically, utilising information technology and electronic commerce to 
provide access to citizens and business partners to a range of governmental 
information, documents, and services is called electronic government [4]. 
By mentioning information transmission over networks and interactions 
between a government and its citizens, or a bank and its customers, concerns 
about information security and user privacy immediately arise. Number of 
questions will arise like: How does the system know that people are who they 
claim they are? How to pass this sensitive information through the 
communication channel without being intercepted or corrupted? Therefore, 
information system security is an essential management responsibility for e-
business services generally, and e-government and e-banking services 
specifically.  Chapter 1 Introduction                  2 
       
Lately, most of the countries governments and organisations are concerned 
about issuing a smart card for their citizens or customers. For example, in the 
case of e-government, the smart card project mainly proposes a single card for 
citizens and expatriates that will allow access to government services such as 
personal identification, health, immigration, driving licence, and support an e-
purse payment mechanism [5]. Therefore, this smart card is going to be used as a 
tool to support number of e-government applications. The main applications can 
be identified as following: 
  E-gates: The governments are planning to implement electronic gates at 
the airports to support ease of transport to and from the country [5]. As 
such, the smart card holder will be able to benefit from quick and 
convenient e-gates at the airport. An additional benefit is that the smart 
card is considered to be a valid travel document for trips among the 
countries that allow such use of smart cards and e-gates because it 
conforms to the international standards for electronic smart cards [6], [7]. 
  E-health: The automation of the systems used in hospitals and medical 
centres lead to an efficient working environment, as it offers quick and 
easy access to relevant health data [8]. From this point of view, the 
governments decided to implement the e-health application within the e-
government strategy and use the smart card as a tool to be used in 
governmental organisations to provide the basic medical information. 
Such information is going to be stored in the smart card, as well as the 
ability to keep track of the immunisation system that is applied by the 
ministry of health [9], [10]. Finally, doctors' appointments can be saved 
and tracked in the smart card to effectively manage the visits to the 
hospitals. 
  E-voting: The smart card can support the e-voting technology, which is 
mainly practicing various election processes through the internet [5]. This 
way of voting will allow all eligible voters to participate in any election in Chapter 1 Introduction                  3 
       
a simple and timesaving manner regardless of their geographical location. 
In order to identify the voter and assure a secure and confidential means 
of voting, the voter's details on the system are crosschecked with the 
biometric information stored on the card [11]. 
  E-purse: This application will allow the cardholder to store electronic cash 
within the chip at selected cash points and outlets [12], [4]. By attaching 
the card reader to the computer, the holder's identity is instantly and 
securely verified. The stored credit can then be used to pay for various 
services and products at the governmental facilities and selected outlets, 
the card holder will be able to pay government bills, fees, and benefit from 
automated payment systems via specially installed electronic devices at 
government facilities and private establishments.   
  Other Online Public Services: The e-government technology will support 
services such as renewing driving licences, viewing birth certificates, 
various governmental forms, etc [5], [7]. Generally, the identification 
number, name, address, personal photograph, signature, and fingerprint 
data will be available to view at the smart card.  
 
In addition, the e-banking system is using the smart cards instead of the 
normal magnetic stripe cards as a new means of payment technology in many 
countries [13]. These smart cards adopt the Europay, MasterCard and VISA 
(EMV) specification, this specification defines the technical requirements for 
banks that use the smart cards for Automated Teller Machines (ATM) and point-
of-sale (POS) terminals [14]. The primary purposes of using a smart card are to 
store cardholder sensitive data securely, protect data stored on the chip against 
unauthorized modification, and reduce the number of fraudulent transactions 
resulting from counterfeit, lost, and stolen cards [13]. The smart card holds the 
personal details of the cardholder, account details, issue and expiry dates, and 
allows access to the cardholders account to obtain monetary value.  Chapter 1 Introduction                  4 
       
Therefore, having all these applications activated in the e-government system 
or the e-banking system, and accessed by number of users through a smart card 
raises a huge security responsibility that the management of the whole 
information system has to fulfil. The users will attempt to ask and enquire about 
the security, privacy, and risks related to this new technology that contains 
sensitive information like personal details and access to monetary values for 
each citizen in an e-government system or a customer in an e-banking system. 
So, it is a priority to study the security issues like availability, confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and authorisation.  
Governments and organisations must pay great attention on safeguarding 
and protecting their systems from all sorts of attacks. Also, they must be 
proactive rather than reactive to computer and system crimes and crises that 
may take place [12].  Therefore, it is vital for the management to adopt a risk 
management programme to be able to identify the areas that need to be audited, 
and to reduce the exposure faced by the governmental organisations and 
commercial organisations to an acceptable level of risk.  
They must start by identifying their systems’ assets, the value of the assets, 
the systems risks and vulnerabilities, recognising the possible threats and 
assessing the level of impact on the system components, identifying possible 
attacks, studying the security requirements, and finally satisfying the security 
requirements and goals by applying certain security safeguards. In addition, 
having a tool or a program that can be utilised to test the system qualities and 
safeguards, measure the robustness of the security measures employed, and give 
results of possible attacks and risks associated with the employed safeguards Chapter 1 Introduction                  5 
       
will have a great impact on controlling and evaluating the system defence 
structure.  
 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
1.2.1 Research Aim 
The aim of the research is to conduct a risk management programme on the 
smart cards systems that are employed in e-business systems, suggest the best 
safeguards to be applied to better secure the smart card systems depending on 
the services and applications the smart card serves, and produce a simulation 
tool using a high level of abstraction programming language to be able to test the 
robustness of the proposed solutions. 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the study are: 
  To conduct risk analysis to be able to examine the threats and attacks, 
point out the vulnerabilities, identify risks, and determine risk levels 
that face the smart card system,  
  To come up with possible solutions that contribute to the enhancement 
of the smart card system security,  
  To produce models using UML, which shows the possible proposed 
solutions,  Chapter 1 Introduction                  6 
       
  To build an executable model out of the designed model by using 
SystemC and Transaction Level Modelling (TLM), and evaluate it in 
terms of system robustness and functionality.  
1.3 The Importance of the Study and Contributions 
It is vital to study, examine, and appreciate the latest technologies adapted 
and implemented by the organisations and governments in our technologically 
advanced era. The smart card, which is considered to be the latest trend in 
today’s e-business environment, it is important to point out the risks behind 
using this type of technology, particularly when it is used on a daily basis. Thus, 
governments and organisations must understand the nature of the smart card 
transactions and exert the necessary effort to implement a successful smart card 
system. 
 In fact, successful implementation of any smart card project will support the 
country’s communications, businesses, and government systems. It will prove 
how powerful and capable technology is in facilitating the day to day 
transactions in a secure and confident way. Risk analysis must be conducted 
whenever money or resources are to be spent, and exchange of sensitive data and 
information occurs. Therefore, being aware of the related risks of using this 
technology is highly recommended, and the implementation of the required 
security methods in a reliable, available, and usable way is extremely necessary. 
The level of security of the employed smart card system in any e-business 
environment is the focal point of concern; hence, the study focuses on the smart 
card system security along with its associated risks and possible safeguards. The Chapter 1 Introduction                  7 
       
first part of the study intends to conduct a risk management programme. The 
outcome of the programme is significant to organisations that employ smart card 
systems and would like to operate in an environment that can stand against 
internal or external risks. It allows the organisations, regardless of their areas of 
operation, to put into focus the smart card system security objectives, and it also 
serves as a guide in developing the risk analysis process that meets the 
organisation’s business and system needs.  
The second part of the study focuses on modelling and testing the proposed 
security mechanisms and solutions. The modelling and design process uses a 
well known and highly recommended modelling language like the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) to produce diagrams, along with SystemC as a 
programming language that is of a high level of abstraction to produce a 
simulation tool that allows the testing of the current and proposed solutions.  
The contribution of the study is to help decision makers and system analysts 
to take better decisions in terms of operating in safe environments, have a better 
idea of the possible solutions, and test their security employed schemes against 
possible attacks, threats, or risks. The risk analysis in this study focuses on the 
smart card system, which is something that has never been done before. Most 
risk management programmes are concerned about information technology 
security in general like the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) risk management framework [15], but there has been no risk analysis 
study or guide that is conducted specifically on smart cards.  
In addition, the modelling of the smart card current systems and proposed 
systems including the modelling of the possible attacks has not been done before, Chapter 1 Introduction                  8 
       
this part of the study is successfully published in the 2010 IEEE/IFIP 
International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, please refer 
to Appendix (B).  
Finally, the executable model that is produced using SystemC along with its 
TLM extension is a new way of modelling and testing the smart card systems, 
and is considered as an additional contribution that supports bridging the gap 
between the design and implementation phases of the smart cards systems 
development. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The report contains six chapters. Chapter one is an introduction to the 
research, and it includes an explanation of the general background of the 
research, statement of the research aim and objectives, in addition to the 
importance of the study.  
Chapter two provides an overview and evaluation of the related literature on 
the research topic; the purpose of this chapter is to help the reader develop a 
good understanding of the relevant previous research work and investigation 
that took place in similar areas of interest.   
Chapter three contains the Risk Management Programme that is carried out 
to determine the risks associated with the usage of smart cards in e-business 
systems, analyses of the findings, and the discussion of the study findings. 
Chapter four includes the smart card system modeling and design, and a 
description of the current and proposed smart card systems using UML diagrams 
to illustrate the transactions and operations of the system objects.  Chapter 1 Introduction                  9 
       
Chapter five includes an explanation and implementation of an executable 
SystemC model, number of tests to examine the security mechanisms employed 
in the system are presented in the chapter.  
Chapter six revisits the arguments, theories, and results stated in the 
previous chapters of the research, in addition, number of concluding remarks are 
drawn. It also contains a section that discusses the possible future work of this 
study. Finally, the last chapter includes the references list. Chapter 2 Literature Review                10 
       
Chapter 2 
 
 
Literature Review 
This Literature Review chapter provides the background required and the 
theories and practises related to the research field. At the beginning, an 
overview of the smart card is presented. The second part explains the security 
mechanisms that are used in the current smart card systems like the PIN and 
Passwords, Cryptographic Key Management, and Biometrics along with the 
proposed mechanisms that will enhance the security of the smart card systems. 
After that, a section about the smart card applications that are employed in the 
market today will discuss the uses of the smart card in different areas. The final 
section is a discussion of the review of the related literature that shows the 
reflection and arguments. 
   
The developments and advances that have taken place in today’s business 
environment especially e-commerce and related technologies such as the Java 
language influence the initiation and development of the smart card systems. 
The main determinant of the smart card product rests on the combination and 
the overall coherence of technologies like cards and readers manufacturing, 
software and hardware development, cryptographic algorithm development, 
customisation, etc [16]. The technology is getting more and more sophisticated; 
in addition, various advances and improvements take place especially in the 
areas of operating systems, applications, and security and cryptography. This Chapter 2 Literature Review                11 
       
technological evolution played a major role in the creation and development of 
the smart card industry.  
2.1 What is a Smart Card? 
The smart card technology has been around for approximately 20 years; 
German inventors patented the idea of having plastic cards that contain 
microchips in 1968. Then the Japanese and the French have patented other 
versions of smart cards in the 1970s. Failures took place at first but then the 
technology started to bloom in the 1990s [17]. Therefore, this technology has 
been part of the governments’ strategies and projects lately and seems to be 
taking place in every individual’s purse. A number of reasons played a role in the 
massive growth of the smart card technology; those reasons are mainly related to 
the market. One of the reasons is the credibility of the magnetic stripe card, 
which has reached very low levels [18]. People are now aware of the problems 
and fraud that are caused by the magnetic stripe cards, so they prefer the smart 
cards technology. The growth of the commercial activities through the Internet 
had given rise to the demand of smart cards [18]. Because of the advances in 
technology and the evolution of the Internet, most of the people in the current 
era rely heavily on the Internet and have most of their daily work and business 
transactions done online. Thus, practicing electronic commerce requires a more 
consistent security card that will ensure the safe exchange of data and 
information online such as the smart card. In addition, [18] says that there are 
several applications that are growing rapidly today such as health cards, 
customer relationship management, and satellite television decoding, those 
applications are strongly linked to the smart card technology. The GSM mobile Chapter 2 Literature Review                12 
       
telephony system is another developed technology that places a chip card in 
every user’s pocket [18]. A number of well known technology companies such as 
IBM, Sun, and Microsoft engaged in the production and implementation of the 
smart card field, these efforts took place in order to cope with the demand in the 
market and the advances of technology.     
From this point, it is important to begin with defining the smart card. The 
author in [17] defined the smart card as any credit card sized card with more 
memory than the traditional magnetic stripe card, which has an on-board 
embedded processor, or smart chip. Smart cards provide a cryptographic token; 
they are able to execute cryptographic algorithms in their embedded internal 
circuitry [19]; it indicates that the user’s data are kept secretly and never leave 
the boundaries of the tamper resistant silicon chip. Tamper resistance mainly 
means the protection of the sensitive information stored in the chip, so tamper 
resistant silicon chips have features that make them capable of securing the 
sensitive information like the private keys. The tamper resistant chip has an 
active shield that once broken makes it unusable by initially destroying any data 
held within the chip, in addition to shutting down the operations of the chip. 
Hence, they are designed in a way that prevents an attacker from modifying or 
altering the sensitive information stored within the chips. For example, the VISA 
security module that is commonly used in banks to generate and check PINs has 
a microprocessor that performs the cryptographic operations; it contains lid 
switches and circuitry which interrupts power to memory when the lid is opened 
so that the key material stored is erased or set to zero [20], [21]. Therefore, the Chapter 2 Literature Review                13 
       
features and capabilities of the tamper resistant chips employed in smart cards 
gives them the characteristic of being very secure.  
Moreover, the technology of smart card offers the benefits of easy mobility, 
with the capability of storing a great capacity of information in comparison with 
the magnetic-based plastic cards. In addition, programs can be stored in the card 
that can provide rich services such as security, authentication, health record 
management, and alert system [22]. Thus, the smart card seems to have 
tremendous advantages and advances in the technology embedded in them in 
comparison with the old magnetic cards.  
2.2 Smart Card Security  
Security is a very high concern when it comes to linking number of computers 
or terminals together through networks. It is easy to monitor the flow of data 
throughout the networks by applying different techniques such as sniffing, 
spoofing, or session hijacking [23]. Thus, it is extremely important to secure and 
authenticate the traffic in the networks and systems to ensure the integrity, 
privacy and confidentiality of the transferred data.  
Privacy and confidentiality are almost the same, they both mean that the 
message being transferred must be read by the sender and the intended receiver 
only [24]. Confidentiality implies that the information or asset is restricted to 
authorised users only, whereas privacy is more concerned about the identity of 
the individual, it refers to the ability to prevent invasions of the user’s personal 
secrets and space, which includes any information related to identifying the 
personality of the user, also; it is concerned about the ability of the users to 
choose with whom to share their private information or asset [25]. Chapter 2 Literature Review                14 
       
The smart card is now known for its high level of security and is used as a 
tool for authentication and authorisation in today’s different information 
systems. Still, it is imperative to go through the security techniques that are 
applied to the smart card to ensure security and safe information transition 
through the systems. The user identification is the most important security 
technique; there are three different methods that can be used to identify a 
person. The first identification method is knowledge of a secret, the second 
method is to test the possession of an object, and the third method is testing a 
specific body feature[26].   
2.2.1 Identification through PINs and Passwords 
This type of control is responsible of identifying and verifying the system 
users, processes, and information resources. One of the common practices of 
identification is entering a PIN, it is usually a four digit number entered using a 
terminal keypad or a computer keyboard and then sent to a smart card. Then the 
smart card compares the value that it receives with an internally stored 
reference value and reports the result to the terminal [27]. PINs have to be 
memorised by the user, therefore, the user has to choose a number that is easy to 
remember. The number of characters in a PIN depends not only on the desired 
level of security but also on the memory capacity of the average card user [27]. 
However, this method of security is not the best identification or 
authentication method because one of the simplest attacks is guessing the PIN, 
the probability of guessing the PIN increases if the PIN digits were less, for 
example, a four digit PIN has the probability 0.03% in three tries [27]. Moreover, 
some people have their PINs written on pieces of papers that are stored next to Chapter 2 Literature Review                15 
       
their cards; others use easy numbers such as 1234 or 3333, which also increases 
the probability of figuring out the PIN. This indicates that this kind of method is 
not the best authentication method to be adapted.  
The other authentication method that is widely used to secure the data 
through networks is Password Authentication. This method has been used for a 
long time because of its easiness of usage and implementation. This method 
generates a unique identifier (ID) and a password for every user in the network, 
each user has to enter his ID and password in order to have access to the 
network resources [28], it allows the communicating parties to verify their 
signatures to each other without exchanging public or private keys [28].  
As stated by [29], the ID-based schemes have the following advantages: 
neither secret nor public keys need be exchanged, the public key directory table 
is not needed, and the assistance of a third party is not needed. Hence, the ID-
based scheme is an alternative to public key schemes where the ID of the user is 
used as the public key. Furthermore, Shamir’s ID-Based scheme has a fixed 
password; the user does not have the option of changing the corresponding key to 
his ID. A password generator generates a password to each user ID rather than 
the user himself, which means that the user cannot choose the password 
assigned to his/her ID after registration. In the case of compromising the user 
password, the user has no choice but changing the current ID to a new one with 
a new password. This makes the scheme less flexible and weak against the 
attack of replaying previously intercepted passwords [28].  
Then, Yang and Shieh came up with the timestamp-based password 
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nonce-based password authentication scheme to be used within the smart cards 
[28]. These two schemes do not need the directory of passwords or verification 
tables to authenticate users and is based on the concepts of ID-based schemes. 
However, [30] mentioned that Yang and Shieh password authentication 
scheme that is used in smart cards has been vulnerable to some forged login 
attacks [30]. Also, [31] showed that an intruder is able to construct a valid login 
request from an intercepted login request and then impersonate other legal users 
within the network by sending a forged request to the remote host [31]. This 
indicates that the password authentication scheme is not the best authentication 
method that ensures a high level of security within a system though few 
scientists and researchers like [32], [33] and [34] have spent effort in improving 
Yang and Shieh’s scheme. Therefore, using other types of authentication 
methods is required to ensure the safe and secure transmission of information 
within the smart card system.  
2.2.2 Cryptographic Key Management 
Cryptography is the science of keeping secrets secret [35], where the 
mechanisms of cryptography achieve the security main objectives like 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. The fundamental 
task of cryptography is to allow the users to communicate securely over an 
insecure channel in a way that guarantees their transmissions’ privacy and 
authenticity [36]. Moreover, cryptography is the study of the methods used to 
encrypt and decrypt data using keys. The great idea behind using the encryption 
and decryption processes is to make it difficult, expensive, and time consuming 
for an unauthorised person to have access to confidential and private data [37]. Chapter 2 Literature Review                17 
       
Therefore, key generation, distribution, and storage must be securely 
managed. The objectives of cryptography are Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authenticity, and Non-repudiation [37]. Thus, cryptography is an important 
technology that has to be applied to ensure secure transmission of data through 
the public networks especially the Internet.  
Any encryption method consists of three types of data: plain text 
(unencrypted data), cipher text (encrypted data), and the key, which is a secret 
code used to encrypt and decrypt a message (one or sometimes more are required 
for encryption and decryption of data). These three types of data are processed by 
a mathematical formula used to encrypt the plain text into the cipher text and 
vice versa. Generally, algorithms are hard to change, for some reasons such as 
the easiness of making a small mistake and ending up creating a weak 
cryptographic algorithm, keeping the algorithm secret is difficult as well because 
nobody builds a cryptographic algorithm for a short period of time, so algorithms 
should be published and used rather than kept secret. Modern algorithms are 
based on Kerckhoffs’ principle [38]. This principle has a clear rule, which is the 
security of the encryption scheme must depend only on the secrecy of the key and 
not on the secrecy of the algorithms. Of course this does not mean that to operate 
securely we could use any simple algorithms, the fact is, the more complex the 
encryption algorithms and keys the more secure the system would be. 
There are two major encryption systems, the symmetric systems where the 
algorithms use one secret key for encryption and decryption and the asymmetric 
systems where the algorithms use different keys for encryption and decryption 
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Symmetric Systems (Private Key Encryption) 
In symmetric systems the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the data, 
so the sender and receiver must share the same key without revealing it to 
anyone else. The problem with this scheme is the transportation of the secret key 
between the sender and the receiver without security exposures. Thus, this kind 
of security schemes can work successfully in some small organisations, however, 
it cannot work effectively in large organisations. For number of years the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) was well-known as the standard symmetric 
encryption algorithm which uses a 56-bit key that ensures high encryption [39]. 
Basically, DES is used to encrypt and decrypt packet data; it turns clear text 
into ciphertext with an encryption algorithm. On the other hand, the decryption 
algorithm on the remote end restores the clear text from the ciphertext. It is 
usually used to encrypt PINS [39]. In the year 2001 the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) declared that DES was being replaced by 
Rijndael, which is the new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [40]. Rijndael’s 
standard is a block cipher standard that has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a 
key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits, it can be specified with key and block sizes in 
any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits 
[40]. To make it more clear, a block cipher might take a 128 bit block of plaintext 
as an input, and the output will be a corresponding 128 bit block of cipher text. 
The transformation is controlled using a secret key [40]. Then again, the 
decryption algorithm takes the 128 bit block of cipher text together with the 
secret key and yields the original 128 bit block of plain text. Until today, AES is 
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Asymmetric Systems (Public Key Encryption) 
On the other hand, public key encryption is the method that uses a pair of 
matched keys, a public key and a private key [41], [1]. The public key is publicly 
available to anyone and the private key is known only to its owner. In this 
method, if a person needs to send a message, then the message has to be 
encrypted using the receiver's public key. When the receiver gets the message, 
the decryption of the message is done using the receiver's associated private key 
[41]. Briefly, if a message is encrypted with a public key, then the associated 
private key is required to decrypt the message. 
 
 
The best-known public key cryptography algorithm is RSA, which is named 
after its inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [42], [43]. It is commonly used 
to do public key cryptography and digital signatures based on factoring. RSA 
algorithm is not limited to a particular key length, it uses keys ranging in length 
from 512 bits to 1,024 bits; in contrast, DES is limited. This characteristic makes 
Figure (1): Public key Cryptography 
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the RSA better than DES for the reason that to increase security longer keys can 
be used without the need to modify the algorithm [41]. However, the main 
problem associated with this algorithm is speed [44]. Asymmetrical algorithms 
are generally slower than symmetrical algorithms due to the complexity of 
asymmetrical algorithms, so public key encryption cannot be used effectively to 
encrypt and decrypt large amount of data. These symmetric and asymmetric 
algorithms are the most well-known algorithms, therefore, they are common and 
used by most manufacturers.   
 
Digital Signatures 
The digital signature is the electronic version of the personal signature in the 
online world. It is an identifying code that is used to authenticate the sender of 
the message, ensure that the message contents are unchanged, and ensure non-
repudiation in the future [45]. 
Suppose that Alice wants to send a message to Bob, at the same time Bob 
wants to make sure that Alice is the sender of the message and the original 
message contents have not been tampered with during the data transmission. 
The digital signature is the best solution to Bob’s questions, the following is what 
Alice and Bob will do if the digital signature was applied to the message 
transmission:  
Alice generates a mathematical computation known as a hash function and 
applies it to the message; the result of the hash function is called a message 
digest. Alice will also use a key generation algorithm to create her own pair of 
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hash, which will result in a creation of a digital signature. Finally Alice is going 
to encrypt both the message and the digital signature with Bob’s public key and 
sends the digital envelope to Bob.  
On the other side, Bob will then use his private key to decrypt the digital 
envelope and gets access to its contents (the message and the digital signature). 
Bob is going to use Alice’s public key to decrypt the digital signature, using the 
same hash function employed by Alice, Bob can then creates a message digest 
from the decrypted message and compares the resulted message digest with the 
original message digest. If both messages digests match, then Bob will conclude 
that the message is genuine and Alice is the true sender of the message, at the 
same time, Alice could not deny that she is the sender of the message [46], [47].   
The digital signatures are vital in achieving some of the most important 
security objectives like authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation [45]. 
However, the main problem that lies behind the usage of this technology is that 
Alice or the sender is not the one who computes the digital signature; it is the 
sender’s computer that does compute the digital signature, hence, the proof that 
Alice is the person who signed the message is not accurate. Simply because 
someone else may have access to her machine and sends the message to Bob 
claiming that the sender is Alice, therefore, the dishonesty will take place.   
2.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
2.2.3.1 What is PKI? 
Most of the current smart card systems use the Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) technology to fulfil the system security requirements, it is until today 
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one point to the other. Public-key infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates 
were generated to conquer the lack of presence and the anonymity of the entity 
that characterise insecure networks such as the Internet. PKI has number of 
definitions, [48] defined PKI as: 
A scheme based on public and private key cryptography and 
digital signatures. These signatures use software and policies that 
permit users to electronically encode and decode information in a 
secure way over the internet [48]. 
 
This definition is very brief and does not describe precisely how this security 
method works. The PKI contains other important elements that should be listed 
in the definition. The following definition is by [49] where they defined PKI in a 
more descriptive way: 
PKI is a security infrastructure that incorporates hardware, 
software, standards, and policies to create a framework for 
securing transmissions, verifying and validating identities and 
ensuring the integrity and source of data through the use of 
asymmetric encryption and digital certificates. PKI uses the 
concept of a trusted third party for implementing key life-cycle 
management processes [49]. 
 
This is a more clear definition of what PKI is and what the important 
elements in this type of security method are. A more specific definition will 
probably mention the digital signature and the management system of the 
certificates. 
If the PKI is available, then digital signatures are available as well [19]. The 
PKI provides a framework for addressing important security considerations like 
authentication, confidentiality, authorisation, integrity, and non-repudiation 
that are extremely required to conduct business on the web [49], [48]. It mainly 
uses the concept of a trusted third party for implementing key life-cycle 
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which validates the identity of the user and issues digital certificates [50]. The 
following section will discuss in more details the PKI main components and their 
related duties.  
 
2.2.3.2 PKI Main Components and Operations 
The CA is one of the major and main PKI components that are considered to 
be a trusted party in managing the confidential details that are included in the 
digital certificates that are issued to the requesters, normally; the CA issues a 
policy statement indicating the company’s procedures and responsibilities [48, 
51]. In addition, the CA could be online where the certificates can be obtained 
through the network infrastructure or offline where the certificates are saved in 
a room and sent to the requester by using disks through a secured transport 
service.  
For example, Verisign which is one of the well known PKI vendors in the 
market operates online [51]; however, some other vendors prefer to stay offline to 
better control the security of the stored certificates. Each CA has its way of 
securing the digital certificates and ensuring the safety of the certificates 
transport to and from the CA, it all depends on the resources available to the CA 
and its capabilities comparing to the requesters terms and conditions as well. 
Public key cryptography uses two keys and a series of mathematical formulas 
to scramble and unscramble data that flow through the network as mentioned 
earlier [19]. PKI authenticates the users through digital certificates, the 
validation of those applying for a digital certificate and the verification of the 
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have a RA involved in the PKI cycle is something that is considered to be 
optional [50], some users just prefer to have the RA included in the system to 
ensure the authentication of the subscribers because the RA is a local agent that 
requests a certificate from the CA on behalf of the subscriber after 
authenticating the subscriber face to face or in other forms. Therefore, the 
request of issuing a digital certificate given to the CA by the RA is trusted 
because of the authentication of the subscriber; this is just as good as if the CA 
had done this authentication of the subscriber by itself.  Then the CA issues the 
digital certificates; this is done through the use of public/private key pairs and 
an effective key management process.  
Furthermore, there is an important process within the PKI, this process is 
called Revocation [43], [50]. The revocation process mainly revokes the digital 
certificates that are not any more valid, have been corrupted, the private key has 
been stolen or wrongly disclosed due to improper storage or use, the subject no 
longer requires the certificate, or in the case where the certificate has been 
stolen [43], [1]. The users are informed by the revocation process that their 
certificates are not any more valid to use by publishing a Certification 
Revocation List (CRL), which is a list signed and issued by a CA consisting of the 
revoked digital certificates that are not in use any more [1]. Yet, the revocation 
process must be done in a secure manner to prevent intruders from having the 
ability to revoke valid certificates. If anyone can revoke anyone else’s certificates, 
then the system will end up being corrupted. The publication of certificates and 
CRLs is a very essential step that must be controlled securely to ensure the 
safety of the certificates.  Chapter 2 Literature Review                25 
       
 
Therefore, the PKI mainly consists of a CA that issues and verifies digital 
certificates, a RA that authenticates the subscribers and must verify the CA 
before a digital certificate is issued, which is in other words the verifier of the 
CA, a directory or could be more than one where the digital certificates with 
their public keys are stored, and a certificate management system [48].  
Figure (2) is an illustration of PKI's main elements and the flow of requesting 
and issuing a digital certificate. According to figure (2), the subject requests a 
digital certificate from a CA; this step has to be done by passing through a RA 
first for the purpose of validating the requesting party and the verification of the 
associated CA. Then, the CA creates a digital certificate for the requester, the 
most commonly used format for the certificates is X.509 [1], this certificate 
includes the requestor’s information, an expiration date for validity, and the CA’s 
digital signature. Furthermore, the CA creates a pair of keys (private key and 
public key); the private key is provided to the requesting party and the public 
key is stored in a repository that is publicly available to give all other parties 
Figure (2): Public Key Infrastructure Entities and Operations 
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access to the public keys. It is imperative to mention that the private key has to 
be kept secret and available to the owner only, never share a private key with 
anyone else and never send it through a public network like the Internet. 
Therefore, the sender uses the receiver’s public key that is publicly available 
through the repository to encrypt the message, and then the message could be 
safely sent through any network even the Internet because the only party that 
can decrypt the message and have access to its contents is the receiver by using 
the associated private key. The PKI builds a trusted relationship between its 
entities that is implemented to make sure that the public keys stored in the 
repository are trusted. Simply because parties that are going to use the PKI 
technology want to make sure that the people they are communicating with are 
who they claim they are, and the public keys used to encrypt the data are really 
the keys belonging to the parties they are willing to communicate with. 
Moreover, there is another issue to be pointed out, which is the digital 
signature part that takes place in PKI [43]. The private key is not only used to 
decrypt a message sent through the system, it is also used in creating a digital 
signature to confirm that the message has not been tampered with, in addition 
to, authenticating the origin of the message. To digitally sign a message, the 
sender passes the data through a hashing algorithm that returns a value that is 
unique and at the same time could not be reproduced [45]; this value is known as 
a one way hash. The next step is encrypting the one way hash using the sender’s 
private key, therefore, creating the digital signature. On the other hand, the 
receiver decrypts the digital signature using the sender’s public key that is 
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to get hold of the one way hash. The receiver then runs the data through the 
same hashing algorithm and compares the result to the one way hash that is 
pulled out of the digital signature of the sender to make sure the results are the 
same.  
As a result, the receiver can prove that the message received was sent by the 
owner of the public key and has not been tampered with. Figure (3) shows how 
the message encryption and decryption in addition to the digital signature 
works: 
 
After going through the digital signature method that authenticates the 
origin of the sender and ensures that the data has not been tampered with using 
the private key of the sender, an important question to ask here is what if the 
private key of the sender has been stolen? This could result in faking the 
sender’s identity, which will result in authenticating the wrong person. In this 
situation, the intruder will be authenticated successfully to the system and 
Figure (3): Digital signatures within the PKI  
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therefore have access to the data within the system so easily. Bearing in mind 
that it is possible to destroy the private key after knowing that the key has been 
stolen, yet, it depends on the moment the person discovers that the key has been 
stolen or used by someone else. 
 
2.2.3.3 PKI Advantages and Disadvantages 
Similar to any other technology, PKI has number of benefits, associated 
problems, and risks to be taken into consideration. It is very important to setup 
each system’s security requirements and decide on the level security that has to 
be implemented to secure each type of information that flows within the system, 
in addition, the people that are in charge of the system security must identify the 
security objectives and determine which information and which person needs to 
be secured and how. There are number of PKI vendors that provide various 
versions of PKI services in the market [51], however, these services vary in price 
and quality. Thus, the decision on what service to chose and which vendor to 
select must be done in an accurate way to implement the best PKI solutions to 
the business. 
Starting with PKI benefits, in addition to the believe that PKI is one of the 
best security methods available today because of its ability to secure the Internet 
transactions from most of the computer crimes like information or identity theft, 
information tampering, or other hackers problems, once the PKI software is 
configured the PKI solution is almost invisible to the user [48]. This indicates 
that this technology could be considered as user friendly because the user will 
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the rest of the work, which will make the technology more easy and acceptable to 
the users. Another benefit of PKI is gaining the users trust by relying on a third 
party like the CA to manage the digital certificates and keys [43], which will 
perhaps ends in having the user trust the third party in handling the 
information privacy.  
The most important benefit of establishing PKI is the ability to customise its 
use to fit within the application specifications, moreover, some additional toolkit 
approaches can be added to increase the level of customisation [49]. This 
indicates that the PKI appears to be one of the best security technologies that 
can ensure the organisations or industries different levels of security depending 
on each sector’s requirements. PKI relies on encryption between computers; the 
key difference in the encryption methods applied is where the encryption control 
occurs. The encryption can take place in two levels, the secure network level or 
the secure application levels; the decision is made by the business after studying 
the required security level for their system [48]. Table (1) shows the possible 
solutions in addition to listing the advantages and disadvantages related to each 
solution [48]. 
Table (1) lists number of levels where security can take control; each method 
has its advantages and disadvantages. The organisations or individuals need to 
make clear what their needs are and indicate where the most secure levels are 
suppose to be implemented because each business has different products and 
services, therefore, has different security requirements. 
Choosing to secure the network by implementing a VPN will definitely work well 
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difficulty takes place when it comes to performing transactions with customers 
or partners. Moreover, digital signatures are not provided, which means that it 
will be impossible to identify and authenticate the sender, only the machine can 
be identified to the system.  
Solution  Advantage  Disadvantage 
Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) 
 Able to create a 
secure network over 
the internet  
 Do not need to lease 
lines 
  Digital signatures not 
provided 
  Individuals not 
authenticated 
  Individuals do not have 
specific levels of trust 
Secure Socket 
Layers (SSL) 
 Compatible with 
popular web browsers 
 Digital signatures not 
provided 
 Client authentication 
cumbersome 
PKI Toolkits    High flexibility   Requires trained labour 
to implement and support 
 Implementation time 
 Legacy applications may 
not be compliant with 
toolkits 
 Requires ongoing 
relationship with vendor 
PKI Middleware    Client software 
provides SSL service  
  Legacy applications 
accommodated 
 
  Table (1): The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Security Solutions. 
 
The same problem exists with SSL, although the protocol has been widely 
accepted on the World Wide Web for authentication and encrypted 
communication between servers and client, no digital signatures are provided to 
ensure non-repudiation. Unless a proxy or a java applet is used for each 
connection to log on users and validate certificates there will be no possible way 
to avoid repudiation. On the other hand, the secure application level can be 
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require employee ongoing training, implementation time, and a long term 
relationship with the vendor, it is yet a very flexible way of application security. 
There are number of vendors in the market with different products and 
services, so organisations or individuals can agree with the vendor on the 
required security level and the choice of encryption software because simply 
these toolkits can be customised. The final solution listed in table (1) was PKI 
Middleware, where the software is used between the network and applications to 
meet the security objectives required by an organisation. Vendors provide this 
solution and claim it is good priced and have number of advantages comparing to 
other security solutions. 
As a result, every security solution has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The decision of the solution to be implemented depends on the requirements of 
each system, some systems require the implementation of one of these solutions 
and other systems require a combination of these solutions to better achieve the 
security objectives of their businesses.  
On the other hand, PKI like other technologies has some problems and risks 
associated with it. One of the problems is the consumers fear that governments 
might use the PKI technology as a way to invade their private and confidential 
information and transactions. Because of Escrow recovery the consumers do not 
have full trust in the PKI technology [52]. Escrow recovery is a function similar 
to the backup recovery of any system, however, the difference is in backup 
recovery the user requests the recovery of the private key or encrypted data, but 
in the Escrow recovery the third party can allow recovery of the user’s private 
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example the police in order for them to retrieve private information about the 
consumer without him/her knowing or authorising. Therefore, some consumers 
do not trust governments with access to this kind of confidential information, 
and conflicts between consumers and governments may arise every day and 
another regarding the privacy of their information and the governments’ 
willingness to monitor transactions for discovering criminal activities. 
Another important complexity that is associated with PKI implementation is 
interoperability. Cross-enterprise transactions are critical when it comes to 
organisations that rely on PKI as a security method, the reason behind this is 
every company, region, or even country has different standards and regulations. 
However, a study conducted by [38] has come up with a possible middleware 
mechanism that allows interoperability of PKI among different parties. 
According to [38], interoperability refers to interactions of PKI operations 
among components in PKI application systems, each interaction might happen in 
different level like interactions between PKI components, different PKIs, 
different PKI applications, or PKI application and the PKI. As a result, PKI 
interoperability is considered to be multi-dimensional, which may cause 
problems in different levels. Therefore, the suggested middleware mechanism by 
[38] provides the following: hides the implementation complexity of PKI 
components from applications, addresses the implementation diversity of PKIs 
from different trust domains and different industrial sectors, and finally 
implements a simple system interface to application developers that meets the 
security and communications needs of e-commerce applications. The solution 
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complexity and has enhanced the interoperability of PKI; yet, the awareness of 
this possible way of making PKI interoperable has to be wide spread among the 
PKI vendors and users to better defeat the interoperability complexities that are 
associated with the PKI implementation and cross-enterprise activities.   
The cost of relying on PKI as a security method is one of the problems that 
PKI users face [53], [51]. Generally, any low priced technology will most probably 
not include a full package of service like future upgrades or maintenance. It is 
the same with PKI, according to what the business requires the price of PKI will 
differ; if more options are required then the price of the product will be higher. 
There are number of vendors in the market, so businesses have the 
opportunity to go and search for the best offer by the best provider of PKI 
bearing in mind that logically the more experienced the vendor is the better the 
quality of the product is. Even if the price was relatively high, the PKI 
technology until today is better in terms of authentication than other methods, 
which at the end of the day worth what the business is going to pay for.  
Moreover, the CA employed in the PKI must be trusted by everybody; 
actually, there is no entity in the world that is trusted by all countries or every 
single individual. There are some different PKI models that have a single CA, a 
single CA plus RAs, an oligarchy of CAs, configured plus delegated CAs, 
anarchy, top-down, up-cross-down, and flexible bottom-up [54]. The writer in [54] 
has discussed the PKI models in details and stated how each model is 
constructed, how the CAs are organised in each model, and what the advantages 
and disadvantages of each model are. Then [54] concluded that the best model 
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the previous models are within the flexible bottom-up and it allows more flexible 
trust rules to the CAs than the strict up-cross-down model. Hence, the decision of 
which model to pick is not that easy, a single CA will be risky if that CA was 
attacked, issued a false certificate, or went bankrupt. In contrast, multiple CA 
models will increase the size of the certificates because more details must be 
stated within the certificates, moreover, every extra CA will provide an extra 
point of attack, which will reduce the overall system security.     
In addition to the problems, PKI has number of risks that could not be 
eliminated but some of them can at least be reduced to some extent. There are 
ten risks stated by [55], the risks are as follows: 
  Who do we trust, and for what? 
  Who is using my key? 
  How secure is the verifying computer? 
  Which John Robinson is he? 
  Is the CA an authority? 
  Is the user part of the security design? 
  Was it one CA or a CA plus a Registration Authority? 
  How did the CA identify the certificate holder? 
  How secure are the certificate practices? 
  Why are we using the CA process, anyway?   
 
Taking into account the risks stated above, the PKI technology looks really 
unsafe to be applied to e-commerce systems. Dealing with the previously listed 
risks is a huge management responsibility, the people managing the PKI 
technology must pay great attention to the risks associated to the usage of this 
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addition to, ensuring high levels of system recovery and backup in case one or 
more of these risks take place.  
 
2.2.3.4 Using Smart Cards with PKI 
When it comes to the phase of storing the digital certificates and the need of 
having physical access to a system, the smart card technology will most probably 
take place. The matter of storing and transporting the user certificates in 
addition to the server certificates is complicated and the decision by where the 
certificates are to be stored is critical. According to [50]:   
Users and servers both need certificates. Server certificates are best 
stored in Hard Security Modules (HSMs), but more often they are 
simply stored on the server hard drive. User certificates, however, 
are probably best kept off of the computer hard drive [50]. 
 
This implies that the server certificates will anyhow be stored in the server; 
however, the user certificates are most likely better stored on an external token 
like a smart card for example. Although the smart cards are one of the best ways 
of keeping the certificates safe, there are some weaknesses associated with this 
way of storing the certificates.  
One of the weaknesses is the smart cards standards [50], smart cards might 
not be able to talk to each other simply because there are few standards related 
to the smart card technology. Hence, different vendors and middleware might 
not have products that are able to work together, which will affect 
interoperability in a negative way.  
Another probable drawback of storing the certificates in a smart card is the 
fact that the user may possibly lose the card; in this case, the user must go 
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generate a new public key value with its related information and store it in the 
new certificate, then the user has to validate the new certificate. So losing the 
card will make the user go through the identification and validation processes all 
over again. 
 At the end of the day, every technology has its strengths and weaknesses; the 
smart card technology has proved to be one of the well secured technologies with 
high level of operability. If the smart card was well managed and well secured it 
could be the safest way to store the certificates and private keys of the users. 
Consequently, smart cards that are enabled with the PKI technology are able 
to protect the user’s information by making them accessible to the rightful owner 
only. Although hackers and thieves can attack any computer system or steal any 
smart card, the security that is enabled within the smart card technology is hard 
to beat. Also, it is important to mention that the smart cards operate within 
number of protocols that support the PKI technology like DES and RSA [41],  it 
depends on the protocol chosen by the system but the smart cards can work on 
symmetric and asymmetric protocols.  
In fact, the PKI technology services have the ability to fulfil most of the 
security requirements in any smart card information system, yet, some 
requirements like untraceability and anonymity especially in the context of e-
voting cannot be fulfilled. This is because PKI has a strong confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation features. The key management 
process where the users are identified physically to the CA during the 
registration phase, and then exchange their public keys through a public 
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via digital signatures does overcome the anonymity and untraceability features, 
which are required by some applications like e-voting. However, some 
modifications to the PKI protocols have been made recently to satisfy the highly 
specialised, applications specific, security requirements like anonymity and 
untraceability, for more details please refer to [25] and [56].  
As a result, the smart card is capable of handling number of mechanisms that 
support the PKI technology with high level of functionality and thus ensures 
high level of security.  
2.2.4 Biometrics 
Biometrics is one of the powerful security methods among the major emerging 
technologies and security methods in the current digital era, it is known as one 
of the best identification methods used to accurately authenticate a user. 
Apparently, people face various cases where they must identify and verify 
their personal identity to number of systems to gain access to the system 
components or facilities. This process is critical, failure to successfully identify 
and verify a user will result in harmful consequences. The previously mentioned 
security methods like PKI can only verify the user’s computer but cannot assure 
the user’s identity. However, Biometrics is the required method to identify and 
verify the transaction maker along with the password or token, which are the 
generally well known methods of authentication. 
  
2.2.4.1 What is Biometrics? 
The Biometrics method is based on the fact that a person possesses certain 
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which are used to confirm a user’s claimed identity rather than a forgettable 
code or password [57], [58]. Biometrics terminology was defined by [59] as “the 
automated use of physical or behavioural characteristics to determine or verify 
the identity of an individual” [59]. Also, Biometrics can be defined as “the science 
of recognising a person on the basis of behavioural and physical characteristics. 
Biometrics relies on who you are by one of any number of unique 
characteristics that you cannot lose or forget”[60]. Therefore, Biometrics is 
something you are, it is a powerful security method that identifies and 
authenticates the user without requiring the user to carry evidence like a 
passport or to remember the password or PIN. However, this does not mean that 
users can walk around without other evidence as a backup in case the Biometrics 
system fails.  
For a biometric evidence to be ideal it has to have number of characteristics 
that fulfil number of requirements [61], [62], [57], the main requirements are the 
following: 
  Universality: the biometric element has to exist in all people. In this respect, 
not all biometric elements are equivalent and the rate of distinguishing one 
person from another is very different, according to the type of biometrics 
used. 
  Distinctiveness: the biometric element must be distinctive to each person, for 
example, no two persons should share the biometric. Fingerprints have a high 
diversification, even fingerprints of identical twins are different; moreover, 
the probability of two persons having the same iris is estimated as negligible. 
The most distinctive elements seem to be DNA, iris, retina and fingerprint. 
  Permanence: the property of the biometric element has to remain invariant 
and not alterable over time for each person. While some biometrics such as 
iris remains stable over decades, other biometrics like a person’s face or Chapter 2 Literature Review                39 
       
signature’s dynamics change over time. Besides, fingers are frequently 
injured or cracked. 
  Collectibility: the biometric characteristic should be quantitatively 
measurable and readily presentable to a sensor, on other words, easy to 
collect. Retina scan and DNA analysis are quite intrusive, as opposed to face 
related characteristics and fingerprints, which are easy to obtain. 
  Performance: accuracy, speed, robustness, and resource requirements for 
successful recognition should be satisfied, in order for a biometrics system to 
be practical and efficient. 
  Acceptability: it is the extent to which a system is harmless and accepted by 
the intended users, and their willingness to use it on a daily basis without 
feeling annoyed or invaded. 
  Circumvention: refers to the robustness of a system against various 
fraudulent methods and attacks, the ability of fraudulent methods to fool the 
system must be negligible. 
 
2.2.4.2 Biometric System Components and Process 
Biometric systems convert data derived from physical or behavioural human 
characteristics into templates, then compare the live templates with the stored 
templates, after the matching process produces the results, the biometric system 
takes decisions. Usually, every biometric system includes three major 
components [26]: 
  A mechanism to detect, scan, or capture the image of a living person’s 
biometric characteristic. 
  Software for storing, processing, analysing, and comparing the live image 
with the stored image or template. 
  An interface with the applications system that will use the result of 
matching to confirm the person’s identity.    
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Enrolment: is the process where the user submits the biometric sample or 
samples to the system via different means according to the type of the biometric 
sample. The method works by capturing a live biometric image of the user at the 
point of interaction with the system, then the image is processed using 
biometrical algorithms to extract the features from the image and produce a 
template. Finally, the template is stored in a central database or in an external 
token like a smart card [26]. The enrolment process takes place in both one-to-
many and many-to-many systems [59], cases where users face problems with 
biometric systems, they need to re-enrol to be able to submit other biometric 
samples. 
Verification: The biometrics method is used in two types of recognition, which 
are either identification or verification [63], [57]. Identification is a one-to-many 
comparison; it verifies if a person exists within a known population, therefore, 
the biometric sample presented by the person is compared to with existing 
samples in a central database [64]. The identification process confirms that the 
person providing the biometric sample is not enrolled with another identity and 
is not on a predetermined list of prohibited persons [26].  
The verification process is a one-to-one comparison; it confirms that the 
submitted biometric evidence belongs to the person submitting it [26]. The user 
provides a live biometric image captured using a scanner or a reader, and then a 
live biometric template is created using special algorithms. After that, the live 
template is compared with the previously captured and stored biometric 
template in the smart card or the database, which was extracted during the user 
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between the two templates takes place to ensure the verification or 
authentication of the user. The result of the matching process determines 
whether the person providing the biometric sample is who he/she claims to be or 
not. 
 
The system performance in terms of identification accuracy can be evaluated 
using the false acceptance rate (FAR) and the false rejection rate (FRR) [65], [3], 
[57]. FAR records the situations where an impostor is accepted, on the other 
hand, FRR records the situations where a user or a correct person is incorrectly 
rejected. The system designers set this numeric score to put up with the desired 
accuracy level in the system, they have to tune the system sensitivity to FAR and 
FRR to be able to meet the system security requirements.   
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Furthermore, a biometric smart card is “a processor-based device which can 
be used to authenticate a user with a server via biometrics, there are several 
variants of such cards which can store the template only, perform feature 
extraction, or perform matching only” [58]. This indicates that the organisation 
has the ability to choose the kind of smart card that is equipped with the 
biometrics according to its needs.  
As mentioned in the previous section, there are some important biometrics 
features that should be pointed out in order for the users to be aware when using 
the biometrics scheme, the features are the following: universality, uniqueness, 
reliability, collectability, performance, acceptability, forge resistance, and 
permanence [63]. In addition, not all biological features are suitable for personal 
identification [27]; the feature must satisfy the following criteria before it can be 
practically employed: 
  Measured effectively 
  Capable of being uniquely associated with a particular individual 
  Widely distributed within the population 
  Not possible to alter the feature with fraudulent intent 
  Amount of reference data generated must be small 
  Correct measurement of the feature must always be possible 
  Both the measurement method and the feature must be acceptable to 
users  
This points out that unless the feature satisfies the previous criteria, it is not 
considered to be an acceptable biometric feature to be applied to the smart card 
system. From this point, it is very important to take into account all the 
requirements of the biometrics method before and after implementing the 
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method is going to achieve successful results once employed in the smart card 
system or any other information system that requires high level of security.   
A study conducted by [66] proposed two signature systems that rely on 
biometrics, PKI, and smart cards. In one signature system, the cryptographic key 
is stored in the smart card and is only accessible when the signer’s extracted 
fingerprint features match the signer’s stored template. Certainly, this system is 
able to prevent illegal access to the private keys that are stored in the smart 
card, however, [66] stated that the fingerprint matching process is time 
consuming, and storing a template requires considerable storage space, which 
shows two disadvantages that stand against the successful implementation of 
this system. 
In the other signature system, the keys are generated by combining the 
signer’s fingerprint features, check bits, and a memorable key as named by [66]. 
This system has no matching process and no keys stored on the smart card. 
Moreover, there is generally more than one public key in this system; some 
pseudo public keys except a real one exist in the system. Therefore, this system 
does not require great storage space. Yet, this system still requires the 
development of some algorithms to be able to process all the required functions. 
So, both systems have advantages and disadvantages but trying to overcome the 
disadvantages of the systems may end up creating one of the best ways of 
combining the biometrics, PKI, and smart cards schemes in one system, in 
addition to providing a solution to better secure the private key. 
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2.2.4.3 Classification and Types of Biometrics 
Biometrics can be split into two main categories physiological and 
behavioural biometrics, it identifies an individual by how one is or what one 
does. 
Physiological Biometrics:  
This category is based on direct measurements and data derivation of a part 
of the human body [59]. The physical characteristic is considered relatively 
stable, usually it is unchangeable and at the same time unalterable. Examples 
are fingerprint, facial recognition, retinal scans, iris pattern, DNA, or hand 
geometry.   
Behavioural Biometrics: 
In turn, this category is based on measurements and data derived from an 
action, and indirectly measure characteristics of the human body [59]. The 
behavioural characteristic is more a reflection on an individual's physiological 
makeup. Such common examples are signature, voice recognition, gate, 
keystroke dynamics. 
Fingerprint: 
The use of a fingerprint as a biometric evidence is one of the oldest 
techniques, best-known biometric identification method based on a physical 
feature, and the most widely spread biometric method, since it presents 
relatively few problems in terms of user acceptance and technical difficulty 
despite the common criminal stigma [57], [3]. In addition, it has been estimated 
that it is very hard to find two persons with the same fingerprint, 
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that even fingerprints of identical twins are different and so is the fingerprints of 
each finger of each hand in the same person [62].  
Fingerprints are graphical flow like ridges and valleys that take place on 
humans finger tips [65], most fingerprint recognition systems follow the 
minutiae based approach [64], other non-minutiae based approaches are directly 
based on the gray-scale images. The minutiae are the bifurcations and endings of 
the ridge lines, the feature extractor finds those bifurcations and endings from 
the input fingerprint images [65], [64]. Number of algorithms can be used to 
extract the minutiae, however, the performance of currently available algorithms 
relies on the quality of input fingerprint images, where fingerprint images may 
not always have well defined ridge structures [65].  
The current electronic fingerprint sensors require the user to place the 
fingertip on a transparent plate, where a camera is placed under the plate to be 
able to scan the skin surface of the fingertip without any contact [27]. 
Alternatively, there are number of live scan imaging sensors that can be used to 
capture the fingerprints like ultrasonic sensors or semiconductor-based 
capacitive sensors [27], [65]. 
Fingerprint verification can be a good choice for many businesses or projects 
[3], they are expected to lead the biometric applications, the reasons behind that 
are simply because fingerprints are relatively low in cost, easy to integrate the 
fingerprint devices with the operating system in any business, and explaining to 
the users at the same time training the employees is an easy step that does not 
require lots of effort. 
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Retinal Pattern: 
The human retina is an area at the back of the eyeball, which has a pattern of 
blood vessels, the pattern is formed by veins beneath the retinal surface situated 
at the back of the eye [67], this pattern is unique, and therefore is considered to 
be an accurate and feasible characteristic for recognition [3]. This technology 
involves analysing the retina pattern, to capture the pattern, a retina scanner is 
used, it is a specialised device that scans the eye from a close range [62]. The 
technique involves projecting a low intensity light source through the pupil, the 
light reflected by the retina is then collected by a camera, the recorded image 
data is then sent to a computer for analysis [27]. To be able to get hold of a fixed 
portion of the retinal vasculature needed for identification, the users must place 
their eyes very close to the scanner and focus on a predetermined spot in the 
visual filed in order to be identified [62].  
Therefore, retinal scanning is one of the most accurate biometric methods, 
since it has the ability to uniquely identify a person with a very high degree of 
probability, thus, number of retinal scanning systems have been installed in 
several highly secure environments such as military places and prisons. 
However, the cooperation of users in retinal scanning has a low degree of 
acceptance, since they must place their eyes very close to the scanner, which may 
raise the subject of anxiety, discomfort, and fear of infection [57], [67]. In 
addition, the retinal scanners are considered to be expensive [62], which is 
another disadvantage of this biometrics method. Therefore, although the 
technology works very well, it has not been widely accepted by users. 
 Chapter 2 Literature Review                47 
       
Iris:   
People are sometimes confused with retinal scanning and iris scanning. The 
iris is a variable diaphragm that is responsible of controlling the amount of light 
reaching the retina in the eye [27], the iris is known as “the annular region of the 
eye bounded by the pupil and the sclera (white of the eye) on either side” [62]. It 
is basically the coloured ring of tissue that surrounds the pupil, which comes in 
different colours and styles. It is similar to the retina because it is a biological 
feature that is unique to each individual, which offers a very high capability of 
distinguishing individuals. According to [57], the probability that two irises 
would be identical by random chance is approximately 10-35. Even the 
individual’s left and right eyes have different iris features [57], which certainly 
assures that the iris is a unique biological feature that has a great ability to 
differentiate individuals. 
In comparison with the retinal scan, the iris scan can be performed at a 
greater distance than the retinal scan because the process is simpler, retinal 
scan uses lasers that focus on the back of the eye, while iris scan zooms on the 
front. Iris scan makes the scanning less intrusive, as a result, the individual 
feels more comfortable.  
An iris scanner is equipped with a digital camera that takes the picture of the 
eye where an infrared light is illuminated to be able to take the picture [67]. The 
data analysis and evaluation is very much similar to the retina scan, moreover, 
the iris is more readily imaged than retina; it is very hard to tamper iris texture 
details at the same time it is easy to detect artificial irises [62]. Eye scanning is 
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area of biometric research because of its promise for high scan accuracy. Yet, iris 
based identification and authentication systems are expensive to implement and 
require significant user acceptance and participation. The hardware is several 
times more expensive than face, finger, or palm recognition systems. Although 
iris or retina scanners are the most expensive biometric technologies, they are 
the most difficult to fool.  
Hand geometry: 
Is a biometric identification technique that is based on the measurements of 
the hand or part of the hand, these measurements can be based on number of 
features such as the shape of the hand, the finger spacing, the finger length and 
width, or the finger diameter and fingertip radius [62], [3]. This biometric 
technique is relatively easy to use; the user only has to place the hand on the 
scanner, which then performs the measurements. In addition, the hand geometry 
templates generated from the scan are comparatively small about 9 bytes, which 
requires low storage area [68], therefore, restricting their application to simple 
authentication purposes only.  
Regarding the accuracy of hand geometry, it can be very high if desired. This 
method can be easily integrated with other systems and processes, so, 
organizations are using this biometric technique in various scenarios [3]. For 
example, using hand geometry in applications like time and attendance 
recording for employees appears to be popular.    
Facial Recognition: 
People are without doubt used to being recognised by their faces, that is how 
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photo attached to it, moreover, face recognition does not require great human 
interaction, so it is one of the biometric methods that are considered to be 
natural and easily accepted by individuals.  
According to [57], face recognition can be employed using still images, 
multiple still images, or video sequence. The system normally uses a standard 
digital camera to take a picture of the face, which is a still image, or may use a 
digital video camera to capture a sequence of images from different angles [67], 
[60]. Usually, face recognition systems rely on still images; however, the current 
systems are improving and starting to make use of the video cameras to capture 
a sequence of pictures in order to enhance the authentication process. Perhaps 
the reduction of video capturing devices prices helped the organisations and 
systems make use of them [57].  
The approaches of face recognition are normally based on the location and 
shape of the facial features [62]. The features like eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips, 
chin, and skin colour can be changed during a certain period of time because of 
aging like wrinkles or surgical operations, moreover, external factors like 
eyeglasses, lenses, makeup, beards, hair style and colour, and the way the 
picture was taken including the illumination and angles may also have great 
effect on the results of the face recognition process. Furthermore, it is preferred 
that the stored image is three-dimensional (3D) [69], it has been declared that 
3D has more advantages in comparison with 2D, the advantages stated by [69] 
are as follows: 
  Improved ability to process face samples acquired from non-frontal angles, 
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  Improved ability to operate in suboptimal lighting, reducing error rates 
and environmental restrictions. 
 
Although the advantages seem convincing, there are still some disadvantages 
with 3D face recognition. They include the need for specialized acquisition 
devices and processes, and 3D images also require large sample size and 
processing power [69]. Face recognition is widely accepted; less intrusive, easy to 
collect, however, it cannot yield a high probability of accuracy in identifying a 
person when compared to other biometric methods. Therefore, accuracy will be 
the main reason of restricting the use of face recognition unless improvements on 
devices to ensure better accuracy take place.  
Typing rhythm (Keystroke): 
The manners in which different individuals type characters on a keyboard 
appeared to be different, the term keystroke dynamics was defined by [70] as: 
“Keystroke dynamics is a technique that monitors a user's fluctuating typing 
speed patterns” [70]. The typing rhythm or keystroke dynamics determine the 
time required to press a key, release a key, and pause between a key and another 
on the keyboard, once this time is recorded, a special algorithm is used to 
produce a biometric template to be used for future authentication. The main 
advantage of this type of behavioural biometric is that it does not require any 
additional hardware device [27], the method requires a keyboard and a 
computer, which is almost available everywhere. 
Voice:  
The voice is a behavioural biometric that can be used to identify a person; it is 
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speech style and different voice, the invariance of the characteristics of the 
human speech is due to the dissimilarity of the shape and size of the appendages 
(vocal tracts, mouth, nasal cavities, lips) in every person [62], which has an 
influence on the voice of the person. Voice biometrics analyse the inflections of 
the person's voice [67], to able to collect the voice data, the system requires a 
microphone and a computer. The system asks the person to speak out one or 
more sentences into a microphone, this technique is known as text-dependent 
[57]. By providing different sentences each time, the person can prevent the 
system from being attacked by a playback of a previous recording of a genuine 
speech [57], for example, an attacker can record the identification session on a 
magnetic tape or a digital disk and play it back to the system. Therefore, a 
different sentence must be spoken each time the person is authenticated to be 
able to avoid a recorded speech from being played back to the system.   
Although the speech of each individual is distinctive, it may not contain 
enough invariant details to authenticate people on a wide range and for a long 
period of time [62]. One of the reasons behind this is the person's bodily 
condition, for example, an illness like cold or flu can affect a person's voice. 
Another reason is the acquisition device and the environment, in which the first 
identification session was collected, the quality of the microphone has a great 
impact on the voice recorded. Furthermore, voice recognition is sensitive to noise, 
all background noises will affect the voice collected for the identification session, 
thus, all noises must be filtered. 
Like other biometrics voice recognition has its drawbacks such as peoples' 
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Otherwise, it is generally accepted by users and considered to be a friendly way 
of collecting evidence for authentication purposes in comparison with other 
biometrics.  
Signature: 
It is one of the most commonly used identification methods, people use the 
signature to prove their identity on daily bases, the reason behind using 
signature as an identification method is because each person has a unique style 
of handwriting [62]. People sign on personal documents, banking transactions, 
credit cards and their receipts, legal documents, approval letters, invoices, etc. It 
has been proved that no two signatures of a person are exactly identical, the 
emotional and physical status of a human affects the way the signature id made 
each time [62], [70].  
Signature recognition comes in two methods, static (offline) and dynamic 
(online). The static method is the most commonly used method since ages, the 
evaluation in the method takes place after the signature is written, because this 
method relies on the geometric features of the signature [62]. On the other hand, 
the dynamic method relies on both geometric features and dynamic features, 
therefore, measurements are made while the signature is being written [62]. In 
this method, the user writes the signature in a digitised tablet, stylus-operated 
PDA, a tablet PC, or similar digitised input device [71]. The dynamic method 
measures features like speed, velocity, acceleration, pressure, time, azimuth, 
altitude, etc [57]. In comparison with the static method, the dynamic has the 
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signature has been written, which makes it more difficult for anyone to duplicate 
other person’s signature. 
The signature recognition method is accepted by people, and can be easily 
incorporated into an existing system for identification and authentication 
purposes [62]. In addition, it is almost not possible to replace any of the elements 
of a biometric method; however, the signature recognition method is not similar 
to the other biometric methods because people can change their signature if 
required. This feature gives the signature recognition a great advantage when 
compared to other biometric identification methods.  
Each identification system has different requirements, specifications, 
limitations, and levels of security. The selection of the appropriate biometric 
method for each system depends on number of factors like the user profile, 
environmental conditions, levels of accuracy required for verification, 
interoperability, the overall system cost and capabilities, and cultural issues that 
might affect user acceptance [26], [3]. Table (2) shows a comparison of the 
biometric types or technologies, with their performance rated against different 
characteristics. 
The biometric technologies have different ratings according to each 
characteristic, the behavioural biometrics are easy to use and widely accepted by 
users, but at the same time have number of error incidences that may affect the 
stability and level of security provided. In contrast, physical biometrics have 
higher levels of accuracy, at the same time have less user acceptance rates and 
are more difficult to use. 
 Chapter 2 Literature Review                54 
       
Characteristic  Fingerprints  Retina  Iris  Hand 
Geometry  Face  Voice  Signature 
Ease of Use  High  Low  Medium  High  Medium  High  High 
Error 
Incidence 
Dryness, 
dirt, age 
Glasses  Lighting 
Hand 
injury, 
age 
Lighting, 
age, 
glasses, 
hair 
Noise, 
Sickness 
Changing 
signature 
Accuracy  High  Very High  Very High  High  High  High  High 
User 
Acceptance  Medium  Medium  Medium  Medium  Medium  High  High 
Required 
Security 
Level 
High  High  Very High  Medium  Medium  Medium  Medium 
Long-Term 
Stability 
High  High  High  Medium  Medium  Medium  Medium 
 
 
Therefore, the selection of the appropriate biometric technology relies on 
many factors, mainly on the systems requirements, levels of security, and type of 
users. According to the factors, the organisations get to choose among the 
available biometric technologies.  
 
2.2.4.4 Biometrics Advantages and Disadvantages 
Biometrics is an authentication method that assures who is gaining access to 
the system; it authenticates the user not the machine. Therefore, this security 
method has number of advantages like offering a high level of security and 
convenience. By using the biometrics method, it is quite easy to check if a person 
has more than one identity [61], the biometric method is not based off a standard 
true or false system; it includes levels of security that accept the relative 
closeness of the characteristic [72]. This security criterion offers good levels of 
authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality in the identification system.  
Table (2): Comparison of Biometric technologies 
Source: [3] 
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It is important to mention that the biological features cannot be transferred 
to another person and at the same time not modifiable [65]. In addition, 
biometrics cannot be lost, forgotten, guessed, stolen, or shared because they are 
part of the human’s body or a behavioural characteristic in the human that no 
other person can use [61]. The system extracts the features from the biometric 
sample and transforms it into templates, a template cannot be used to recreate 
the original biometric sample provided earlier, it only has details about the 
user’s characteristics [72]. This gives the biometrics method the ability to 
guarantee information integrity and provide a greater degree of security in 
comparison with other security methods. 
Along with the great benefits that the biometrics method offers, there are 
number of disadvantages. Every system has its pros and cons, one of the 
drawbacks of biometrics is not being able to keep biometrics secret, it is public, 
people can record voices, take pictures, lift fingerprints from anywhere, etc [72]. 
If the biometric evidence have been stolen or miss used, then it is not possible to 
replace it [61]. This is a major drawback of biometrics because in some cases and 
under certain circumstances fake biometrics can be issued, it is quite hard but 
intruders can go around the system security method and fool the system with 
fake biometrics. In the case of stolen biometrics, users may want to know what 
happened and what will happen to their biometric data since it is associated to 
their identity [72]. 
As stated by [72], the biometrics technology is costly, not everyone can afford 
such an advanced security system. For example, iris and retina scanning tend to 
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Moreover, biometrics scans can cause inconvenience for the user, some types 
of biometrics are considered to be intrusive, other types require preparation and 
repetition of scan. The users must be knowledgeable with the scanning devices 
and educated about the biometric method used in the identification system they 
are dealing with, they must also accept to use this type biometrics to be able to 
overcome the inconvenience. 
 
2.3 Smart Card Applications 
In order to successfully implement a smart card system it is vital to have the 
overall know-how of the system and its requirements. In fact, [16] states that the 
smart card industry can be represented by the following three levels: 
technologies, core products, and applications. Figure (5) represents these levels: 
 
 
 
Figure (5): Smart Card Industry levels. 
Source: [16] 
 
Using smart cards as a tool to access required confidential information or 
carry out a financial transaction brings to mind the importance of having the 
smart card operate in a secure environment. So, it is quite essential to know 
what each card holds access to, how confidential and private this data is, what 
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are the consequences and costs  of losing this data, how long does it take an 
intruder  to gain access to the data via the smart card, etc.  
Various reasons rely behind people committing computer crimes. Card theft 
or fraud is common these days because simply people have different motivations. 
“A psychological explanation for fraud would appear simple—greed and 
dishonesty.” [73]. Some people are just lacking honesty and integrity! This 
depends on the people’s background, behaviour, and social situation. Others have 
motivations like curiosity, ego, intelligence, monetary gain, revenge, blackmail, 
destruction, exploitation, challenge, or competition [74]. All those motivations 
can somehow lead people to commit card theft or fraud; hence, it is hard to 
control people’s behaviour or attitude towards using a particular technology. The 
thing that is achievable is making the smart card users aware of the ways they 
can help protect their own information in addition to the security methods 
applied.  
It is also crucial to point out the expenditure status of the smart card market 
during the coming years, as illustrated in figure (6) below; the identity 
management market expenditure forecast to 2011 will probably reach about 
1400 million pounds [2]. This indicates that the market is growing dynamically 
and the organisations are rushing into using smart cards as a tool to access the 
required data to their information systems. Also, the graph shows the different 
types of smart cards used and the other types that are planned to be used in the 
coming years.  
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Therefore, a well secured smart card system must be one of the major issues 
to be looked at. The following chapters of the thesis enclose a demonstration of 
the smart card applications, the value of data stored in the smart card or 
accessed through the smart card, the time needed for the user to discover that 
the card has been lost or stolen, and finally the motivation behind the 
willingness to attack the smart card system.  
2.3.1 Smart Cards in Payment Systems 
Smart cards are widely used these days as a payment method; many well 
known and large banks have explored the significance of smart card technology 
in payment systems, therefore, transformed their credit and debit cards from 
magnetic-stripe cards into smart cards. Recently, the use of smart cards with 
smart card chip reader is being encouraged by the banks as a method of reducing 
card cloning crimes [75]. In fact, a credit or debit card user has to be 
knowledgeable of the smart card PIN, and the point of sale (POS) terminal 
Figure (6): Identity management market expenditure forecast to 2011 
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reading the smart card chip on the card has to verify and authenticate the user 
for the transaction to successfully take place. 
Using the smart cards in payment systems can be classified into three types. 
They are used as credit cards where payments are made after rendering a 
service, debit cards where payments are made directly from the account, and 
electronic purses where payments are made before rendering a service.  
It is also significant to mention the EMV specification, which is a product of the 
joint efforts of three leading card companies Europay, MasterCard, and Visa 
[27]. The main purpose of this specification is to ensure the compatibility of the 
cards and card readers, which will allow the consumers to use the three major 
companies’ smart cards interchangeably [76]. This indicates that the EMV 
specification will provide a common and internationally recognised standard for 
global interoperability. According to ACI World Wide: 
The majority of financial institutions worldwide that issue credit or 
debit cards and acquire financial transactions will migrate their 
existing magnetic stripe cards and transaction processing 
infrastructures to implement an infrastructure compliant with the 
EMV standard. [77] 
 
This specification is considered to be a milestone that will affect the future 
of the smart card usage all around the world. 
All those specifications and standards are taking place to facilitate the usage of 
the smart card technology. Yet, a huge concern still exists, which is credit card, 
debit card, and e-purse card fraud is a common phenomena. By breaching the 
system through the smart card the intruder will gain access to the user’s 
account, therefore, uses the user’s cash and funds for his/her own benefit. Thus, 
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been lost or stolen as soon as possible in order for the bank or the card issuer to 
cancel the card; otherwise, the thief will start using the card and spending as 
much money as possible from the card holder’s account. The moment the card 
holder reports the incident, he/she is no longer responsible for unauthorised 
charges made on their card. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) states that: 
If you report the loss within two business days after you realize your 
card is missing, you will not be responsible for more than $50 for 
unauthorized use. However, if you don’t report the loss within two 
business days after you discover the loss, you could lose up to $500 
because of an unauthorized transfer. [78] 
 
Therefore, the card holder has to be careful when using the card, according 
to the financial institutions law the card holder has maximum 48 hours to report 
that the card is lost or stolen. This indicates that the intruder needs very little 
time to gain access to the card holder’s account and benefit from the money 
stored in the account. The card issuer or the bank can support the user only if 
the user acts as quickly as possible, otherwise, the user will lose his money [78]. 
As a result, using the smart card as a credit or debit card is a great issue that 
risks the card holder’s most sensitive belonging which is money.  
2.3.2 Smart Cards in E-Government Systems (ID Cards) 
The expansion of governmental activity to secure and verify citizen identity 
and at the same time work against identity fraud is a worldwide phenomenon. 
For the past decade, governments began to implement projects that support chip 
technology to secure and authenticate citizens as well as achieve other benefits 
such as improved efficiency and border throughput. Thus, the main purpose 
behind electronic government (e-government) systems is the ease of access to 
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agencies. The governments believe the using the smart identification card will 
play a major role in facilitating the e-government activities and communication 
among all parties. 
The identification smart card will support services such as renewing driving 
licence, viewing birth certificates, various governmental forms, etc [79], [80]. The 
smart identification card can also support the e-voting technology, which is 
mainly practicing various election processes through the internet [81]. 
Furthermore, the smart identification card is considered to be a valid travel 
document for trips among the countries that allow such use of smart cards and e-
gates because it conforms to the international standards for electronic smart 
cards [80]. As a result, citizens can successfully enter any country in the world 
that supports e-gate. This is such a huge issue that requires a highly secured 
system. People with motivations like terrorism or illegal immigration can breach 
the system and benefit from this technology. 
In addition to supporting the previously listed e-government activities, the 
smart identification card holds various confidential and private data of the card 
holder, mainly, the citizen. The most common data to be stored in the smart card 
could be the citizen identification number, name, date of birth, address, personal 
photograph, occupation, signature, and fingerprint. Additional data could be 
available to view at the smart card depending on each country government 
requirements. Some countries have the driving licences, visas, registration 
certificates, and passport number stored in the identification smart card 
memory, however, they implement different security level access to these types 
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Although the reasons behind using the smart identification card is primarily 
protecting the public, protecting the family, protecting the community, and 
making life easier [82], the loss or steal of the card will give the intruder the 
opportunity to access various governmental services including the risk of using 
the citizen’s identity to commit different types of crimes.  
2.3.3 Smart Cards in Health Systems 
Managing the patient record through an integrated information system has 
been a great concern for the researchers and practitioners during the past 
decades; many attempts took place during the past few years to fully 
computerise the management of patient health record. The aim behind these 
attempts was to make the patient's health record available across a network to 
hospitals, surgeries, billing agencies, and health insurance companies. The 
availability of patient health records across all the concerned parties will 
contribute to the improvement, ease, and quick delivery of the health care 
services. According to [83] the fundamental concept behind the health system 
design is that the patient is the centre of activity for data collection, the system 
is suppose to be able to provide the answers to the 5 W's (who, what, where, 
when, and why) together with intervention and service result reports. Therefore, 
the patient's data must be stored in a multipurpose database and in a retrievable 
format.  
For greatest accuracy of patient data collection procedure, outcome data 
should be captured as close to the source as possible, including direct data 
capture from patients themselves and from their families. In order to make 
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1) Store data in multipurpose databases;  
2) Share data across different platforms;  
3) Link outcome data to other data that might influence or explain outcomes;  
4) Allow querying of the data by authorized personnel;  
5) Protect patient confidentiality. 
 
These requirements are important for implementing an effective health 
information system. However, with the increasing demand of providing access to 
the patient's record anytime, anywhere, and as quickly as possible the smart 
cards is most probably the best solution. The smart card provides number of 
benefits such as easy mobility, and storing a good amount of data and 
information related to the patient. Because of the processing capabilities of the 
smart card, the development of active programs is effectively designed to easily 
manage the patient record.  
Generally, the smart card gives access to the database that holds record of all 
the specific details of the patient, through the given access, the required 
information for the patient could be retrieved. Yet, for quick access to the 
information the smart card holds number of important information about the 
patient medical record, it contains information like the patient's personal 
identification details such as name, surname, identification number, date of 
birth, place of birth, gender, contact numbers, home and work address, next of 
kin names and contact numbers, and blood type. It also holds record of the 
patient's drug allergies, regularly prescribed drugs, immunisations record, and 
health insurance details.  
A study by [85] in Taiwan to investigate the first phase of the national health 
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and non-visible information. The visible information contains the cardholder’s 
name, identification number, date of birth, photo (optional), and the card serial 
number (a unique number assigned to each card) [85]. On the other hand, the 
non-visible information that is stored inside the card can be divided into four 
segments: basic data, health insurance data, medical data and public health 
administration data.  
The basic data segment stores the identification information for both the 
cardholder and the card itself [85]. The health insurance data segment contains 
the cardholder’s insurance information and service data for insurance claims. 
The medical data segment is to record important physician orders, prescriptions 
and drug allergies. The public health administration data segment contains 
personal data related to public health such as vaccination records and organ 
donation notes [85]. 
As a result, the visible data is mostly about personal identification and the 
non-visible part contains the patient's medical information and health insurance 
details. This way of classifying the information that is on the health smart card 
seems to be the most relevant and effective way. Therefore, having all these 
details stored on a smart card, in addition to, gaining access to the main 
database to retrieve full medical reports gives the health smart card a great 
responsibility of holding seriously confident and sensitive type of information 
especially when it comes to insurance coverage details.  
2.3.4 Smart Cards in Loyalty Systems 
One of the modern ways of gaining customer loyalty or even retention to a 
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card. It is well known that loyalty programs practiced by businesses are mainly 
used as a competitive weapon in today’s huge and competitive business 
environment; in fact, the main objective that relies behind issuing the customer 
a loyalty smart card is to improve customer retention and increase spending [86]. 
Proving to the customer that the business cares about the number of times 
the customer visited the shop, amount spent during the visits, and type of 
products and services purchased will result in strengthening the relationship 
with the customer, therefore, gaining a competitive edge among rivals. However, 
a study conducted by [87] shows that “When holders are satisfied with the 
reward scheme of the loyalty card programme, they are more loyal and less price 
sensitive than unsatisfied card holders” [87]. This indicates that the business 
must build a rewarding loyalty card programme before the establishment of the 
loyalty cards. Some businesses start accumulating points from the amount spent 
by the customer, others accumulate points according to the number of visits, it 
mainly depends on the type of product or service provided by each business, at 
the end of the day what matters to the customer is the rewards that are going to 
be gained after using the loyalty card.  
Another main reason behind issuing a customer loyalty card is monitoring 
and gaining knowledge of the customer’s buying behaviour,   according to [88] 
the loyalty cards “provide a clear sign of the great thirst for customer 
knowledge”[88]. In order for the businesses to acquire such knowledge, they need 
to collect some personal information from the customer to issue the card and 
then save the information in the loyalty smart card. The information will most 
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  Name of the cardholder 
  His/her address 
  His/her household size 
  Date of subscription 
  Total number of all shopping visits 
  Total amount spent since subscription 
 
Some additional information could be the date of birth and the contact 
details of the customer like the electronic mail address and telephone numbers. 
This type of personal information stored in a loyalty smart card may end up 
having the customer in a risky status if the card has been lost or stolen. Simply, 
if any one was able to read the information stored in the card through a smart 
card reader, then thief can introduce himself/herself to the company as if he/she 
was the real owner of the card and therefore redeems the points collected by the 
card holder or even buys products and services from the company if the card 
stores monetary value.  
A good example for such a case is the well known loyalty smart card 
generated by one of the largest stores in the UK, which is Boots advantage card. 
This card stores the subscribers personal details, in addition to, the accumulated 
points depending on the amount spent on the store, the customer collects 4 
points for each ₤1 spent in any Boots store all around the UK [89]. Because of the 
monetary gain that the customer can have while using Boots advantage card, the 
possibility of losing the card or card theft and having the points redeemed by 
someone else is high, the reason is mainly the card is not associated with any 
security method like a password or biometric evidence to proof the identity of the 
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lost is stated. The review says that on a recent visit to Boots the card holder 
discovered that the advantage card is missing from his wallet. He contacted 
Boots to be told that his points had been redeemed, this had taken place because 
there is no ID check on point redemption[90]. It is easy and almost undetectable 
for dishonest people including the staff to redeem the card holder’s points. This 
example shows how easy it is to benefit from other people loyalty smart cards if 
the card was not well protected. As a result, even if the smart card does not 
contain a very valuable amount of information like banking details, it is quite 
important to have the card holder’s information secure to some extent in order to 
better protect the card holder’s privacy and gain his/her trust.    
2.3.5 Smart Cards as Prepaid Cards in different systems 
The smart cards were used for decades ago as a sort of a prepaid card that 
contains a small amount of memory, which is used to store phone call units or TV 
subscription fees. The rapid expansion of smart card as prepaid cards was in 
Europe due to the huge amount of phone card users [91]. The prepaid smart card 
was also adopted in the transportation industry; in fact, the UK transport 
industry realised the real benefits behind adopting the smart card ticketing 
program and produced the so called London’s Oyster cards [92], [93]. The usage 
of the Oyster cards is not only limited to London’s underground network, it also 
includes buses, it  will also be valid on a range of other means of transport 
including London’s Tramlink, Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and certain rail 
routes [94], [95]. The fact that the prepaid transport card is reusable made it 
more flexible to use. The card has the ability of holding credit or so called 
subscription rights, details of the card holder, and access to a range of services Chapter 2 Literature Review                68 
       
and applications [91]. The reason behind making it a reusable card that is 
capable of storing high-value and low-value ticketing details is the believe that 
the smart card is a safe way of storing data, where the data cannot be copied or 
altered because of the high security methods that are accompanied with the 
implementation and usage of the prepaid smart card [91].  
On the other hand, because of the monetary value the card holds it must now 
make its way and stand against attacks. Attackers will be motivated to get 
access to the smart card contents to benefit from the data stored within the card. 
Thus, users of prepaid smart cards must take into account that their cards are 
attracting attackers and therefore use them carefully.  
It is also important to mention that transport smart card has been utilised in 
studies that are concerned about the travellers’ behaviour [96], [92]. Every time 
the card is used the transactions are recorded to monitor the card holder’s 
behaviour [96]. Therefore, the card does attract researchers and analysts to 
conduct their studies depending on the information the card provides while the 
card holder has not a single idea that the card is contributing in a study. This 
issue raises the confidentiality of the transport card user, which is a very 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Risk Management 
This chapter is concerned about the Risk Management Programme that is 
carried out to examine the smart card system security. Risk analysis is based on 
identifying the smart card system assets and their values, identifying threats 
and the possible attacks, identifying the vulnerabilities of the system, producing 
a security requirements list, determining the risks associated with the usage of 
the system, and finally suggesting risk mitigation and controls to better 
safeguard the smart card system assets and users.  
The primary data will mainly be collected from articles related to the study 
subject that are published in engineering and scientific journals, and interviews 
with representatives and experts that work in a smart card employed 
environment. On the other hand, secondary data will include written materials 
such as the governments’ publications, relevant documents, and organisations 
communications (e-mails, web sites, and newspapers).  
 
3.1 Managing the Smart Card System Security 
In order to effectively manage an information system, it is important to apply 
a risk management program to be able to avoid negative impacts on the system 
along with reducing the risks to an acceptable level. The overall objective of this 
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system to better manage risks that have harmful impact and are more probable 
to happen. 
The risk management encompasses three main processes: risk assessment, 
risk mitigation, and evaluation [97], [98]. Risk analysis is the process of assets 
identification, threats recognition, vulnerabilities identification, and risk 
determination. Whereas risk mitigation is achieved by applying the required 
safeguards [97]. Evaluation is the continuous process of evaluating and 
implementing a successful risk management program. 
3.1.1 Asset Identification and Value 
The assets of any smart card system are similar to most e-business 
information systems. They basically consist of Hardware, Software, System and 
User Interfaces, Data and Information, People, and Web and Security Services. 
An asset is only an asset if it holds some value to the system [99], so table (3) will 
show each asset and the value it holds to the system. 
Any harm that may affect these assets will have a negative impact on the smart 
card system, along with all system users. Therefore, assets of the system must be 
protected against any type of attacks. Protecting the information that is saved 
within the smart card system components like smart cards, servers, and 
databases, in addition to balancing and protecting the electronic transmissions of 
information over the networks is an essential task to be taken into consideration.  
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  Table (3): Smart Card Information System Assets and their Values. 
 
3.1.2 Threat Identification 
It is important to be familiar with the threats that may affect the system. A 
threat is the potential for a particular threat source to practice vulnerability [99]; 
threats are the possible means by which a security policy may be breached [12]. 
A threat source can be any person, thing, event, or idea that poses danger to an 
asset within a system in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, or 
legitimate use. Moreover, threats can be deliberate or accidental [12]. If it was 
accidental, then the responsible attacker has done it by mistake and meant no 
Asset  Value 
Hardware  System equipment ( PCs, workstations, 
servers, card readers, biometric readers, etc), 
staff access points, networks like internet 
and intranet connections, data and 
information storage (smart cards and 
databases, and system backup. 
Software  Operating systems, information security 
(anti-virus and spyware programs), database 
software, compilers, utilities, and 
applications. 
System and User 
Interface 
Direct interaction with system and web 
services, and access to mobile devices like 
the smart card and viewing its contents. 
Data and Information  User personal record, account numbers and 
details, amount saved (monetary value), 
biometric template, user digital signature, 
private and public key, or passwords. 
People  Performance, development, control, 
management, customer confidence and trust, 
and communication. 
Web and Security 
Services 
Provide interface to the e-business platform, 
government or banking transactions 
(certificate requesting, forms, statements, 
any other documents), collaboration with 
other business parties (e-mail), publications, 
news, generating passwords, exchanging 
cryptographic keys, etc.  Chapter 3 Risk Management                72 
       
harm. In contrast, if it was deliberate, then it can be categorised as a passive 
threat such as network sniffing or it can be active such as negligence, errors, 
attempt to gain unauthorised access to the system, or changing the value of a 
particular transaction by malicious persons. Therefore, possible threats on the 
smart card system can be [12], [99], [97], [98]: 
  Unauthorised system access, 
  Hacking and System intrusion, 
  Information leakage or theft,  
  Integrity violation (errors and omissions by insiders or outsiders),  
  Availability violation like Distributed Denial of Service (DOS),  
  Illegitimate use (dishonest or disgruntled insiders or outsiders), 
  System penetration and tampering. 
 
Threat sources have different motivations that may lead to carrying out 
various attacks on any governmental or business information system; therefore, 
the parties involved in the smart card system must be familiar with the human 
threat environments and their different motivations. Moreover, being aware of 
the possible threats and threat sources will help the smart card system 
administrators and analysts create an efficient security requirements list that 
will facilitate the determination of the risks that might take place.    
3.1.3 Attacks on the Smart Card 
Security is a huge matter; it tackles every single stage of a product’s lifecycle. 
The security of the smart card must be considered in early stages, starting from 
the development stage, the manufacturing stage, ending up with card in use 
stage. The main reason behind taking into consideration the security issue in all 
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 3.1.3.1 Attacks during the Development Stage and Manufacturing Stage 
 
According to [24], attacks can take place at the development stage of the 
smart card. During the development of the hardware of the smart card 
microcontroller, a small number of people carry out the development within a 
secured and monitored facilities, in addition, the computer systems that are used 
for the design of the microcontroller are connected through an independent 
network that is highly secure where no outsider can have access. Hence, the 
attack on this stage may possibly come from an insider. The comprehensive 
knowledge required to affect the security of the chip in a negative way by an 
outsider is rare, therefore, such an attack is highly unlikely to occur unless an 
insider turns out to be an attacker.  
On the other hand, the development of the smart card software including the 
operating system is another concern to be looked at. The origin of the software 
used must be determined, otherwise it is prohibited [24]. The main purpose of 
knowing the origin of the software in use as stated by  [24] is to decrease the 
possibility of manipulating the development tool, which might have the intention 
of  changing the generated program tool.  
Furthermore, [24] declared that it is quite essential to have strict 
authentication during the manufacturing stage of the smart card or chips, 
although is it a closed environment, the access is closely controlled, and each 
access is recorded, the manufacturing stage must be monitored from a security 
viewpoint because some technically interesting and effective attacks can be 
carried out here by an insider. 
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3.1.3.2 Attacks during Smart Card Use 
During this stage, access to the smart card is easier than the previous stages, 
simply because the smart card is not in an independent highly secure 
environment where few people are monitored while working and equipments are 
highly secured, now it is used by users in more opened networks, this raises the 
probability of a successful attack. 
Attacks during the smart card use stage can be physical or logical [24], the 
physical attacks manipulate the area of semiconductors usually, in contrast, the 
logical attacks do not attack the hardware properties directly, it is more focused 
on the communication and flow of information between the smart card and the 
terminal [24].  
The following is an overview of the common physical attacks that threat the 
smart card security, physical attacks require number of equipments like 
microscopes, laser cutters, micromanipulators, focused ion beams, etc [100]. In 
addition to the corresponding knowledge of their applications that are only 
available to few specialists or organisations [24]. However, this does not mean 
that a potential attacker will not be able to commit such an attack; therefore, the 
protective mechanisms must be applied to the smart card and its microprocessor. 
Invasive Attacks 
Invasive attacks are attacks that function by physically gaining access to the 
microprocessor embedded in a smart card, they require the microprocessor to be 
removed and directly tampered [100], [101]. They tend to damage the 
appearance of the smart card, so there is no possibility of reusing the original 
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measure of any microprocessor, they require expensive equipments, high 
expertise, and great investment in time to produce results [101]. Invasive attacks 
involve reverse engineering and physical probing on buses and memory. 
  Reverse engineering: target the internal design of a chip to be able to 
identify the given chip or block functions [101]. Trying to reverse engineer 
secure blocks, obtaining information that can improve the knowledge of 
chip design, finding a weakness in the chip, and attempting to read the 
contents of the Read Only Memory (ROM) is the attacker’s main objective. 
The attacker reveals the chip by removing the plastic body of the card and 
removing the gold plate, then using fuming nitric acid or acetone to 
remove the resin used to protect the chip. The next step is identifying the 
different functions by observing the chip under a microscope [101]. 
Successful reverse engineering attacks will result in loss of proprietary 
asset, compromising the chip’s integrity, and gaining a competitive 
advantage by knowing the other product’s information if the attacker was 
a company [100], [101]. A good example of a recent successful reverse 
engineering attack on smart cards is the attack on MIFARE Classic chip. 
Is has been declared by [102] that the security of embedded devices 
usually relies on the secrecy of proprietary cryptographic algorithms. 
However, these algorithms and their weaknesses are disclosed by reverse 
engineering, this is what happened to the MIFARE Classic chip where the 
proprietary cryptographic algorithm used was reverse engineered and 
then broken. This successful attack allowed the attacker to get hold of the 
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  Physical probing on buses and memory: another method of invasive 
attacks on the microprocessor is placing a probe on the bus lines, the bus 
lines are long metal tracks that carry data including cryptographic keys 
and other secret values between the parts of the chip [103]. It is quite hard 
to make direct contact with the bus lines because they are fabricated in 
the lower layers of the chip. Although the chip is packaged inside a 
protective coating, once it has been removed from the packaging, 
identification of the bus lines and their contents can be done using an 
oscilloscope [100], [103]. An attacker can also use an optical microscope to 
examine the layers of the chip [101], the images can be extended using a 
specific technique to stain the ROM [103], which holds the operating 
system and its related data and code, in addition, it may hold the 
applications of the smart card. So, by observing the ROM, an attacker can 
gain secret information.  
Side-Channel Attacks 
These types of attacks are considered to be non-invasive attacks because they 
take place on a working smart card chip, so they do not require the destruction of 
the smart card most of the time [101]. Side-channel attacks consist of observing a 
side channel while the information is being processed, the attacker seeks to 
obtain secret data like cryptographic keys or PINs by observing how the 
characteristics of a smart card change while processing different information 
[100], [103]. The types of side-channel attacks include timing analysis, the data 
exchanged on the I/O channels, power analysis, the electromagnetic emission, or 
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  Timing Analysis: it is considered the simplest side channel attack when 
compared to the other attacks. Mainly, this attack consists of observing how 
long a given process takes to execute and draw a conclusion from these 
observations [100]. The time required to complete a specific process can leak 
information about the data being processed, for example, the digits of a PIN 
are checked byte by byte, and a negative result returned when a wrong digit 
is encountered, therefore, an attacker can use this information to determine 
how many digits of a guessed PIN are correct [100]. At present, PIN 
comparison is changed, it is constructed in a way that all digits of a PIN are 
always compared, so there is no difference in time between positive and 
negative comparison results [101]. However, observing the times difference 
and producing timing tables may still leak some relevant details of what 
type of data is being processed.  
  Power Analysis: this side channel attack is the most common against smart 
cards, these attacks attempt to use variations in some measurable 
characteristic of a smart card to be able to determine secret data like 
cryptographic keys or PINs [103]. Power analyses are measured by 
observing the power consumption of the smart card chip with an 
oscilloscope. Because of the simple structure of the smart card chip, the 
internal processes along with the data processed make it possible to have 
measurable and interpretable effects from the power consumption [24]. 
There are two main types of power analyses; these are Simple Power 
Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). As explained by 
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smart card chip over time, by using an analogue-digital converter to 
determine the voltage change at a resistor connected in series at a high 
temporal resolution. The amount of power consumed is dependent on the 
type of instruction being executed and the data being processed, simply, the 
same program sequence with the same data results in a certain cycle of 
power consumption of the processor, running different data leads to 
different power consumption. For example, [100] explained that the power 
consumption during the implementation of AES  consists of nine identical 
rounds and a tenth shorter round, the encrypted data is decrypted using a 
secret key, the power consumption varies depending on the value of a secret 
key, therefore, an attacker can obtain the secret key values by inspecting 
the power consumption even if the difference is relatively small [104]. In 
comparison with SPDA, DPA is about conducting a statistical analysis to 
discover even smaller differences in the power consumption of the chip as 
described in [104] and [105]. The power consumption during the processing 
of known data is determined first, then during the unknown data, the 
measuring is repeated many times, after that, the mean value is calculated 
to eliminate noise, after all the difference is determined and therefore the 
unknown data can be figured out [24]. In fact, this attack allows the 
attacker to break a secret key into smaller portions that can be analysed 
separately. Therefore, power analysis on smart cards has serious impact on 
hardware and software, which makes it extremely important to apply the 
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  Electromagnetic Analysis: this is a complicated attack to implement, 
electromagnetic analysis measures the electromagnetic radiation of the 
chip, conclusions can be drawn about the internal sequence of events in the 
smart card chip, the measurement information collected in this type of 
analysis is similar to DPA [24]. This attack requires the chip surface to be 
exposed to be able to get a strong signal and therefore deduce information 
[101]. Superconducting quantum interference devices can be used in order 
to measure magnetic fields of low extension strength [24]. Furthermore, the 
signals obtained in electromagnetic analysis can be processed in the same 
way as power analysis, analysis can be done individually or treated 
statistically [101]. However, the technical effort along with the necessary 
knowledge required is generally not available, which makes it a hard attack 
to take place compared with the previously mentioned attacks. 
  Fault Induction Attacks: it is one of the side-channel attacks that attempt to 
inject a fault during the normal functioning of a smart card and hope that 
this fault will result in exploiting secret data [101]. These type of attacks 
allow information leakage on the cryptographic key that is being used, they 
have been working successfully with both public key and private key 
algorithms [106]. The most common fault injection techniques stated by 
[106] are variations in supply voltage, variation in the external clock, 
temperature variations until the chip exceeds the threshold’s bound, light 
exposure, laser over an exposed chip surface, or x-rays and ion beams 
radiation on the chip. An abnormal signal sent to the smart cart may result 
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of attempting to avoid sensors by illuminating certain portions of a chip. 
The effects from fault injection attacks vary, depending on which part of the 
chip being attacked; however, the main countermeasure to avoid this type of 
attacks on smart cards is redundancy.  
Other important types of attacks while the smart card is in use are the logical 
attacks or so called software attacks. Attackers can write malicious software, 
which can be employed in a software attack on a smart card, for example, in 
smart cards that support Java Card it is possible to load and run software. The 
following are the possible logical attacks. 
Bug exploits 
To be able to bug or manipulate the data in a smart card during a session, a 
good example  by [101] was to place an error in a loop test, which makes it hard 
to detect, or some read/write operations would result in an obvious vulnerability. 
It is quite hard to discover a bug in a deployed smart card, but once it is 
discovered it may be possible to perform illegal operations [101]. Another 
example is bugging of the data transmission stated by [24], an electrically 
insulated dummy contact is attached to the I/O interface of a smart card, 
therefore, the original I/O interface will no longer be connected electrically. The 
dummy contact along with the original contact are then connected to a fast 
computer, which can cut out or insert any data while the terminal and the smart 
card are communicating. If the computer was fast enough, then the smart card 
and the terminal will not be able to find any difference between the normal data 
and the manipulated one. 
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Illegal bytecode 
This is another way of attacking smart cards that support Java Card, it is 
called illegal bytecode or ill-formed applications [101]. These attacks are 
malicious applications that do not have valid bytecode parameters or made of 
illegal sequences of bytecode instructions. The bytecode is a complex process and 
bytecode verification is difficult, the smart card processors are not fast enough to 
be able to run the verification, also, the standard algorithm requires a memory 
that is beyond the smart card’s ability [101]. Therefore, the attacker can retrieve 
details or even execute functions and take full control of the smart card.   
Attacks during PIN comparison    
Attacks during the comparison process of a PIN can be carried out; it focuses 
on all the methods related to the data sent to the smart card in order to be 
compared with the stored value or template. For example, power analysis can be 
practised during the PIN comparison process [24], a drop in voltage at a resistor 
connected to the Vcc circuit will make it possible to determine through power 
measuring whether the retry counter was increased or not, this command must 
be sent to the smart card together with the comparison data. In this case, if a 
positive comparison was returned before the retry counter was increased, then 
the comparison value could be determined by an attacker [24]. Another possible 
attack during the PIN comparison could be through run-time optimisation, 
which is called time analysis [24]. The corresponding comparison routine carries 
out a byte-by-byte comparison between the entered and saved PIN, if the routine 
is programmed in a way that a difference in the comparison of two PINs will 
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time differences that can be measured with suitable equipment, and therefore 
simply used by an attacker to determine the secret PIN.  
 
3.1.3.3 Attacks on Biometrics 
Attacks on Biometrics are growing because the use of Biometrics as an 
authentication method has become more widespread. The most dangerous threat 
against Biometrics consists of the acquisition of the employed Biometric data or 
its corresponding templates by unauthorised parties. A study conducted by [107] 
showed eight possible vulnerable points that can be identified in a biometric 
authentication system, it showed the system modules along with the channels 
interconnecting them. An attacker can steal, modify, or delete the data 
exchanged among the biometric system modules through the weak points 
demonstrated in figure (7). 
 
 
Figure (7): Eight vulnerable points in a general Biometric System. 
Source:  [107] 
 
Therefore, understanding the weak points, and being aware of the nature and 
risks of attacks on Biometrics is imperative to researchers, designers, and 
system developers. A study by [108] discussed the attacks and vectors of 
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Biometrics. The following are the attacks and weak points explained by [108], 
[109], [110], [111]: 
Fake Biometrics 
Spoofing or presenting a fake biometric to the sensor in order to get access to 
the system. This may be as simple as presenting a picture to a face recognition 
scanner or as difficult as producing a fake fingerprint out of the original finger 
by using the biometric traces left by the owner. Physical fake biometrics are 
likely to take place when using fingerprints, hand geometry, or face recognition 
schemes. Other digital fake biometrics attacks such as obtaining the templates 
or digital images stored are likely to take place inside the biometrics system, 
where the attacker requires access to the biometrics system in the first place.    
Replay old Data 
In this case, the presented biometric data is captured and replayed. This can 
happen by submitting a previously stored biometric signal, such as a recorded 
audio signal, to the feature extractor bypassing the sensor. 
Override Feature Extractor 
This attack targets the feature extractor normal practice; the data processed 
is maliciously altered and manipulated in order to produce templates with 
preselected features, for example using a Trojan Horse attack. Then again, other 
possible way is to attack the software of the biometric system in order to disable 
it through practicing a DOS attack.    
Synthesised Feature Vector 
Usually, the extractor and matcher components are combined. In the case 
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through a network, there is a possibility that a third party intrudes the 
communication channel and alters the templates before they reach the matcher, 
an example of this type of attack is called “hill climbing” and is described in 
detail by [112] as follows: 
A hill-climbing attack may be performed by an application that 
sends random templates to the system, which are perturbed 
iteratively. The application reads the output match score and 
continues with the perturbed template only when the matching 
score increases until the decision threshold is exceeded [112]. 
 
Therefore, this attack injects a stream of fake biometrics into the system to 
fool the matcher, to be able to practice the attack successfully; the attacker must 
have access to the biometric system communication channels and the match 
scores. 
Override Matcher 
This attack replaces the matching scores that are produced by the matcher 
with fake ones, possibly by a Trojan Horse. The important thing to mention in 
this attack is that the authorised users will not notice any difference because the 
system will continue providing them access.  
Modify/Steal Template 
Altering or stealing a template that is stored in the biometric system by 
attacking the storage area, the templates are stored in a database, a smart card, 
or the biometric reader in some systems. The result of the attack will either deny 
legitimate users from having access to the system or allow illegitimate users to 
access the system.  
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Intercept the Channel 
The templates that are stored in the system travel in a communication 
channel between the storage areas like a database to the matcher. An attacker 
can intercept the communication channel and alter or manipulate the templates 
while being transmitted through the channel before reaching the matcher. 
Override Final Decision 
It is a form of a bypass attack where an attacker can block the final decision 
or insert a new one. Injecting a false acceptance between the system and the end 
device will result in accept/accept for all cases, therefore the final decision is 
going to be overridden. 
The previously explained framework by [107] is a good point to start from, it 
simplifies the task on the system analysts. By looking at the framework, the 
analyst will have a clear idea of the weak points that are vulnerable to successful 
attacks. Yet, the framework is considered to be abstract when it comes to 
identifying vulnerabilities of a biometric system in a holistic view. To add extra 
interpretation to the framework a study conducted by [113] focused on the 
technical testing of the biometric devices. It proposed a framework that includes 
the vulnerable points of [107], in addition, it identified five extra subsystems: 
data collection, signal processing, transmission, data storage, and decision, 
allowing a more clear analysis of the potential attack points.  
After that, [110] added to the previous frameworks. The extended framework 
in [110] added three more components: administrative supervision, underlying 
information technology environment, and token presentation. Figure (8) shows 
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in the biometric system, and twenty two vulnerabilities identified. This is an 
indicator that attacks possibility on biometric systems is something that needs to 
be reduced when employing a biometric system. There are some 
countermeasures to the attacks presented in the framework that are mentioned 
by [108] like liveness detection, randomising input biometric data, using multiple 
biometrics, clearing retention of data especially in the sensor area, emphasising 
on the usage of strong cryptography and digital signatures, physical security, 
and network security. 
 
Figure (8): Bartlow and Cukic framework presenting the Biometric System Vulnerabilities. 
Source: [108]. 
 
These defences will enhance the biometric system and will add strength to it; 
however, it does only reduce the probability of successful attack but it does not 
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Accordingly, the governments and organisations must study and review the 
history of the system break-ins and security violation reports, also, they must 
conduct interviews with the system administrators to be able to identify the 
latest potential human threats. As a result, the governments and organisations 
will be able to produce, and at the same time make available to all users, a 
threat statement or list that contains the threat sources and the potential 
threats along with the common frequent attacks, which will exploit the system 
vulnerabilities. 
3.1.4 Vulnerability Identification 
"The security system is only as strong as its weakest link!" [114]. Thus, for 
the system to be stronger and well protected from any internal or external harm, 
the system administrators must test their system and find its weaknesses, which 
are the system's vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that may 
potentially be exploited to cause loss or harm, they are the susceptibility of a 
system to threats; it is an aspect of a system that leaves it open to attack [99]. 
Therefore, after identifying the threats and attacks that may harm the 
system, the next step the governments and organisations must do is to test the 
system and discover the possible system vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
potential threat sources. The following are some common technical and non-
technical system vulnerabilities to be taken into consideration [99]: 
Technical Vulnerabilities 
  TCP/IP protocol stack 
  Lack of database backup 
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  Old encryption methods 
  Firewall allows inbound telnet, and guest ID is enabled on the 
organisation's server 
Non-technical Vulnerabilities 
  Negligence in removing the terminated employees' system identifiers 
  Carelessness of monitoring employees' behaviour 
 
To be able to avoid the previous common system vulnerabilities, the 
government and organisation managers and administrators must review 
previous system auditing and assessment documentation, evaluate the system 
security test reports, update the system vulnerabilities list, and benefit from 
vendor advisors.  
3.1.5 Development of Security Requirements List 
This step is about developing the security requirements list for the smart 
card information system, the main reason behind developing this list is to assess 
the sensitivity of the system and to determine the security requirement for each 
system phase because each phase in the system is accompanied with different 
security requirements. The awareness of the possible threats and attacks that 
may harm the system and its' users, in addition to identifying the system 
vulnerabilities before developing the security requirements list will facilitate the 
development of an effective list.  
Every information system has the following main security goals [4]: 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, availability, authentication, and 
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Confidentiality simply means that a message should not be read by other 
than the sender and the intended recipient [97]. According to the smart card 
system, private data like the health record, criminal record, immigration details, 
must be kept private from being disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, 
or even processes. Loss of confidentiality may lead to jeopardising national 
security, loss of public trust, or even legal action against the responsible party.  
Integrity means that the sender and receiver want to be sure that they both 
have exactly the same message [12], [99], [97]. This means the integrity is the 
ability to protect data from being altered or even destroyed in some cases by 
intentional or accidental manner. Therefore, violation of the smart card system 
integrity will be the bridge for successful attacks against the system, which will 
result in inaccuracy and fraud.  
Non-repudiation is defined as the ability to limit parties from disproving that 
a transaction took place [12], [99]. The individuals cannot deny that they were 
involved in the transaction; this can be achieved by signatures.  
Availability is mainly making the system resources and facilities obtainable 
and accessible to all system users [97], [4]. This security requirement prevents 
and detects the improper denial of access to the services provided by the smart 
card system. Loss of availability in the smart card system will lead to less 
performance and will reduce the productive time. It may also delay some 
important governmental activities that will have negative impact on both 
providers and users.   
The recipient wants assurance about the identity of the sender, hence, the 
process of one entity verifying that another entity is who they claim to be is Chapter 3 Risk Management                90 
       
called authentication. The smart card system has to apply trusted techniques to 
ensure efficient authentication of the system components, most familiar 
techniques of authentication are passwords and signatures. Loss of 
authentication means that system is not anymore confident and is vulnerable to 
any type of attack.  
Authorisation means that access to data should be permitted only to 
authorised users; it is the process that ensures that a person or a program has 
the right to access certain system resources [12]. This process may vary; every 
user in the smart card system has certain resources to be able to have access to.  
However, other security goals may be required according to each application or 
during different system phases such as anonymity, public trust, logging, etc.     
It is preferable that the governments and organisations sort out the security 
requirements in the smart card system in terms of the service phase and user 
type. Each application contains the following phases [115]: System set up, which 
is mainly setting up the system hardware and software. Verification, this phase 
is where the employment of the appropriate mechanisms for authenticating all 
system users is required. Providing the service, this phase is about offering the 
service online to the end users. After service, this is the last phase of the system; 
it is responsible of maintaining the progress of the offered service, providing the 
end user with the output of the transaction (certificate, form, statement, update, 
etc), and system storage.  
E-Banking, e-gates, e-health, e-voting, e-purse, and other online public services:  
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Service Phase  User  Type of Security Requirement 
System  set up  Administrators  Availability 
Verification  Operators 
Smart Card Users 
Authentication 
Authorisation 
Providing the 
service 
Smart Card Users  Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Non-repudiation 
Availability 
Logging (not applied for e-
voting) 
(anonymity and untracability 
for e-voting only)  
After service  Operators  Logging 
  Table (4): Service phases and the related types of security requirements. 
 
The information listed in Table (4) is derived from discussions with a smart 
card expert [116], who is working in an organisation that produces and manages 
smart identification cards. Table (4) shows that there is a distinction of the 
security requirements per service phase. All the security requirements are 
important to ensure the overall system security, but assigning different security 
requirements to specific service phases will help the system management create 
a better security policy for the smart card system adopted. To be able to develop 
and maintain the security requirement list, awareness of the possible threats, 
attacks, and vulnerabilities is essential.   
During the system set up phase, the administrators of the system must 
ensure that the system is going to be available to all users, specify access 
privileges, and support the functionality required. Hence, they have to protect 
the system from possible threats and attacks that violate availability mainly 
Distributed Denial of Service (DOS), as explained previously in the thesis.  
The second service phase involves the verification of the system operators and 
users, which requires the employment of security mechanisms that allow 
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PINs, Passwords, or Biometrics. It is vital to take into consideration the fact that 
there are possible threats like unauthorised system access and hacking, in 
addition to different physical and non-physical attacks on the employed 
mechanisms that are mentioned in sections 3.1.3.2 and 3.1.3.3, which can harm 
the system users and violate the authentication and authorisation security 
requirements. Applying the most appropriate authentication mechanism at this 
service phase is quite important and is not an easy job to handle, especially with 
all the possible threats and attacks that may take place.  
During providing the service phase, which involves the users of the smart 
card system, numbers of security requirements have to be ensured because this 
phase is a critical phase with great number of transactions and users exchanging 
information. The confidentiality (non-disclosure) and integrity (non-modification) 
of the information exchanged among the users and the providers has to be 
obtained. In addition, maintaining non-repudiation and proof of origin while the 
transactions are taking place among users is crucial. Also, time stamping and 
logging are important to handle possible arguments and disagreements that 
might occur among system users and providers. Many information and details 
are exchanged in this phase, so protection against threats and attacks is a 
priority. For example, the threat sources of violating integrity can be insiders or 
outsiders, the same can happen with violating confidentiality. Successful attacks 
on the smart card and the security mechanisms employed will violate more than 
one security requirement of the system at the same time, for example, as 
mentioned in section 3.1.3.2, an attacker can get hold of the legitimate user 
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this will result in violating the confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation 
security requirements. 
The final service phase is the operators' responsibility, they have to ensure 
that the users are satisfied and their logging activities are saved. Being aware of 
the system vulnerabilities will help the operators avoid information loss and 
leakage, in addition, backing up the output of the transactions and information 
exchanged is very important to avoid problems with the system users. 
Hence, assigning the security requirements to each service phase will enhance 
the management of the smart card system security and will provide a flexible 
and expandable list that can be used to better serve the system users and help 
the system administrators determine the risks that might take place in each 
service phase.               
3.1.6 Risk Determination 
The purpose of this step is to determine the risk that may face the 
information system and to assess the risk level (high, medium, or low) [97]. Risk 
is the measure of the possibility of security breaches and the potential severity of 
the resulting damage, on other words; it is the measure of the cost of 
vulnerability taking into account the probability of a successful attack [12], [99], 
[97]. The risk is considered to be high if the value of a vulnerable asset is high 
and the probability of a successful attack by a particular threat source is also 
high. Therefore, to be able to determine the risk level, it is recommended to have 
a Risk-Level Matrix [98]. By using the Risk-Level Matrix, it is possible to detect 
the possible risks associated with the system and at the same time determining 
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However, examples of the risks that are associated to the system are [97]: 
  Natural disasters,  
  User error (accidentally delete, overwrite, or insert wrong number),  
  Loss of money, data, or information,  
  Computer Crimes,  
  Hardware Crash or Software failure, 
  Database or Server failure. 
 
Therefore, the governments and organisations have to take the risk 
assessment seriously and include it in their monthly tasks in order to avoid and 
eliminate possible risks from taking place. Emphasis must be on the adequacy of 
the existing security controls to eliminate or at least reduce the risks. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the risk management program consists 
of three main processes, the processes are: risk assessment, risk mitigation, and 
evaluation. Based on that, the next step is to assess and determine the risk that 
might occur when the smart card system is employed. Risk analysis determines 
the risk level and examines the risk probability and impact associated with each 
type of smart card. Therefore, a qualitative risk analysis approach is applied to 
determine and analyse the risk that is accompanied with each type of smart 
card, the reason behind applying a qualitative approach is because in this case it 
is not possible to quantify the system threats and vulnerabilities to be able to 
come up with quantified risk levels. It is more effective to use a risk matrix to 
determine the risk levels. This section explains the qualitative risk analysis 
approach and shows the study results.  
One way of determining the risk associated with the employment of a 
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level of risk is measured by a risk value; this value could be described as high, 
medium, or low, however, other scales could be applied depending on each case. 
Thus, this study will use the following risk scales:  
Risk Level  Description 
Unacceptable  This risk must be mitigated directly with certain 
controls to an undesirable risk level or even less 
within a specified short period of time, the sooner 
the better. 
Undesirable  Should be mitigated with certain controls to an 
acceptable risk within a specified period of time 
but could take longer period than the 
unacceptable risk. 
Acceptable with 
controls 
Should be verified that procedures or controls are 
in place. 
Acceptable as it 
is 
No mitigation required. 
 
   Table (5): Risk levels 
 
  The risk level is determined based on the assessment of the likelihood of 
occurrence of the unwanted incident and its consequence or sometimes called 
impact in terms of loss of asset value [118]. The likelihood of occurrence or in 
some cases called the probability of happening is mainly stating how likely the 
event is to occur, the probability should be a number between 0-1, which is most 
probably represented as a ratio of the number of chances by which an event or an 
unwanted incident may happen [118], for example a 40% chance for an event to 
happen. On the other hand, the consequence states the severity of the event and 
what losses or damage to the system are going to take place; this is also 
represented as a ratio.  
  So, the qualitative way of analysing the risk involves assessing the likelihood 
and impact of an unwanted incident to be able to determine the level of risk. The 
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of both the likelihood of occurrence and the consequences, each range is listed on 
one side of the matrix or on an axis. The likelihood of occurrence is described as 
follows [119]: 
Likelihood 
(Probability) 
Description 
Frequent  Can be experienced in a continuous manner. 
Probable  Will occur several times. 
Occasional  Unlikely but possible to occur. 
Improbable  So unlikely to occur, but possible. 
  Table (6): Likelihood of occurrence or probability levels 
 
  Then again, on the other side of the risk matrix the range of consequences 
severity is listed, it is described as follows [119]: 
Consequences 
(Impact) 
Description 
Catastrophic  Very high severity perhaps whole system failure. 
Critical  High impact with huge losses. 
Marginal  Medium impact with ability to recover. 
Negligible  Low impact but might cause small damage. 
  Table (7): Consequences levels 
  Therefore, the risk matrix is formed of the probability axis and the 
consequence axis. The intersection of the likelihood of occurrence of an attack 
with the impact of the attack will identify the risk level of each unwanted 
incident that might take place and harm the information system; it also 
maintains an awareness of the risks throughout the lifetime of an information 
system.  
Based on the data collected from the primary and secondary sources of the 
study, risk analysis is carried out. Depending on each type of smart card, which 
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or prepaid card there are number of factors in determining the probability of 
attacks occurring and the impact of these attacks are considered, therefore 
ending up determining the level of risk that is related to each type of smart card. 
The factors that are examined in this study are cost, time, motivation, and 
amount of information stored in each type of smart card. The following are 
number of figures and tables that illustrate each factor in comparison with each 
type of smart card. The second step is developing a risk matrix that shows the 
risk tolerability depending on the probability of attack taking place and the 
consequence of this attack on each type of smart card.  
The cost is related to the monetary value that the card possibly store or have 
access to. Card fraud losses has been a great issue to the payments industry, 
according to APACS, the fraud facts report produced in 2009 stated that the 
annual card fraud losses in the UK-issued cards are increasing. The fraud types 
on plastic cards are different; table (8) will show the fraud types and the total 
monetary value losses in the years 2003-2008: 
 
Fraud Type  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Card-not-present  122.1  150.8  183.2  212.7  290.5  328.4 
Counterfeit  110.6  129.7  96.8  98.6  144.3  169.8 
Lost/Stolen  112.4  114.5  89.0  68.5  56.2  54.1 
Card ID Theft  30.2  36.9  30.5  31.9  34.1  47.4 
Mail non-receipt  45.1  72.9  40.0  15.4  10.2  10.2 
Total  420.4  420.4  504.8  427.0  535.2  609.9 
Table (8): Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 2003-2008 
Source: [120] 
 
Table (8) shows that the money figures have increased from £420.4 million to 
£609.9 million within a range of five years. In essence that, the smart cards have 
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been introduced and used in the market approximately three years ago, it did not 
contribute to making the fraud losses figures decrease. 
Figure (9) illustrates the relationship between the type of smart card and the 
cost of losing the card or an intruder having access to the card contents, the 
monetary data in figure (9) are anecdotal. It is based on an assumption of the 
most probable amount of money that each smart card could possibly have access 
to. Figure (9) shows that the cost related to the identification card is very high 
comparing to other types; the reason is that the ID card gives the attacker access 
to many privileges. 
The attacker will have the ability to claim to a bank, hospital, government 
agency, or any other entities that he/she is the legitimate user of the card, which 
will result in high losses of monetary value and other personal information. The 
banking card is also causing loss of relatively high amount of money when 
comparing to the other types of cards. 
 
Figure (9): Type of Smart Card compared to the Cost factor 
Source: [120] and [121]. 
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The banking card allows the attacker to get hold of the amount of money 
stored in the account or accounts that are linked to the card, so depending on 
each type of customer, the amount will be in thousands as an average. The 
health services card can have a great impact on its card holder as well, especially 
if it was linked to the health insurance party, according to [121] about 1.5 million 
Americans have been pointed out as victims of medical identity theft with losses 
of approximately $20,000 per victim. This amount of loss indicates that the 
health services card can give the attacker access to a huge number of benefits. 
The rest of the card types contain fewer amounts of money stored, which can be 
limited to few hundreds of pounds and therefore costing very little damage in 
case of theft or loss. 
The time required for the smart card user to realise that the card has been 
lost or stolen is an important issue to be looked at. By pointing out the time the 
user needs to discover the disappearance of the card, it is essential to mention 
that each type of smart card has different timing. The user needs less time for 
example one or maximum two days to realise that the banking card has 
disappeared because people use their banking cards almost on daily basis, in 
addition, the banks allow the user to inform the bank of the loss of the card 
within maximum 48 hours, otherwise the bank is not anymore responsible of 
defending and supporting the card holder. 
On the other hand, the health services card has the maximum days 
comparing to the other types of cards because the user will look for the health 
services card the next time he/she has to visit the health care centre or hospital, 
which might require few days or few weeks. The number of days is based on Chapter 3 Risk Management                100 
       
anecdotal evidences that depend on the users’ behaviour when using a smart 
card. Thus, mainly the banking card along with the identification card need less 
time for the user to discover about their loss.  
Table (9) shows the motivation behind the willingness to attack the smart 
card and gain access to the information stored within, the determination of the 
type of motivation is based on the outcomes from interviews conducted with 
analysts from organisations that employ smart cards [116] and [122].  
Smart Card Type  Banking 
Card 
ID 
Card 
Health 
Card 
Loyalty 
Card 
Prepaid 
Card 
Monetary Gain           
Destruction of information           
Illegal information disclosure           
Unauthorised data alteration           
Blackmail           
Destruction           
Exploitation           
Revenge           
Challenge           
Ego           
Rebellion           
Curiosity           
Intelligence           
Unintentional errors and 
omissions 
         
Competitive advantage and 
espionage 
         
Table (9): Smart Card Types Compared to Motivation Factor  
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Depending on the applications that the smart card supports and the type of 
data stored within the card, the attacker will be inspired. The motivation will be 
greater when the gain behind getting hold of the data is greater. It is clear that if 
the card contains or has access to more monetary value, then the motivation 
behind attacking is going to be very high.  The reason that attackers have less 
motivation attacking the other types of smart cards is because the level of benefit 
is relatively low in comparison with the identification card and banking card. 
Banking Card  ID Card  Health Card  Loyalty Card  Prepaid Card 
- Title 
- Forenames 
- Surname 
- Issue Date 
- Expiry Date 
- Issue No. 
- Account No. 
- Card No. 
- Signature 
- Security Code 
- PIN/Password 
- Title 
- Forenames 
- Surname 
- Date of Birth 
- Place of Birth 
- Address 
- Gender 
- Marital 
Status 
- Nationality 
- ID Number 
- Personal 
Photo 
- Occupation 
- Signature 
- Blood Group 
- Biometric 
Image 
- Vision and 
Disability 
- Driving 
License 
Number 
- Driving 
License Date 
- Driving 
License Type 
- Card Barcode 
- Expiry Date 
- Title 
- Forenames 
- Surname 
- Date of Birth 
- Place of Birth 
- Address 
- Gender 
- ID Number 
- Personal Photo 
- Marital Status 
- Number of 
Kids 
- Next of Kin 
- Contact 
numbers 
- Blood Group 
- Health Record 
- Drugs Allergy 
- Drugs 
Prescriptions 
- Immunisations 
- Health 
Insurance 
- Title 
- Forenames 
- Surname 
- Date of Birth 
- Address 
- E-mail 
Address 
- Contact 
Numbers 
- Household 
Size 
- Accumulated 
Points 
- Shopping 
Behaviour 
- PIN/Password 
- Title 
- Forenames 
- Surname 
- Date of 
Birth 
- Address 
- E-mail 
Address 
- Contact 
Numbers 
- Personal 
Photo 
- Monetary 
Value 
- Tickets 
- Password 
- User Uni 
ID 
- User Uni 
Name 
- Expiry 
Date 
 
  Table (10): Smart Card Types Compared to Amount of Information Factor  
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Table (10) shows the amount of data stored on each type of smart card; this is 
determined from conducting personal communication with representatives from 
different organisations that employ smart cards [116], [122], and [123]. The 
reason behind creating this table is to encapsulate the data to construct the 
UML diagrams in page 118.  
Loyalty and prepaid cards have a less important and at the same time low 
amount of information stored on the smart card in comparison with the other 
types. However, banking card has access to a very huge and sensitive amount of 
information especially money, in addition to a very sensitive amount of data 
stored in the smart card itself, which must not be available to anybody other 
than the card holder and the related bank.  
The identification card contains even more sensitive data stored within the 
card chip; it could also contain monetary value in the case of the card supporting 
e-purse. The identification card also allows access to the system; it exchanges 
data and information to and from the system. Hence, the identification smart 
card has access, stores the most sensitive information, and has the biggest 
amount of information comparing to the other types of smart cards.   
An element impact schedule that is developed by [124], suggests that there 
are five key elements that need to be assessed to determine the relative 
criticality or impact of failure on systems when conducting risk analysis. The 
elements are time criticality, health and safety, customer satisfaction, 
embarrassment, and financial. The loss impact table and the information 
classification table are presented in Appendix (A), the elements and their 
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type of smart cards, data and information are obtained from [125], [126], [127], 
[128], [129], [130], [131]. To be able to summarise the impact of each factor on 
each type of smart card, table (11) is produced, where some elements are derived 
from [124]. By observing the impact of the factors and elements on the different 
types of smart cards illustrated in table (11), the outcome shows that the severity 
of impact on the banking and identification cards is higher in comparison with 
the rest types of cards.  
Factors and Elements  Banking 
Card 
ID Card  Health 
Card 
Loyalty 
Card 
Prepaid 
Card 
Financial Loss  Very High  High  Medium  Very Low  Medium 
Amount of Information and 
Information Sensitivity 
High  Very High  Medium  Low  Low 
Motivation  Very High  High  Medium  Low  Medium 
Time Sensitivity  High  High  Low  Low  Medium 
Customer Satisfaction  Very High  Very High  Medium  Low  Low 
Embarrassment  Very High  Very High  Medium  Medium  Medium 
Table (11):  Factors and Elements Impact on Smart Cards 
 
The next step is to develop a risk matrix to point out the risk level associated 
with the employment of each type of smart card. Based on the outcomes 
illustrated in tables (8), (9), (10), (11) and figure (9), in addition to the 
judgements made by the interviewees [116], [122], and [123] while collecting the 
primary data of the study, the risk matrix is developed. In order to construct the 
risk matrix, the likelihood of occurrence and the consequence of any attack to the 
smart card must be considered.  
Therefore, taking into account the previous factors and their relationship 
with each type of smart card, the probability of attacks (Pa) on each type of 
smart card along with the consequence of attacks (Ca) are going to be assigned. 
Table (12) shows the weights and their descriptions: 
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Weights  Probability of attack 
(Pa) 
Consequence of attack 
(Ca) 
0 to 0.2  Improbable  Negligible 
0.3 to 0.5  Occasional  Marginal 
0.6 to 0.8  Probable  Critical 
0.9 and above  Frequent  Catastrophic 
      Table (12): Probability of attack and Consequence of attack weights 
 
Thus, weights are assigned to the smart card types to determine the risk 
level. The main purpose of developing the risk matrix is to show the risk 
tolerability level that each smart card type has. To be able to distinguish 
between the different levels of risk in the matrix, different colours are assigned 
to each risk zone as suggested by [132] and [119]. Figure (10) is the risk matrix 
that demonstrates the types of smart cards along with their risk levels. 
The matrix shows that the loyalty and prepaid smart cards have an 
acceptable level of risk because of the small probability of an attack to take 
place, plus the low impact of the attack because these types of cards have less 
sensitive data and information stored comparing to the other types of cards, 
hence, even if one attack or more took place, the smart card system will be able 
to handle the risk because the value of the stored data is manageable and losses 
are able to be recovered.  
Moreover, the health services card mainly contains the patient’s personal 
details plus the health record; sometimes it is also connected to the insurance 
company that will cover the patient’s bills. Thus, the health services card is 
placed on the acceptable risk with controls zone, which indicates that any attack 
to the smart card will result in marginal consequences that could be taken care 
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happen if the employed safeguards are efficient and the system backup and 
recovery scheme is effective. 
 
 
Figure (10): Risk Matrix 
 
Furthermore, the matrix shows that the banking card is within an 
undesirable risk zone and it is probable for attacks to take place. The 
consequences of the attacks will have critical results on the system and the 
users. This is simply because this type of card has access to and contains very 
sensitive data, which is basically money. Attackers will increase the effort of Chapter 3 Risk Management                106 
       
trying to attack this type of smart card because the results will be rewarding. So, 
it is quite risky to use the smart card as a banking card unless more security is 
applied to shift the card from this risk level to an acceptable level with controls.   
The identification card has a marginal impact on the system and the users in 
the case of an attack occurring. The likelihood of attacking this type of smart 
card is probable because the attacker will gain a great amount of details, will get 
access to governmental facilities and services, and many other benefits that were 
listed earlier. 
Finally, the most risky type of smart cards is undoubtedly the identification 
smart card that is equipped with access to the users’ banking accounts. This type 
of card contains great amount of details stored in addition to the possibility of 
monetary values if it supports e-purse or linked to users’ banking accounts. 
Motivations are very high behind trying to attack this type of card, and the 
probability of attacking is considered to be frequent plus the impact of any attack 
will result in severe damage. Although this type of card will facilitate the daily 
transactions and will add value to the e-government system, it is yet very risky 
to use because the failure of this type of card will end up in causing very great 
damage to the e-government system. Gaining the trust of the users and ensuring 
the safety of their most sensitive and private data is not a simple task. 
Therefore, extra care and effort are required to try to shift the identification 
smart card with access to banking accounts to a better risk level zone, to be able 
to encourage users to use the card and ensure their information safety. 
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however, taking into consideration the availability and usability of the employed 
methods is also critical. 
As a result, the risk matrix showed the types of smart cards and the 
associated risk to each type of smart card, which will play a role in guiding and 
helping the information system developers build up a special security 
configuration that is relevant to each type of smart card. 
3.1.7 Risk Mitigation  
It is extremely important to mitigate or even trying to eliminate the risks. 
The main idea behind this part of the process is to come up with controls to 
eliminate the risk or reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level. As a matter of 
fact, the elimination of all risks is almost impossible [12], [97]; therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the governments and organisations management to employ the 
most appropriate controls to the smart card system to decrease the impact of 
risks to an acceptable level. Usually, security controls are derived and configured 
to protect against the given threats from the previous threat identification step. 
The security controls contain number of measures like system architectures, 
engineering disciplines, and security packages [97]. The goal of all these 
measures is to satisfy the security requirements and to secure the whole system 
contents. 
The security controls at the smart card system can be divided into 
identification and verification, cryptographic key management, security 
administration, and system recovery. According to the risk matrix produced 
previously, it is important to suggest the required security controls and 
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and suggestions from the interviews with experts, analysts, and technicians, of 
different smart card systems, in addition to the final output of the risk matrix 
presented earlier, suggestions of the required security controls and safeguards 
are set. Figure (11) demonstrates each smart card system and its required 
controls and safeguards. Based on the risk level associated to each type of smart 
card, the security methods presented in figure (11) are suggested. 
Banking and ID smart cards are within the marginal and critical impact area 
where the risks are undesirable, therefore they require advanced and robust 
authentication methods to make sure that the user is who he/she claims to be, 
both PIN and Biometrics have to be implemented, or even a combination of 
Biometrics methods can be implemented together to be able to offer higher 
authentication, moreover, they require a powerful cryptographic key 
management scheme like PKI to enhance the system security. 
 
Figure (11): Security Methods suggested to each type of Smart Card System. 
Source:  [116], [122], and [123] 
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The Health smart card can have either PIN or Biometrics to ensure better 
authentication of the users, in addition to a good cryptographic key management 
scheme like PKI. Finally, the Prepaid and Loyalty smart cards are within the 
acceptable level of risk zone, therefore, there is no reason for implementing very 
strong and expensive authentication and cryptographic key management 
schemes. 
Having a general smart card design that is applied to all smart card systems 
regardless of what the system serves sounds ineffective and perhaps costly for no 
reason. It would be a better idea if the smart card is designed and equipped with 
the relevant elements and security methods depending on what the smart card 
stores and what functions are employed in the system.   
 
3.2 Concluding Remarks 
Risk Analysis is a significant management technique that allows the smart 
card system administrators and operators to evaluate the system security, 
having an effective risk analysis process will facilitate the management of the 
controls and safeguards that the system requires. Knowing the possible threats, 
exploiting the system weak points, and determining the possible risks will 
enhance the decision making process of the system management, will help 
meeting and securing the customers or end users needs, and will reduce the 
possibility of implementing unnecessary controls and safeguards or vice versa. 
Now that the smart card system assets and their related values are 
presented, it is much easier to know what are the controls and safeguards 
responsible of securing. Moreover, the security list allows the administrators to Chapter 3 Risk Management                110 
       
focus on what security objectives need to be met, in addition to what type of 
users are involved in each phase, this is quite essential to monitor the system 
performance. 
The qualitative risk analysis method used in this study made is subjective in 
nature; however, it provided an easy way to understand and express the risks 
associated with each type of smart card. It also provided sufficient identification 
of problem areas. For example, it showed that the identification smart card 
contains huge number of information stored within the chip, which increases the 
risk of losing very sensitive and confidential information in case of an attack 
occurring. 
The qualitative risk matrix made it easier to point out the impact and 
likelihood of risks that might take place in the smart card system. Consider the 
difficulty of determining the impact of the smart card server going down under 
the quantitative method, in contrast, it is much more easy to make the system 
administrators agree that the impact would be a major loss, critical loss, or even 
a minor loss. Hence, the chosen way of determining the risks showed a clear and 
efficient outcome. By producing the risk matrix, it is now possible to declare that 
each type of smart card faces different types of risk with different likelihood of 
occurrence and different severity of impact. Therefore, it is not a good idea to 
generalise that any smart card system has to employ a very robust and 
expensive security measures. This will make the organisation implement 
unnecessary security controls and safeguards in some cases; on the other hand, 
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cryptography and key management techniques but may employ weak controls 
and safeguards.  
As a result, the risk analysis process gave a detailed explanation of the 
threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and risks and related to the smart card system 
as a whole, and gave specific risk levels associated to the different smart card 
systems along with the required security methods that are appropriate to each 
type of smart card, which achieves part of the study objectives that are listed in 
the beginning of the thesis.  
This chapter explained the smart card system assets and the required 
security list that includes the main security objectives like confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, availability, and non-repudiation. These results are the 
main input of modelling the smart card system components and protocols in 
chapter (4). In addition, this chapter discussed the threats, attacks and 
vulnerabilities of the smart card system regardless of the smart card type used, 
which is going to be the input of modelling the attacks in chapter (5).    
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Smart Card System Modelling and Design 
 
In this chapter, a brief review of the modelling languages and their different 
uses is discussed. Next, the current and the proposed smart card systems are 
modelled using different types of UML diagrams such as use case, class, and 
sequence diagrams. The last part of the chapter discusses the concluding 
remarks of the models and designs of the smart card system. 
 
4.1 Modelling Languages Related Work  
Security protocols are set of rules that are designed to make sure that the 
data transfer among the system parties achieves all the security goals; however, 
designing and implementing these protocols remain difficult and possible to fail 
against different attacks. To be able to effectively integrate the security protocols 
within the systems early development stages, modelling languages and 
techniques are used to better visualise the entire system components.  
There are different modelling languages that can be used to model security 
protocols with different styles. One is the Communicating Sequential Processes 
(CSP), which is a process algebra that is used to describe and analyse security 
properties and protocols by providing a mathematical framework [133], this 
method is able to provide an expressive framework that shows the exchange of 
messages among agents. However, to be able to use CSP, the designer must have  Chapter 4 Smart Card System Modelling and Design          113 
       
specialised knowledge and training mainly in mathematics, which limits the 
usage of this method to specialised people.  
GSPML presented by [134],  is a visual security protocol modelling language 
that provides a visual modelling language suitable for the security specific 
problem of protocol modelling. It is quite impressive; yet, this language 
introduces new notations and complex models that are targeted to security 
specialists and is not easy to be understood by others.  
The UML is the modelling language that is used to produce the models in this 
study; it includes several types of diagrams that represent different parts of a 
system, some model the static structure of the system and others model the 
dynamic behaviour of the system entities [135]. To support using UML for secure 
systems development, an extension in form of a UML profile using the standard 
UML extension mechanisms called UMLsec is given by [136], [137]. UMLsec 
uses a combination of use-case driven process with a goal directed approach, the 
three main mechanisms of the extension are stereotypes, tags, and constraints 
[138]. 
Stereotypes and tags are used to create and present the security 
requirements and assumptions, constraints may be attached but they should be 
satisfied by modelling elements with the related stereotype [137]. An adversary 
can be created in UMLsec to be able to model possible threats on a system, the 
adversary model is created with certain capabilities depending on the considered 
level of strength for the adversary and the physical properties of the system 
designed, the adversary can read, insert, or delete parts of the system when the 
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UMLsec was used to indicate possible vulnerabilities on Common Electronic 
Purse Specifications (CEPS) [136], it was also used to define security permissions 
that enforce restrictions on the workflows of a system [139], and other systems 
that are related to security development. The following sections include the 
smart card system design and modelling. 
4.2 Analysing the Smart Card System using UML 
 
After showing the risks associated with using each type of smart card, it is 
important to look for a more secure and less risky way of employing the smart 
card system. This is the part of the risk management programme that deals with 
risk mitigation. As listed previously in the thesis, there are number of methods 
that are used in today’s digital era to ensure the system security and user 
privacy, however, each method has its pros and cons. A robust and secure smart 
card system requires a design that ensures the implementation of a perfect 
selection of policies, procedures, architecture, technology, and staff. In order for 
the electronic commerce to be a complete success, the implementation of solid 
security methods and indisputable user identification techniques are required to 
take place.  
Therefore, the issue here focuses on two dimensions, the first dimension is to 
employ security methods that secure the system as a whole including the system 
access points, storing and transmitting information, system components, system 
networks, etc. The second dimension is to focus on employing the best and most 
accurate user identification and verification techniques to solve the problem of 
user privacy allowing the user to operate in a more confident and secure  Chapter 4 Smart Card System Modelling and Design          115 
       
environment. Practically, physical or digital attacks to any system are carried 
out by people, which points out the importance of accurately identifying the 
people who should have access to the system and keep track of their behaviours. 
Through focusing on those two dimensions and employing these security 
requirements the risk mitigation phase of the risk management programme will 
achieve its goals. However, it must be taken into consideration that there is no 
existing system that is 100% secure, no matter what is done to operate securely 
in any digital or computerised system there will be a way somehow to breach the 
system. That certainly does not stop electronic and computer specialists from 
coming up with the best mechanisms to keep their systems secure. 
Furthermore, the smart card system is one of the sensitive information 
systems these days; it has the same requirements of any computerised system in 
addition to the great emphasis on system security, user privacy, and information 
confidentiality. To have a better idea of the smart card system and its 
components, operations, applications, data and information, and security 
mechanisms the following UML diagrams were created to illustrate the smart 
cards system. 
4.2.1 Overview of the Smart Card System 
Figure (12) is a use case diagram that gives an overview of the basic 
components and functions of any smart card system. The Actors illustrated in 
figure (12) represent the main components of the system, which are the User, 
Smart Card, Smart Card Reader, Client, Server, and Database. The use cases 
represent the functions or services that take place while the system is operating.  Chapter 4 Smart Card System Modelling and Design          116 
       
The focus of the analysis in this study will be on the functions of three main 
components, which are the User, Smart Card, and the Smart Card Reader. 
 
 
 
 
When the User decides to use the Smart Card, the first step is inserting the 
Smart Card in the Smart Card Reader that is provided by the smart card 
system. The Smart Card Reader has number of jobs to take care of, it has to 
verify and authenticate the User and Smart Card, commit transactions, and 
exchange and confirm the User details with the other system components.  
  The first function is verifying and authenticating the User and the Smart 
Card, which includes number of sub functions. The Smart Card Reader 
requests the authentication code from the user; this code can be a user 
name and password, PIN, or biometrics. Then, it compares the provided 
code with the code stored in the Smart Card, if the matching process is true 
then it authenticates the User and Smart Card and allows access to the 
Figure (12): Use Case Diagram- Overview of the Smart Card System  Chapter 4 Smart Card System Modelling and Design          117 
       
system, otherwise it rejects the request and cancels the transaction, 
therefore, not allowing the User to get access to the system. 
  The second function is communicating with the system components Client, 
Server, and Database to retrieve the User details that were stored within 
the system during the enrolment process. Then the details are sent to the 
Client to carry out the next function along with the Smart Card Reader. 
  The third function is committing the transaction that is requested by the 
User. This function requires communication between the Smart Card 
Reader and the Client. The Client shows the transaction details, and the 
User details that are retrieved from the system Database. Then it commits 
the transaction, exchanges details with the Smart Card Reader, and finally 
sends a confirmation to the Smart Card Reader. 
Basically, this is what happens when a user gets involved in a smart card 
system. No matter what type of smart card was used or how complicated or 
simple the system was, these functions will take place. By having a closer look at 
each use case illustrated in the diagram, it will be clear that there are number of 
functions included within each use case, which need to be stated precisely to 
better study the smart card system, and to be able to come up with some 
proposed solutions related to the system security and user privacy.  
Moreover, the smart card system sensitivity, system security, and user 
privacy requirements depend on the services the system offers and the type of 
smart card used in the system. Smart cards are employed in various information 
systems like payment systems, personal identification systems, loyalty systems, 
etc. Therefore, smart cards are equipped with different applications,  Chapter 4 Smart Card System Modelling and Design          118 
       
specifications, security mechanisms, and data in each type of information 
system. 
4.2.2 The Amount of Data stored in each Smart Card Type  
According to the type of the information system the smart card serves, the 
amount of data stored within the smart card varies. The class diagram presented 
in this section demonstrates the smart card system components and shows 
specifically the different types of smart cards used in today’s digital environment 
along with their contents. The reason behind creating the smart card system 
class diagram was to describe the system structure by illustrating the system 
components, their attributes and operations, and their relationships between 
each other. 
The key point in this diagram is to show the amount of data that is stored 
within each type of smart card and the operations that are performed by each 
type of smart card. The User can own one or more smart cards depending on 
what systems the user is engaged in. Obviously, the User is the main source of 
the original personal data; on the other hand, the User details that are stored in 
the Smart Card and the system Database are extracted from the user during the 
registration or enrolment phase. The User’s role in the smart card system is to 
insert the Smart Card into the Smart Card Reader, request a transaction from 
the system, scan the Smart Card if the Reader has a touch pad, scan biometrics 
if the Reader has a biometric pad, or insert PIN if the Reader has a key pad. 
There is also a possibility of signing a document or a biometric pad if the 
system requires extra evidence or confirmation. Regardless of the type, the 
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templates, keys, algorithms, etc. It represents one of the main components of the 
system; therefore, the study is concerned about the data stored within the card 
and the flow of this data throughout the whole system. The Smart Card has the 
capability of reading, writing, saving, and updating data. It has direct 
communication with the other system components especially the User and the 
Smart Card Reader, and can also confirm the transactions that take place within 
the smart card system.  
The most important thing behind using the Smart Card is enhancing the 
security of the system, the question that arises here is: Does it really enhance 
the system security or does it represent a weakness in the system if it was 
misused? The answer to this question is never certain. Any component of any 
computerised system that is misused will make the system vulnerable to any 
kind of an attack, and therefore increase the probability of risks occurrence. 
However, if the Smart Card was built and controlled in a way where it loses its 
access to the system in case it was breached, that will make the Smart Card one 
of the best choices in terms of securing the data of the current information 
systems.  
This is a very hard goal to achieve; it is not as easy as it sounds. An 
important thing to point out at this stage is the amount of data that is stored 
within each type of Smart Card. The class diagram in figure (13) specifically 
shows the amount and type of data stored in the smart cards.  
  Loyalty Smart Card: it has the least amount of details stored, also, there 
are no monetary values stored in the card, so the need for sophisticated 
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system owners. Chip and PIN is the security method that is the most 
probably employed mechanism in the loyalty smart card systems. 
 
Figure (13): Class Diagram- The Amount of Data Stored in Each Type of Smart Card 
 
  Prepaid Smart Card: it contains more details than the Loyalty Smart Card; 
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identity details that are stored within the card. A good example would be 
the Oyster transport card that is used in London, the news about the 
breaches in the security of the MIFARE chip that is used by the Oyster card 
was publicly revealed. As reported in [102], [140], the discoveries of Karsten 
Nohl from University of Virginia and Henryk Plotz who effectively publicly 
revealed much of the cryptographic architecture at the core of the MIFARE 
Classic chip have been reported, in addition, the work of the digital security 
group at Radboud University in the Netherlands who continued with where 
Noel and Plotz left off was revealed. There work showed that there can be 
no doubt that both teams had cracked the MIFARE Crypto-1 algorithms, 
and the Radboud team was travelling freely in London Underground, which 
without a doubt means that the data stored within the smart card is 
vulnerable. This indicates that the intruders can have access to the 
sensitive data that is stored within the Prepaid Smart Card, therefore, have 
the ability to use the data in committing different types of attacks to the 
system and User ending up causing harm to all system components. Thus, 
is it really worth it to store all those details in a Prepaid Smart Card? This 
is what the system designers need to think about.  
  Health Smart Card: it is very similar to the ID Smart Card; it contains all 
the User personal details plus contacts names and numbers in case of an 
emergency, health record, drugs allergies and prescriptions, and 
immunisations. So, this card here contains more sensitive data than the 
previous ones except that the Health Smart Card does not hold any 
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programme where the User can pay for his medical expenses through the 
smart card, then the smart card holds access to extra sensitive data that 
deals with monetary issues. This will result in increasing the probability of 
attacks on the card and therefore increasing the risks that are associated 
with using this type of smart card. Information leakage from this type of 
smart card will harm the User privacy especially the confidential records 
related to his/her health and medical status. The User reputation will be 
affected depending on his/her role in the society, if the User was a well 
known personality in any community, then attackers will be more concerned 
about the User’s private and confidential data. 
  ID Smart Card: the same or even more can happen to the User ID Smart 
Card, this type of smart card holds the hugest amount of details that are 
stored within the smart card comparing to the other types of smart cards. 
The class diagram shows that the ID Smart Card basically holds all the 
identification elements of the User including very specific details like blood 
group, disabilities, signature and biometrics, and driving licence details. 
The huge amount of details stored within the ID Smart Card increases the 
chance of attackers committing attacks to get hold of the User details. 
Simply because getting hold of these details without the User knowing 
allows the attackers to pretend to be the User in order to steal money or get 
other benefits, this will make the User suffer from serious and various 
consequences that may take place because of the attackers actions, this type 
of crime is known as identity theft, which is very popular and is the main 
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  Banking Smart Card: is more attractive to attackers in comparison to the 
other types of smart cards because of its access to monetary values. It holds 
the User’s identification details plus the User’s account details like account 
number, issue and expiry dates, security code, and PIN or password. In fact, 
the worst case scenario is to combine the ID smart Card with the Banking 
Smart Card or making the ID Smart Card have access to the User’s banking 
accounts, which is what some projects are trying to do in order to minimise 
the number of cards that Users carry in their purses. This will make the 
User more vulnerable to attacks and the consequences will be more 
harmful.  
Now, the point behind specifically listing the contents of each type of smart 
card is to reveal the fact in case the User’s purse gets lost or stolen, taking into 
account that in our days the purse probably holds at least two types of the 
previously listed smart cards. Thus, when an attacker gets hold of the banking 
card and any other smart card in the purse, then breaching the User’s banking 
system is not a problem. The attacker can get hold of the User’s identification 
details including date of birth and address, in addition to the User’s account 
details. Then, the attacker will easily identify himself to the system and enjoys 
spending money or doing other things after successfully stealing the User’s 
identity.  
On the other hand, if getting access to the smart card contents is very much 
complicated and requires the User to be present for banking and identification 
transactions to take place, then the smart card will be a better option. So, there 
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not only depending on the smart card. Also, the less details the smart card holds, 
the less the risk is.  
 
4.2.3 The Smart Card System Objects and Operations 
Previously, the main elements of any smart card system and the operations 
that each element is responsible of in the system were mentioned. This section 
will present some UML sequence diagrams that will demonstrate the smart card 
system objects along with their associated operations and transactions in more 
details but within the system transaction level. It is quite essential to know 
exactly what happens while using a smart card. Thus, the following sequence 
diagrams will show the transactions that take place in the currently 
implemented smart card systems [141]. 
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  In any smart card system, the User will only interact with the Smart Card 
and the Smart Card Reader. Figure (14) demonstrates the transactions that take 
place when a User wants to use the Smart Card to commit an operation 
regardless of what type of Smart Card is used, the transactions details are 
derived from the daily actions that occur whenever we use a smart card in any 
point of sale or ATM.  
Transactions (1 and 2): the User inserts the Smart Card into the reader and then 
the verification process starts.  
Transactions (3-6): the Reader will request a verification code to be inserted by 
the user depending on what type of security mechanism is applied to the system. 
Thus, the code could be a PIN/Password, Biometric, or a combination of multiple 
mechanisms, etc.  
Transactions (7 and 8): the Reader then starts a matching process between the 
inserted code and the code stored in the Smart Card. If the matching process was 
true, then the Reader will confirm that the individual is who the individual 
claims to be and proceed with the transaction; otherwise, the Reader will reject 
the User and ends the transaction. 
Transactions (9-12): after getting the confirmation from the Reader to proceed 
with the transaction requested by the User, the User inserts the transaction 
details through the Reader. Finally, the Reader commits the transaction and 
informs the User when the transaction is over. 
If the smart card system is using the PIN/Password as a security mechanism 
along with the Smart Card, then the Registration System will generate a random 
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User. Or the User can register the PIN/Password during the enrolment process 
and this will be saved in the system. However, it is important to mention the 
weaknesses of using such a mechanism; the truth is PINs and Passwords 
represent significant risks because the User is in total control of the code. The 
User can share the code with others, write the code down on the card or 
somewhere close to it, use simple codes that can be guessed, in addition to the 
high probability of using the same code across multiple systems. Unfortunately, 
most of the currently implemented smart card systems rely heavily on this 
security mechanism, which results in high system breaches and identity theft. 
The coming corrections to the smart card systems are focusing on using the 
Biometrics technology as a much safer security mechanism in comparison with 
the PIN/Password. 
 
Smart Card Systems with Biometrics as a Security Mechanism 
Figure (15) is a sequence diagram that demonstrates the registration process 
of the Biometrics mechanism along with the verification process that is derived 
from [66]. The registration process and the smart card issue process are similar 
to [66], however, there are differences in the verification process. In [66], the 
authors came up with a new signature system model that has no matching 
process. The private keys in their proposed model were generated from 
fingerprint minutiae; they also added a check bit string and a rememberable key 
to the signing process. Their proposed new signature system is just a model and 
needs more work to become a practical system. Therefore, the new signature 
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The Issuing Authority of the Smart Card must implement a trusted smart 
card system; therefore, focusing on the design of the system is one of the most 
important issues to be concerned of. The design of a secure smart card system 
must have a secure enrolment process and a secure verification and 
authentication process. The enrolment process is part of the Registration System 
that is responsible of collecting the User's information, ensuring that the User is 
entitled of the credentials and privileges granted, and issuing the Smart Card. 
The first number of transactions in figure (15) shows the registration part of the 
system.  
Transactions (1 and 2): the User applies for the Smart Card and therefore 
provides the required information and details to the Registration System. The 
Registration System must make sure that the information provided is of high 
quality and accuracy, the User must prove his/her identity to the system by 
using various methods.  
Some of these methods are less secure like for example applying by filling a 
registration form and sending it by mail or e-mail, on the other hand, a more 
secure method is in-person identification, which is the most common method and 
is the most accurate. The Registration System must also ensure that the User 
has not enrolled in the system before as someone else; therefore, the enrollers 
must be well trained and aware of such cases.  
Transactions (3 and 4): after making sure everything is fine and all the data are 
accurate, the Registration System saves the User information in the Smart Card 
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Figure (15): Sequence Diagram- Biometrics Enrollment and Verification Processes in a Smart 
Card System 
 
Transactions (5-7):  the User provides the required biometric evidence to the 
Registration System, which is the fingerprint in this case, the evidence captured 
must be of a very high quality and accuracy, otherwise, the system performance 
and accuracy will be decreased and will perhaps produce false results.  
Transactions (8 and 9): the Registration System issues a template and saves a 
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Transactions (10 and 11): the Smart Card confirms that the details are saved, so 
the Registration System issues the Smart Card for the User. 
The second part shows the verification process of the smart card system using 
biometrics as a security mechanism. At this point, the Registration System is not 
any more involved.  
Transactions (12 and 13): The User starts the transaction and inserts the Smart 
Card into the Smart Card Reader. 
Transactions (14-17): the Reader will request the security code that is the 
biometric evidence in this case, the User then scans his/her finger and the 
fingerprint is extracted and transformed into a template using the related 
algorithms.  
Transactions (18-21): the Smart Card then compares the provided template to 
the one saved in the system and produces the matching result. If the result was 
true, then the Reader confirms the User identity and proceeds with the User 
transactions, otherwise, reject the User and ends the transactions.  
An important issue to point out is that currently the systems have not yet used 
this criterion of fingerprint live extraction method. The required algorithms for 
this method have not yet been developed and used successfully. Therefore, the 
systems use the template stored in the Smart Card and compare it to the 
template stored in the database of the system. 
 
Smart Card Systems with Biometrics and PKI as Security Mechanisms 
The following figures demonstrate the use of Biometrics mechanism along 
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mentioned in the previous section, the new signature system model that was 
proposed in [66] has been excluded. In [142], the authors examined five scenarios 
with three different strategies for integrating fingerprints into a smart card 
system, the outcome showed that the scenario where the match operation is 
performed on the smart card with the fingerprint sensor being built into the 
smart card reader is the most beneficial in the smart card-card reader model. 
Therefore, the models of this study are derived from the scenario that came up 
with the best results in [142], and added the PKI transactions to it. 
The biometrics mechanism is responsible of identifying and verifying the 
User, on the other side, the PKI is handling the identification and verification of 
the devices that are used in the system. Hence, two diagrams were created, the 
first diagram demonstrates the registration phase of the system and the second 
diagram demonstrates the process of using the smart card to commit a 
transaction in any smart card system that employs Biometrics and PKI. 
Figure (16) focuses on the Registration System that consists of the enrolment 
process.  
Transactions (1-4): at the beginning, the User has to enrol in the smart card 
system by applying for a Smart Card, providing personal details, proving to the 
system that the User is who the User claims to be by showing the relevant proof, 
and providing the biometric evidence depending on the biometric evidence type 
employed in the smart card system, which is in this case, the fingerprint. 
Transactions (5-9): the Registration System extracts the biometric feature and 
transforms it into a template. The template is saved in the system and the Smart 
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Transactions (10): after saving the template, the smart card issue system 
requests a secret key or also called private key from the Certificate Authority 
(CA), which is the authority responsible of generating digital certificates and a 
pair of private and public keys to the Users.  
 
Figure (16): Sequence Diagram- Registration Phase in Biometrics and PKI Smart Card System. 
 
Transactions (11-13): the CA first makes sure that the User is who the User 
claims to be by requesting User verification from the smart card system, if the 
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to the User and generates a digital certificate in correspondence with the public 
key. 
Transactions (14): the CA then stores the User's public key in its databases and 
sends the private key to the smart card system.  
Transactions (15): the Smart Card issue system then generates a digital 
signature that contains the User's private key and the biometric template. 
Transactions (16-17): finally, the smart card issue system sends a confirmation 
to the Registration System and the Smart Card then is going to be issued 
successfully to the User.  
Hence, in order for the User to successfully use the Smart Card, the matching 
process of the biometric evidence must take place along with the correct 
matching of the private and public keys. 
Figure (17) will show the transactions that take place when the User uses the 
Smart Card in a security environment that combines both Biometrics and PKI 
security methods. 
Transactions (1-3): the User first scans the finger through the Smart Card 
Reader scanner; the Reader will extract the User's biometric feature and produce 
a template.  
Transactions (4 and 5): the matching process will then take place and the result 
will decide whether the User has the permission to access the system and use the 
Smart Card or not. If the matching result was true, then the Smart Card will 
release the User's private key and the verification process will then be 
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Transactions (6 and 7): the User starts to send a message to the Receiver; the 
message is going to be digitally signed with the User's private key first. 
 
Figure (17): Sequence Diagram- Verification Phase in Biometrics and PKI Smart Card System. 
 
Transactions (8-11): then the system will request the Receivers public key from 
the CA in order to encrypt the message. The CA will send the digital certificate 
and the message will be encrypted using both the User's private key and the 
Receiver's pubic key, therefore, the digital envelope is now ready to be sent 
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Transactions (12-14): finally, the Receiver will send a request to the CA to get 
the Sender's public key to be able to decrypt the message. Again, using both the 
Sender's public key and the Receiver's private key the Receiver will be able to 
open the message successfully.  
Using these security methods will achieve the security goals, which are 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. However, each 
mechanism has its pros and cons, and the fingerprint has its disadvantages. The 
question that arises in this situation is: How can we know that the biometric 
provided is not subject to misuse? If the User was clever and powerful enough to 
fool the system and use a false fingerprint, then the system will be breached and 
an intruder will have access to the real User's credentials and privileges. In 
addition, the PKI method has its disadvantages as well, in case one of the 
disadvantages take place during the transaction the Sender and the Receiver 
will both suffer from security loss. 
4.2.4 The Smart Card System Proposed Designs 
Putting in mind that each security mechanism can be breached in a way or 
another, some proposed smart card systems are generated to overcome some of 
the disadvantages of those mechanisms. Combining number of technologies to 
achieve a better secured system is a great idea, as mentioned as ideas and 
recommendations in [26] and [143] . The combination will improve the system 
security and better protect the information that flows within the system 
components.  
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Smart Card Systems with PIN, Biometrics, and PKI as Security Mechanisms 
The first proposed system design combines three security mechanisms in 
addition to the Smart Card that is based on "what the user has". The 
mechanisms are: PIN, Biometrics, and PKI, The first two mechanisms are 
responsible of User identification and verification, a PIN mechanism is based on 
"what the user knows", and the biometrics is based on "who the user is". 
Furthermore, the PKI mechanism is the key management method that is 
responsible of verifying the devices in the system. 
The design is divided into two sequence diagrams, the first diagram 
demonstrates the Registration System and the other diagram demonstrates the 
Verification process along with the transactions related to sending the messages 
between the sender and the receiver.  
Figure (18) shows the enrolment process that is the main part of the 
Registration System. Similar to the previously described system designs that 
were derived from [66]; however, it goes beyond what was previously published 
by adding two authentication mechanisms during the Registration System.  
Transaction (1-9): the User provides the required information along with the 
biometric evidence. The system then saves the User details in the Smart Card 
and captures the fingerprint, which is the biometric method used in the proposed 
design, and produces a template that is stored in the system and the Smart 
Card.  
Transaction (10-12): the Registration System requests a PIN from the User to be 
used in future verification processes along with the biometric evidence. In some 
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the User, after that the User has the ability to change the PIN into a code that 
the User can memorise. The PIN is going to be stored in the Smart Card to be 
able to achieve future verification.  
 
Figure (18): Sequence Diagram- Registration Phase in PIN, Biometrics (Fingerprint), and PKI 
Smart Card 
 
Transaction (13-18): the smart card issue system requests a private key from the 
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User verification from the Registration System, generates a pair of keys to the 
User, the CA also issues a digital certificate corresponding to the public key, and 
after all sends the private key to be stored in the Smart Card.  
Transaction (19-21): the Smart Card generates a digital signature that combines 
the private key and the biometric template of the User. Then the Smart Card 
sends a confirmation to the Registration system, therefore the new Smart Card 
is issued and sent to the User.  
Figure (19) shows the transactions that take place when the User uses the 
Smart Card in a security environment that combines PIN, Biometrics, and PKI 
security methods. 
Transaction (1-4): the User inserts the PIN first; next the Smart Card Reader 
will extract the saved PIN from the Smart Card and start the comparison 
process. If the matching was successful the Smart Card Reader will ask for 
another proof, which is the User’s fingerprint, otherwise, the transaction will be 
aborted after allowing the User generally three attempts to enter the PIN.  
Transaction (5-7): the User then scans the finger through the Smart Card Reader 
scanner; the Reader will extract the User's biometric feature and produce a 
template. 
Transaction (8 and 9): the matching process will then take place and the result 
will decide whether the User has the permission to access the system and use the 
Smart Card or not. If the matching result was true, then the verification process 
will be successful. This will make the Smart Card chip unlock and release the 
User's private key. The Smart Card is now ready to use the released private key 
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Transaction (10 and 11): the User starts to send a message to the Receiver; the 
message is going to be digitally signed with the User's private key through the 
Smart Card. 
 
Figure (19): Sequence Diagram- Verification Processes in PIN, Biometrics (Fingerprint), and PKI 
Smart Card System. 
 
Transaction (12-15): then the system will request the Receivers public key from 
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and the message will be encrypted using both the User's private key and the 
Receiver's public key, therefore, the digital envelope is now ready to be sent 
securely to the Receiver. 
Transaction (16-18): Finally, the Receiver will send a request to the CA to get the 
Sender's public key to be able to decrypt the message. Again, using both the 
Sender's public key and the Receiver's private key the Receiver will be able to 
decrypt the message successfully. 
 
Smart Card Systems with Two Biometrics and PKI as Security Mechanisms 
Another suggestion is to use two Biometric methods rather than a PIN and a 
Biometric method for user authentication, which is a further enhancement of 
what have been previously published. It is more significant to use one physical 
biometrics method and another behavioural biometrics method, the reason 
behind using two different biometric methods is to make sure the user is who 
he/she claims to be. If the attacker was successful in fooling the authentication 
scheme with a fake fingerprint, the attacker will have to succeed again in the 
next authentication step that is another biometric evidence to submit, which 
make it harder for an attacker have successful attempts on both biometric 
methods. Attacking Biometrics is possible but is much harder than attacking a 
PIN, therefore, there is a better chance that the probabilities of successful 
attacks will decrease.  
Figure (20) is a sequence diagram that shows the transactions that take place 
in a smart card system which employs two Biometric methods: fingerprint as a 
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registration system in this proposed system is quite similar to the previously 
described Biometrics Registration System; also, this system employs PKI as the 
cryptographic key management scheme, which has a third party that produces 
digital certificates to the system users allowing them to store their private keys 
in their smart cards and exchange public keys throughout the network.  
 
Figure (20): Sequence Diagram- Verification Processes using two Biometric methods (Fingerprint 
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Transaction (1-5): the User submits the fingerprint first, and then the matching 
process will match the live template produced with the stored template. If the 
attempt was successful, then the system will request the User’s signature. 
Otherwise, another attempt will be given to the user to be able to submit the 
correct fingerprint. 
Transaction (6-9): the User is going to sign using the digital screen on the 
Reader. Then the Reader will extract the features, generate a template out of the 
live signature, and match it with the template saved in the smart card. The 
result of the matching process will determine whether the user is the legitimate 
user or not. Each system has the flexibility to allow number of attempts, usually 
the systems allow the users three times to submit the correct evidence. 
Transaction (10-19): these transactions are similar to the previously explained 
transactions in figure (19). The Smart Card will release the private key, digitally 
sign the message, encrypt the message using the Receiver’s public key, and send 
the message to the Receiver. Finally, the Receiver will decrypt the message using 
the Sender’s public key.  
In conclusion, it is much better to use combined methods of authentication to 
be able to better secure the system, there are number of options when it comes to 
combining authentication methods. According to the security requirements, type 
of information, amount of information stored and transmitted throughout the 
network, and some other factors depending on each type of smart card system 
and the services it provides, the system administrators will have to choose the 
methods that better serve their systems and ensure good security levels. 
  Chapter 4 Smart Card System Modelling and Design          142 
       
4.3 Attempt to Test Against Attacks by Using UMLsec 
Three types of UML diagrams have been used, which are behaviour diagrams 
(Use Case diagram), structure diagrams (Class diagram), and interaction 
diagrams (Sequential diagram). The UML diagrams are used to express the 
smart card system protocol and processes, and present the transactions that take 
place while messages are exchanged during the registration and verification 
processes, in addition to knowing where are the areas that could be vulnerable to 
attacks, it is quite essential to test the model against possible attacks. UMLsec 
was used to test attacks against the model, stereotypes like <<secrecy>> and 
<<secure information flow>> along with their tags and constraints were applied. 
An adversary type in UMLsec can have a function called Threat that allows the 
adversary to commit delete, read, and insert as attacks. By writing these 
notations down, the model is still static and not executable. 
As a result, UMLsec is a well developed extension of UML; however, it did not 
automate the model. The reason is that UMLsec is a specification language that 
has the ability of expressing the system protocols and transactions but not 
automating them. Therefore, in this piece of work, we are trying to provide a 
simulation tool, which is the next step after modelling the system using 
specification languages that produce diagrams and notations. For that reason, 
SystemC with TLM extension is going to be used to be able to transform the 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks 
The UML diagrams produced in the chapter gives the designer a detailed 
view of the smart card system components and functions. The diagrams 
illustrate the system objects and assign the transactions to be carried out by 
each object, in addition to demonstrating the system processes that take place 
from the beginning until the end. UML as a modelling language has a strong 
visual component that allows the construction of models at varying levels of 
abstraction, it also allows the designer to propose solutions and demonstrate 
them at different levels of detail.  
The diagrams can be static or dynamic, in this chapter both types are used to 
better demonstrate the smart card system components and their related 
transactions. The static diagrams used are the use case diagram and the class 
diagram, these diagrams offer a structural view of the smart card system, 
examples are figure (12) and figure (13). On the other hand, the sequence 
diagram used is a dynamic type of diagram that shows the behaviours and 
interactions of the smart card system components, examples are figures (14-20). 
However, to be able to take this model to a further advanced step, which is 
automation, the UML and its related extensions do not have the ability to 
support the designer’s needs. Therefore, the next chapter is about using other 
languages that are capable of transferring the static diagrams produced in this 
chapter into an automated model that allows transaction execution.      Chapter 5 Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and TLM      144 
       
Chapter 5 
 
 
Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and 
Transaction Level Modelling (TLM) 
 
Modelling and producing a simulation tool that allows the designer to run 
tests on the proposed smart card systems is the aim of this chapter. SystemC 
along with its extension TLM are used to build the smart card system simulation 
tool, which is an executable model that can run different number of tests and 
therefore gives the designer the opportunity to examine the robustness of the 
smart card system security. 
5.1 Simulating the Smart Card System 
In essence, it is meaningful and quite significant to demonstrate the 
diagrams and produce a simulation tool based on it to be able to know that the 
model is correct. Otherwise, without simulation there is no chance of declaring 
that the model is correct and is running in an effective and efficient manner. 
The previous modelling languages do not provide an automatic transition 
from design to code implementation; the designer would like to have an 
executable model that allows a better testing of the designed model and therefore 
links the gap between the design phase and the code implementation phase. 
Therefore, in this study, the executable model is produced using SystemC with 
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SystemC has become a popular choice for designers of  both System-On-Chip 
(SOC)  and embedded processors, the reasons behind the popularity of the 
language is its adaptability at cycle, facilitating the development of transaction 
level models (TLM), and ability to model concurrent processes [144], [145]. The 
following is a description of SystemC language along with TLM, which are both 
used to test the proposed solutions to be able to enhance the smart card security 
system. 
5.1.1 SystemC Overview 
SystemC consists of a class library and a simulation kernel, the language is 
supported by Open SystemC Initiative (OSCI). SystemC was defined by the 
OSCI [146] as:  
SystemC is a single, unified design and verification language that expresses 
architectural and other system-level attributes in the form of open-source C++ 
classes. It enables design and verification at the system level, independent of 
any detailed hardware and software implementation, as well as enabling co-
verification with RTL design [146]. 
 
The designer creates the SystemC models at different levels like system level, 
behavioural level, or register transfer level (RTL) using C/C++ augmented by the 
SystemC class library [147]. The SystemC library uses many types of hardware 
specific objects like concurrent and hierarchical modules, ports, channels, 
processes, and clocks. In addition, it contains a light weight kernel that 
schedules the processes [147]. 
SystemC is a design language that has developed to support the need for a 
language that improves the overall productivity for designers in the electronic 
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software model using some high level language such as C and C++, on the other 
hand, a hardware model using some hardware description languages such as 
VHDL and Verilog is also required [149]. 
However, it is quite a hard task to communicate with the software using the 
previous hardware languages and vice versa, so the software engineer must 
interact with the established hardware model in ways such as remote procedure 
calls or socket communication [149]. 
SystemC increases productivity by giving the engineers and designers the 
opportunity to design both hardware and software components at the same time 
[148], it supports the development of complex systems by designing and verifying 
hardware system components at a high level of abstraction [150], [145]. By 
providing a higher level of abstraction, a greater understanding of the system 
components interactions and complexity in the early stages of design will be 
possible, in addition to enabling considerably faster, more productive 
architectural trade-off analysis, design, and redesign. SystemC was used by [151] 
to produce a methodology to simulate security attacks on smart cards with fault 
injection, it was also used by [145] to create an environment for design 
verification of smart cards using security attack simulation, their work 
specifically focused on testing the robustness of systems against optical fault 
induction attacks. SystemC represented designs on high abstraction levels with a 
shorter simulation time, which gives the advantage of redesigning the system to 
fulfil certain security demands. However, the executable model with attacks 
simulation in this study is different from the work in [151] and [145] because the 
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robustness is done on the transaction level using the transaction level modeling 
extension that is going to be explained in the coming section of this chapter. 
5.1.2 SystemC Components 
The major hardware oriented features implemented within SystemC are: 
Module Hierarchy, concurrency model, time model, communications 
management between concurrent units of execution, and hardware data types 
[148]. As mentioned previously, the SystemC library provides concurrent and 
hierarchical modules, ports, channels, processes, and clocks. Large designs are 
always broken down hierarchically to be able to manage complexity; structural 
decomposition of the simulated model in SystemC is specified with modules. The 
module is the smallest component with state, behaviour, and structure for 
hierarchical connectivity, the concept known as SC_MODULE is used to 
represent the module [148]. Within the module, a variety of elements make up 
the body, however, the constructor is one of the main elements required in every 
module. It performs number of tasks such as initializing/allocating sub-designs, 
connecting sub-designs, registering processes with the SystemC kernel, 
providing static sensitivity, and miscellaneous user-defined setup [148]. The 
constructor concept in SystemC is known as SC_CTOR, or sometimes 
SC_HAS_PROCESS that is an alternative approach to creating constructors by 
using a C-preprocessor (cpp) macro [152].  
Modules are considered to be the building blocks of SystemC; the interaction 
between modules is designed using channels, interfaces, and ports. A channel is 
the base communications mean that is in charge of propagating values from one 
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SystemC, channels represent complex communications schemes like bus 
channels, at the same time, they may represent very simple communications 
such as a wire or a FIFO (first-in-first-out queue) [150]. 
A SystemC interface is an abstract class that provides pure virtual 
declarations of methods referenced by channels and ports [148], furthermore, 
ports rely on interfaces to communicate with channels. A port is a pointer to a 
channel outside the module, it allows access of channels across module 
boundaries [152]. 
The functionality of SystemC is described in processes, the process is a basic 
unit of execution in the system, from the start of the simulation until the end all 
executing code is initiated from one or more processes, in addition, SystemC 
processes represent concurrent behaviour [148], [147]. There are two basic types 
of processes, methods known as SC_METHOD and threads known as 
SC_THREAD. Method is a process that behaves like a function call, it is in some 
ways more simple than a thread process, however, its simplicity makes it more 
difficult to use for some complicated modelling styles [147]. Methods cannot be 
suspended internally, instead, they can run completely and return, the 
simulation engine calls the methods repeatedly based on the type of sensitivity, 
whether dynamic or static. This characteristic makes the method more efficient 
than the thread process. On the other hand, a thread process is associated with 
its own thread of execution, this type of processes start one only by the 
simulator, once the thread starts executing it is in complete control of the 
simulation until it chooses to return the control to the simulator. Hence, the 
thread process is used to model sequential behaviour [147]. SystemC has two  Chapter 5 Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and TLM      149 
       
ways to pass the control to the simulator again, one way is to exit by (return), in 
this case the thread is totally stopped, the other way is by having a (wait), 
therefore, every thread contains an infinite loop usually has at least one wait 
function. Therefore, SystemC enters the waiting state whenever it encounters a 
wait or a return. 
It is important to mention events in SystemC, an event is considered to be a 
critical element in an event driven simulator similar to the SystemC simulation 
kernel [148]. It is known as sc_event, it has no value and no duration, it is 
mainly the occurrence of an sc_event using the notify keyword that happens at a 
single point in time.  
The SystemC simulation kernel follows the evaluate-update concept, where 
multiple evaluate-update phases can take place at the same simulation time is 
supported [147].  The phases are initialisation, where the system is initialised by 
executing all the processes. Second, the evaluation phase, which is about 
executing the process that is ready to run, it is repeating until all ready 
processes are executed including events. Last, the update phase that is executing 
any update calls made during the evaluation phase [147]. This is mainly the 
basic phases of the SystemC simulation kernel along with the basic components 
that are included in models produced and designed by SystemC. 
5.1.3 Overview of Transaction Level Modelling (TLM) 
In TLM, communication among computation components is modeled by 
channels and transaction requests, which are implemented by calling interface 
functions of these channel models [153]. The initiator port and the target port 
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transactions and passes them on by calling a method of one of the core interfaces 
[155], and the target is another module that receives the sent transactions from 
the initiator. A system component can be an initiator, a target, or an 
interconnect. The interconnect module accesses a transaction but does not act as 
an initiator or a target for that transaction, for example routers can be 
interconnect modules in a system [155], [156]. Another important element in 
TLM is the generic payload, which is defined by [155] as a class for transaction 
objects passed through the core interfaces of the model, it is closely related to the 
base protocol that ensures interoperability when using the generic payload. The 
generic payload is aiming at modeling memory-mapped buses, which includes 
some of the memory-mapped bus protocols attributes like command, address, 
data, byte enables, single word transfers, streaming, response status, etc [155], 
[156].  
TLM enables high speed simulation time in addition to exploring and 
validating implementation alternatives at a high level of abstraction [153].  
TLM have been successfully used in the design of systems by some designers and 
developers; it was used by [157] to ease the development of embedded software, 
and [158] applied TLM with protocol details and used it to integrate system 
components at the transaction level. Therefore, TLM has number of benefits that 
allows the designer to design the communication of the system components in a 
high level of abstraction with less simulation time, in addition to the ability of 
redesigning the transactions in an easier and more convenient manner.  
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5.1.4 Producing the Smart Card System Simulation Tool 
The main idea in this section is to produce a simulation tool, which has the 
ability to transform the static UML diagrams demonstrated earlier into a 
program that executes the transactions in an automated manner. 
 
5.1.4.1 The Structure and Processes of the Smart Card Simulation Tool 
The executable model produced in our work shows the sequence of 
transactions that occur in the smart card system while the smart card is used; 
they correspond to the transactions in the figure (19), where the smart card 
system uses the PIN and Biometrics for user identification, and PKI as a key 
management security method. Figure (19) is the diagram chosen among others to 
be transformed into code because it includes all the smart card system 
components, two different authentication methods, a key management method, 
and it demonstrated all the transactions that occur in the processes of the smart 
card system.   
Hence, in the executable module, the smart card system objects and their 
related transactions, the lifelines in the UML diagram, are represented as 
objects - modules in SystemC, and the arrows are represented as TLM 
transactions. The modules have two types of sockets, an initiator socket that is 
responsible of sending the transactions and a target socket that is responsible of 
receiving the transactions; both sockets are defined in the module structure. 
Figure (21) shows an example of one of the modules, which is the Sender module. 
The Sender module communicates with the Smart Card module and the 
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Card is created, along with another initiator socket to the Smart Card Reader 
module, to allow the Sender to send transactions to both modules. The initiator 
is responsible of calling the transport function to send the payload to the target 
socket. On the other hand, a target socket is created and then registered in the 
constructor; the target socket receives the payload from the transfer function for 
processing and response. 
 
Figure (21): The Sender Module Structure of the Smart Card System  
 
In this case, the Sender receives transactions from the Smart Card Reader 
module and processes them.  
The next step is creating the threads that correspond to the processes taking 
place in each module, creating the payloads that are transferred from a module 
to the other, creating functions, and setting events and variables. In the smart 
card executable model, the authentication methods used are PIN and Biometrics. 
The user, modelled as part of the Sender module, enters the PIN first. If the PIN 
is correct, the Sender enters the fingerprint. The number of attempts allowed for 
the Sender is programmable and flexible to change; the system administrators 
SC_MODULE(sender) 
{ 
// smartcard reader interface 
simple_initiator_socket<sender> iS_to_smartcard; 
   
// smartcard reader interface 
simple_initiator_socket<sender> iS_to_smartcard_reader; 
simple_target_socket<sender> tS_from_smartcard_reader; 
 
  SC_CTOR(sender) { 
    // target socket registration 
    tS_from_smartcard_reader.register_b_transport(this, 
&sender::b_transport); 
    // main thread 
    SC_THREAD(state_machine); 
    // state machine initial state 
    state = START; 
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and decision makers have the authority to decide the number of attempts 
allowed by simply changing the rule of number of attempts.  
For example, in our case the Sender has three attempts to enter the correct 
PIN and other three attempts to enter the correct fingerprint. The executable 
model counts the number of attempts, and compares the inserted PIN and 
fingerprint with the saved PIN and fingerprint template in the smart card. Also, 
there is a time limit for inserting the PIN and fingerprint, the Sender has ten 
seconds to enter the data, otherwise a timeout message will appear and one 
attempt will be counted as incorrect. If the number of incorrect attempts 
exceeded the limit, which is in this case three times, the system blocks the smart 
card and saves the smart card ID in the banned smart card list. Errors in 
entering the correct PIN vary; it could be wrong digits, taking long time to insert 
the correct PIN, or an attacker trying to insert the PIN randomly, etc. So the 
steps that take place during the authentication process are: 
Get PIN 
If PIN inserted = Saved PIN 
If Time is < 10 seconds 
Then print “Correct”  
Request fingerprint 
Else If re-enter PIN 
If number of attempts < 3 times 
Go to Get PIN 
Else block the smart card and print “max pin attempts reached card 
banned” 
 
 
Figure (22) shows a sample of the SystemC TLM code lines of the previous 
pseudo code: 
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void generate_transaction(string &pin_, sc_time &dt_) { 
    scv_smart_ptr<int> correct_entry_ptr;  
    correct_entry_ptr->keep_only(1, 100); 
    correct_entry_ptr->next(); 
    if ( *correct_entry_ptr > PIN_FAILURE_RATE) { 
      pin_ = "correct"; 
    } else { 
      pin_ = "incorrect"; 
    } 
            scv_smart_ptr<int> time_value_ptr; 
    time_value_ptr->keep_only(1, MAX_ENTRY_TIME);  
    time_value_ptr->next(); 
    dt_ = ( (*time_value_ptr) * sc_time(1, SC_SEC)); 
        } 
Figure (22): The PIN Entry Part of the Simulation Tool 
 
The same steps take place when entering the fingerprint, the successful 
attempts of PIN and fingerprint will confirm that the Sender is the legitimate 
user. Therefore, when the Sender passes the authentication step, the smart card 
releases the private key, and the transactions related to signing the message 
with the private and public keys, in addition to sending the digitally signed 
message to the Receiver occur.  
In reality, the User enters the PIN and scans the fingerprint through an 
input device like a key pad, biometric scanner, or a touch pad. However, our 
executable model can randomise the PIN and fingerprint entries, and also 
randomise the correct and incorrect time. A simple pseudo-random number 
generator is used to be able to randomise the PIN and fingerprint entries along 
with randomising the correct and incorrect time in seconds. The simple random 
number generator is fast and provides better randomness properties like 
adjusting the ratios, changing the range of sample smart cards to be tested, and 
modifying the probabilities of failure. 
An arbitrary ratio of successful PIN and fingerprint is used; it can be modified to 
allow flexibility in testing different probabilities of failure.  
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The following is part of the simulation output produced: 
sender_object: 
///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object:// Card count: 100 
sender_object:// Card ID: 611 
sender_object:// Pin entered: correct 
sender_object:// entry duration: 1 s 
sender_object: ///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object: begin transition 1 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 2 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 2 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 3 
smartcard_reader_object: Good pin 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 3 
sender_object: end transition 1 
sender_object: *** good pin decoded *** 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 4 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 4 
sender_object: ///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object:// Card count: 100 
sender_object:// Card ID: 611 
sender_object:// Fingerprint entered: correct 
sender_object:// Entry duration: 5 s 
sender_object: ///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object: begin transition 5 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 6 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 6 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 7 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 7 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 8 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 8 
sender_object: end transition 5 
smartcard_object: begin transition 9 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 10 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 10 
smartcard_object: end transition 9 
sender_object: begin transition 11 
sender_object: end transition 11 
smartcard_object: begin transition 12 
smartcard_object: end transition 12 
smartcard_object: begin transition 13 
smartcard_object: end transition 13 
certificate_authority_object: begin transition 14 
certificate_authority_object: end transition 14 
smartcard_object: begin transition 15 
smartcard_object: end transition 15 
smartcard_object: begin transition 16 
smartcard_object: end transition 16 
receiver_object: begin transition 17 
receiver_object: end transition 17 
certificate_authority_object: begin transition 18 
certificate_authority_object: end transition 18 
receiver_object: begin transition 19 
receiver_object: end transition 19 
 
Figure (23): Simulation Output of Transaction Flow in the Smart Card System. 
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The transitions in the output correspond to the transactions’ numbers in the 
UML diagram in figure (19). Obviously, the designer can observe the attempts to 
enter the right PIN and Biometric along with the required timing. This allows 
the testing of the effectiveness of the authentication methods used, by running 
simulation on different number of smart cards with different probabilities of 
failure; it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of each authentication method.  
This demonstration is in essence showing the objects along with their related 
transactions that take place in a smart card system. It is quite meaningful 
though to demonstrate this diagram, simply because if you cannot simulate it 
there is no other way of knowing that it is correct. 
Testing the proposed authentication methods in the smart card system is the 
next step, as mentioned previously, one proposed model has the PIN and 
Biometrics as authentication methods, and the other model proposed two 
Biometric methods (physical and behavioural).  
 
5.1.4.2 Testing the Authentication Methods  
Validation of the authentication methods in the smart card system is based 
on two proposed models. The first model utilises the PIN and Biometrics 
authentication methods, while the second model utilises two Biometrics 
authentication methods (a physical and a behavioural method). 
The main reason behind carrying out these correctness tests is to check that 
the simulation using the executable model is actually working. Other purposes 
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-  Confirmation of the functionality/workability of the smart card simulation 
tool and the availability of test results. 
-  Reliability of the smart card simulation tool in which actual results 
through the simulation are obtained. 
-  The degree of flexibility of assigning thresholds and failure probabilities, 
which will assist in customising the simulation tool based on the industry 
and sector in which the smart card system will be used. 
-  The speed of testing, which allows users of the simulation tool to obtain 
results and manipulate thresholds with ease and flexibility. 
 
The following tests have been performed: 
Test #1: Examination of the use of PIN and Biometrics as authentication 
methods. 
Test #2: Examination of the use of two Biometrics techniques as authentication 
methods. 
For each of these tests, an arbitrary probability of failure has been assigned 
to each of the authentication methods. For example, the probability of failure for 
the PIN is set at 15%, for the Biometrics (fingerprint) it is set at 10%, and the 
time allowed for entering the correct pin and correct fingerprint is set at 10 
seconds for each. These probabilities are just examples that have been set while 
taking into consideration potential user errors, system errors, environmental 
factors, and the possibility of successful attacks during the process of using the 
smart cards. 
The reason for assuming that the PIN has a slightly higher probability of 
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PIN authentication method is weaker than the Biometrics and thus there is a 
higher probability of successful attacks and user errors and mistakes. 
Test #1 – PIN and Biometrics:  
Table (13) provides a summary of the testing process and its results for the first 
model: 
Remarks 
Number of simulated smart cards 
100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000 
good pin decoded  100  500  998  1490  1976  2464  2950 
pin incorrect/re-enter correct pin  16  102  207  302  394  493  587 
timeout error (pin)  9  58  125  189  257  299  376 
good bio decoded  100  500  998  1490  1976  2464  2950 
bio incorrect/re-enter correct bio  13  38  82  126  167  200  234 
timeout error (bio)  11  58  124  171  236  299  359 
Table (13): Results from Testing the PIN and Biometrics Authentication Methods. 
 
Testing was based on using a sample starting at 100 smart cards and up to 
3,000 cards to provide the necessary range and spectrum for testing. Table (13) 
displays the results for both the PIN and Biometrics authentication methods 
based on the 3 scenarios of potential failure/error. 
An examination of the results may be interpreted according to the industry and 
sector of use which dictate the levels of acceptable thresholds and probabilities of 
failure.  
Initially, when examining the relationship between the expected and 
observed results of failure attempts across all sample sizes we are able to 
confirm that it is a linear relationship and that observed failure attempts are 
always below the expected range. 
The following are graphs that show the total expected and observed attempts 
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Figure (24): Expected and Observed PIN failure attempts in PIN and Biometrics proposed model. 
 
The graph also concludes that the higher the number of smart cards tested, 
the smaller the variance between the expected and observed failure attempts. In 
a sample size of 3,000 cards, failure attempts are 963; over 30% of the sample 
size. This failure percentage alerts us to the vulnerability of the system 
indicating that both the user and the system will operate in a risky environment. 
This entails a low level of acceptance of usage from both parties due to the 
increased risks represented by the use of this method. Having such a high degree 
of risk and vulnerability in the system will expose it to numerous additional 
threats from different sources. 
 
Figure (25) demonstrates the expected and observed failure attempts using 
the Biometrics authentication methods. The probability of failure used in testing 
the Biometrics method is arbitrary, the earlier sections of the thesis discussed 
the authentication methods in details, and the result of the discussions showed 
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probability of failure assigned to the Biometrics method in this test is 10%, 
which is less than the PIN authentication method by 5%. Upon examination of 
the expected and observed failure attempts of the Biometrics authentication 
methods the results are contrary to those of the PIN authentication. Most 
specifically, when simulating a sample size of 3,000 smart cards the number of 
recorded failure attempts is reduced to 593; about 20% of the sample size. This 
reduction of 10% in failure attempts provides a good indication of the strength of 
the authentication method employed. 
 
 Figure (25): Expected and Observed Biometric Failure Attempts in PIN and Biometrics Proposed 
Model. 
 
The results of the expected and observed PIN and Biometric failure attempts are 
listed in table (14) below and recorded as percentage of the total sample size: 
Number of Smart Cards  100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000 
Percentage Observed (PIN)  8%  11%  11%  11%  11%  11%  11% 
Percentage Expected (PIN)  15%  15%  15%  15%  15%  15%  15% 
Percentage Observed (BIO)  8%  6%  7%  7%  7%  7%  7% 
Percentage Expected (BIO)  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Table (14): Percentages of Expected and Observed PIN and Biometrics Failure Attempts.  
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When comparing the observed PIN failure attempts to the Biometrics failure 
attempts, it is noted that the percentages are 10% and 7%, respectively. 
Although the variance is relatively minor, it indicates that the PIN 
authentication method requires additional monitoring, particularly in avoiding 
risks of external threats that pose potential harm against the users and system 
confidentiality and privacy.  
Furthermore, under the simulation of 1,000 smart cards, it is noted that two 
cards have been banned due to reaching the maximum attempts of PIN entry. 
However, as the sample size increases, the number of banned smart cards grows 
exponentially as illustrated in the graph below.  
 
Figure (26): Smart Cards Banned in PIN and Biometrics Proposed Model. 
 
For example when running 3000 smart cards, about 50 of them were banned 
during the PIN authentication step, on the contrary, for the Biometrics 
authentication method, it is noted that no smart cards have been banned when 
using this method. Thus, the example of giving lower probability of failure to the 
Biometrics authentication method in the test gives results that indicate that the  Chapter 5 Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and TLM      162 
       
use of Biometric authentication method provides better security levels when 
adopted by smart cards, particularly ones that store and have access to sensitive 
data. 
Test #2 – Two Biometrics: 
The second test examines the second proposed model which combines two 
Biometrics authentication methods. The probabilities of failure that are assigned 
to both Biometrics methods are 10%. The following are the recorded results of 
the attempts that took place during the test: 
Remarks 
Number of simulated smart cards 
100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000 
good bio1 decoded  100  500  994  1484  1999  2499  2998 
bio1 incorrect/re-enter correct bio1  11  49  107  170  197  253  301 
timeout error (bio1)  11  49  123  175  218  277  342 
good bio2 decoded  100  500  994  1484  1999  2499  2998 
bio2 incorrect/re-enter correct bio2  12  65  119  169  253  303  363 
timeout error (bio2)  9  66  121  175  274  321  393 
Table (15): Results from Testing Two Biometrics Authentication Methods. 
 
Compared to the results of Test #1, the results of this test provide more 
acceptable results due to the reduced observed results of failure attempts of the 
Biometrics authentication method. Overall, this allows for operating the smart 
cards in a safer and more secure environment, particularly when it comes to 
storage and access of sensitive information. 
As illustrated in figure (27), all observed attempts are within an acceptable 
range, more specifically below the expected failure attempts. It is worth noting 
that based on the requirements of the industry and sector in which the smart 
card will be deployed; system administrators are able to set suitable thresholds 
and failure probabilities.   Chapter 5 Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and TLM      163 
       
 
Figure (27): Expected and Observed Biometrics Failure Attempts in Two Biometrics Proposed 
Model. 
 
A preliminary judgment of these results indicate that the use of two 
Biometric authentication methods will further strengthen and protect the 
authentication process and provide an additional level of security and 
confidentiality.    
  
 Number of Smart Cards  100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000 
Percentage Observed (BIO1)  7%  7%  8%  8%  7%  7%  7% 
Percentage Expected (BIO1)  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Percentage Observed (BIO2)  7%  9%  8%  8%  9%  8%  8% 
Percentage Expected (BIO2)  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Table (16): Percentages of Expected and Observed Biometrics Failure Attempts. 
 
The average of failure attempts in the first Biometrics authentication method 
is 7%; while the second method has an average of 8% failure attempts. Taking 
this information along with the number of banned cards as illustrated in figure 
(28) provide us with several observations. Firstly, the use of two Biometrics 
authentication methods provides a rigorous means of security for users and 
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first Biometrics authentication was attacked, the second Biometrics 
authentication will make it difficult to conduct a second attack.    
 
Figure (28):  Smart Cards Banned in Two Biometrics Proposed Model. 
 
The second observation takes into consideration the number of banned smart 
cards during this testing model. The most number of banned smart cards was 
present when simulating a sample size of 1,000, where 6 cards were banned. 
However, when simulating a sample size of 3,000 cards, this number is reduced 
to 2 cards only. This concludes that not only is this method more robust than the 
previous model, but it also allows for a safer processing environment even at 
high transaction volumes. Although the probabilities of failures used in 
conducting the tests are just examples, yet the outcome shows that the 
executable model used to test the authentication methods is working, which is 
the main purpose of carrying out the tests.   
Having examined the two test results and concluding that the use of two 
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opposed to the use of PIN and Biometrics combined, to adopt such method in real 
life it is important to assess the usability of such practice. 
For example, when using the smart card for conducting a bank transaction or 
as means of identification, the frequency of use dictates the simplicity and 
flexibility of authentication methods. Customers using smart card based banking 
cards are unlikely to accept using two Biometrics authentication methods every 
time they wish to conduct a bank transaction. As such, it was decided to 
manipulate the methods of Test #1 where the two methods were reversed in 
sequence; the Biometrics authentication method will be conducted before the 
PIN entry.  
 
Test #3 – Biometrics and PIN: 
The initial expectation is that the use of a Biometrics authentication first will 
decrease the possibility of failure attempts and attacks. This mechanism 
supports the security concept of using something you own (smart card), 
something you are (Biometrics), and something you know (PIN). The results of 
the test are listed below: 
Remarks 
Number of simulated smart cards 
100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000 
good bio decoded  100  500  1000  1499  1999  2499  2993 
bio incorrect/re-enter correct bio  13  38  83  126  162  199  236 
timeout error (bio)  9  56  122  176  244  307  363 
good pin decoded  100  500  1000  1499  1999  2498  2991 
pin incorrect/re-enter correct pin  17  103  207  305  412  507  617 
timeout error (pin)  11  60  129  190  259  306  385 
Table (17): Results from Testing the Biometrics and PIN Authentication Methods. 
 
The probabilities of failure set in this test are similar to the first test, where 
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difference is that the Biometrics authentication will be conducted before the PIN 
authentication. As illustrated in table (17) above, there are fewer errors during 
the first authentication level which translates to a more secure process at the 
initial stages of this process. This method has automatically reduced the number 
of potential attacks on the system and will therefore reduce potential attacks at 
the second authentication level. 
The results of this test have been plotted and illustrated in figures (29) and 
(30). The number of observed failure attempts at the Biometrics authentication 
method range between 22 and 599 for sample sizes of 100 and 3,000 smart cards 
consecutively. At the PIN authentication level, observed failure attempts are 
recorded at 28 and 1,002 for sample sizes of 100 and 3,000 smart cards 
consecutively. Although the observed failures at PIN level are high, it is 
important to note that we start off with a more rigorous and secure process with 
the use of the Biometrics authentication.  
 
Figure (29): Expected and Observed Biometrics Failure Attempts in Biometrics and PIN 
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This ensures that the process is faced with less failure attempts and potential 
attacks, which will drop down to the second authentication level which uses the 
PIN. 
 
Figure (30): Expected and Observed PIN Failure Attempts in Biometrics and PIN Proposed 
Model. 
 
Therefore, when deciding on the use of two authentication methods, it is 
recommended that a Biometrics authentication is used as a first level of defence, 
followed by the usual authentication method of inputting a PIN.  
Number of Smart Cards  100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000 
Percentage Observed (BIO)  7%  6%  7%  7%  7%  7%  7% 
Percentage Expected (BIO)  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Percentage Observed (PIN)  9%  11%  11%  11%  11%  11%  11% 
Percentage Expected (PIN)  15%  15%  15%  15%  15%  15%  15% 
Table (18): Percentages of Expected and Observed Biometrics and PIN Failure Attempts. 
 
Putting these recommendations into table (18) demonstrating percentages of 
failure attempts, we note that the average observed Biometrics failure attempts 
is 7%, while the average of observed PIN failure attempts is 11%. This confirms 
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number of illegitimate users that may potentially attack the system during the 
process. 
The final confirmation that this test produces the best security level and least 
failure attempts is examining the number of banned smart cards as illustrated in 
figure (31).  
 
Figure (31): Smart Cards Banned in Biometrics and PIN Proposed Model. 
 
When using the Biometrics authentication method before the PIN, the 
number of banned smart cards is recorded at 7 and 2 consecutively for a sample 
size of 3,000 smart cards. This comes low compared to when the PIN is used 
prior to the Biometrics where the number of banned smart cards was 50 and 0 
consecutively for a sample size of 3,000.  
Given the benefits to the user and administrator, as well as the practicality of 
using the Biometrics and PIN authentication methods across most industries, it 
is recommended to adopt this method in the given order as it proves to provide 
the best security levels.  
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5.1.4.3 Simulating Attacks on the Smart Card System 
As discussed in chapter (3), section 3.1.3, there are different types of attacks 
that have different probabilities of occurrence and different consequences on the 
smart card system and its users. Each attack targets different areas of the 
system and has a specific goal; this section is concerned about the attacks that 
are practised while the smart card is in use. Some of the attacks violate the 
smart card system authentication, privacy, and confidentiality like attacks on 
PIN or attacks on Biometrics. Other attacks violate the smart card system 
integrity, reliability, availability, and even authentication like invasive attacks, 
side channel attacks, etc. Please refer to Appendix (B).  
Figure (32) is a UML sequence diagram that demonstrates the types of 
attacks that may occur in any smart card system, even though safeguards and 
controls like PIN, Biometrics, and PKI are in place. 
The purple callouts represent the types of possible attacks that an attacker 
can carry out in that area precisely; in addition, the red callouts represent the 
attacks that are created in the executable model to test the system’s robustness. 
  The executable model allows us to simulate attacks on the system. An 
attack on any part of the system is essentially another transaction inserted into 
the model. For example, to simulate an attack that allows the attacker to steal 
the private key released from the smart card object, which is coded as a state 
machine, an attacker is implemented as a singleton class that can intrude into 
multiple simulation modules in a thread-safe manner.     Chapter 5 Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and TLM      170 
       
 
Figure (32): Sequence Diagram- Possible Attacks on PIN, Biometrics (Fingerprint), and PKI 
Smart Card System. 
 
  The attack is defined at the beginning of the model, and then a transaction is 
effectively inserted into the model by including the following line of code at the 
appropriate point in the Smart Card module: 
 
 
attack::getInstance().set_private_key(private_key); 
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Now, the model waits for transitions 1 to 8 to occur, and then the attacker 
interferes and attacks the system after transition 8 where the private key is 
released. 
///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object:// Card count: 98 
sender_object:// Card ID: 547 
sender_object:// Pin entered: correct 
sender_object:// entry duration: 7 s 
sender_object: ///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object: begin transition 1 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 2 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 2 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 3 
smartcard_reader_object: Good pin 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 3 
sender_object: end transition 1 
sender_object: *** good pin decoded *** 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 4 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 4 
sender_object: ///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object:// Card count: 98 
sender_object:// Card ID: 547 
sender_object:// Fingerprint entered: correct 
sender_object:// Entry duration: 6 s 
sender_object: ///////////////////////////////////// 
sender_object: begin transition 5 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 6 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 6 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 7 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 7 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 8 
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 8 
sender_object: end transition 5 
Attacker initialized, @104 s 
Attacker stole the private key, @104 s 
smartcard_object: begin transition 9 
smartcard_object: end transition 9 
Figure (33): Simulation Output of Attack on Private Key 
 
The output of the simulation with an attack shows that the attacker gets hold 
of the private key by practising a successful attack on the smart card object. 
In this example, the attacker has to conduct one of the physical or logical attacks 
that were explained in details in chapter (3), section 3.1.3, to be able to get hold 
of the private key, so the attacker can practise a successful side channel attack,  
invasive attack, attacks during PIN comparison, or attacks on Biometrics. The 
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only assumes that a physical or logical attack has taken place. For that reason, it 
simulates an attack and creates an attacker class with features that allow the 
attacker to modify the transitions and as a result gain access to the user’s secret 
information, specifically the private key.  
In essence, the attacker being able to get hold of the private key is the worst 
case scenario.  When the attacker steals the private key, the user will be in a 
very critical situation because the attacker can claim to be the legitimate user to 
the system and gets access to all the privileges of the legitimate user. The whole 
idea in the key management security is to secure the private key; it is the most 
important element to be kept in a highly secured place. This successful attack 
indicates a weakness in the protocol used within the smart card system. 
 
Another example of utilising the executable module in attacks simulation is 
by modeling another sort of an attack, which is carried out on the key exchange 
operation. This time the attacker monitors the public keys exchanged between 
the users and the CA, and gets hold of the users’ public keys. Being able to 
interfere with the key exchange protocol opens a door for the attacker to practice 
attacks that result in network disruption and loss of user trust like for example 
carrying out a man-in-the-middle attack [159], or a multi-protocol attack [160]. 
Although the public keys are available to everyone, the attacker can still monitor 
the key exchange messages between the sender and the receiver without both of 
them knowing, and then the attacker can use the public keys of both users in a 
way that convinces them that they are exchanging messages with each other  Chapter 5 Smart Card System Simulation Using SystemC and TLM      173 
       
without someone in the middle, for more information about the details of man-in-
the-middle-attack on public keys please refer to [161] and [159].     
smartcard_object: begin transition 13 
certificate_authority_object: begin transition 14 
certificate_authority_object: end transition 14 
Attacker stole the receiver public key, @203 s 
smartcard_object: end transition 13 
smartcard_object: begin transition 15 
smartcard_object: end transition 15 
smartcard_object: begin transition 16 
smartcard_object: end transition 16 
receiver_object: begin transition 17 
certificate_authority_object: begin transition 18 
certificate_authority_object: end transition 18 
Attacker stole the sender public key, @206 s 
receiver_object: end transition 17 
receiver_object: begin transition 19 
receiver_object: end transition 19 
Figure (34): Simulation Output of Attack on Public Keys 
  
This example focuses on modeling an attack that allows the attacker to 
interfere through the transactions exchanged between the user and the receiver 
and gets hold of the data exchanged without both of the users knowing, by being 
able to model the attack, it is possible to point out a gap in the protocol that 
allows an attacker to monitor the flow of data, interfere within the transactions, 
and get hold of the public keys exchanged. 
Attacking the key exchange operation generally and stealing the private key 
specifically violates the confidentiality, privacy, authentication, and integrity 
properties of the system. Also, it compromises the security of the user, which 
may result in identity theft, information leakage, or message alteration. Being 
able to steal the private key points out vulnerability within the security protocol 
employed in the system. 
A Denial of Service (DOS) attack is simulated using the same model. The 
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DOS attack takes place against the Certificate Authority server and manifests 
through the following mechanism. First, the attacker attempts to exhaust the 
server through high frequency login requests. The aim is to guess user pin or 
passwords to gain unauthorized access into the smart card system. When 
successful, the attacker intrudes into the certificate authority and intercepts the 
user certificates and sender/receiver public keys. Due to such attack, the smart 
card server fails to provide the services to legitimate users. Figure (35) shows 
result of DOS attack simulation: 
iteration: 4 at time: 2 s 
insert_pin_password  
extract_pin_password  
request_fingerprint  
match_with_saved_templates  
release_private_key  
release_private_key  
send message  
get_receiver_public_key  
send_encrypted_message  
Attacker stole the sender public key, 
SERVICE DENIED, @2 s  
Figure (35): Simulation output of Denial of Service Attack 
 
As can be seen, the transactions of the smart card system are running 
normally, however, when the DOS attack successfully takes place, the service is 
denied and the attacker gets hold of the users public keys exchanged among the 
system objects. In addition, the subsequent transactions failed to occur because 
the Certificate Authority server is unavailable. This attack shows that the 
availability property has been violated; the system users are going to suffer from 
service unavailability, and will not be able to use their smart cards until the 
Certificate Authority server recovers from the attack. 
DOS attacks are indistinguishable from legitimate sign-in requests. The only 
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number of sign-in attempts in rapid succession can be indicative of a DOS attack. 
Hence, smart card systems can be protected from DOS attacks by identifying 
high frequency of login attempts from a source and denying service to the source 
of such attack. Another effective way is to limit the number of login attempts a 
user is allowed at a time.  
 
5.2 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the executable model developed using SystemC TLM allowed 
the designer to test the proposed models that support a combination of 
authentication methods; by running simulations on different number of smart 
cards with different authentication methods and recording the results, the 
designer can examine the robustness of the proposed models in terms of 
enhancing security specifically during the phase of authenticating the smart 
card system users.  
The simulation tool provided a quick, automated, and flexible environment to 
test the proposed models, in addition to allowing the designer to observe and 
modify the transactions whenever changes are required.  
In addition, the SystemC TLM executable model also allowed the designer to 
discover the weak points of the system and point out vulnerabilities; the 
successful attacks indicate that there are weaknesses in the security protocol. By 
referring to table (4) in chapter (3), which shows the service phases and the 
related types of security requirements in the smart card system, the executable 
model included two authentication methods, which are PIN and Biometrics, and 
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security goals that are listed in table (4). However, by running the tests on the 
authentication methods, and carrying out successful attacks that were explained 
in details in chapter (3) like attacks on PIN, attacks on Biometrics (figure (7)), 
and other physical and logical attacks on the proposed model, some of these 
security goals have been violated.   
Testing the proposed model against physical and logical attacks while the 
smart card is in use has resulted in giving the attacker the chance to get hold of 
the user’s private key, and therefore violating numbers of security properties like 
authentication, confidentiality, privacy, and integrity. Also, by successfully 
simulation a denial of service attack (DOS), the attacker succeeded in 
interpreting the key exchange mechanism and denying the service to the 
legitimate users, which resulted in violating the availability and reliability 
security goals. This in essence shows that the system is vulnerable to threats 
and successful attacks taking place. Yet, to be able to reduce the probability of 
successful attacks, the executable model allows the designer to modify the 
executable model to test against future attacks. 
In contrast with the UML diagram, the animation makes it possible to see the 
attack actually happening. Furthermore, it is possible to make changes easily 
within the model and try number of attacks to test the system robustness by 
simply inserting transactions into the UML diagram, and transforming it into 
transactions within the SystemC TLM executable model. 
To be able to defend the smart card system against possible attacks, some 
countermeasures are suggested. The countermeasures that can be implemented 
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resistant topological design measures. Some integrated circuits include an active 
shield or sensor that detects an attack when its lines are cut or contacted, if an 
attack takes place the shield erases the chip’s memory and ends all functions, 
which ends up making the smart card unusable [100]. Yet, not all types of smart 
cards have this type of tamper resistant chips; hence, it is vital to make sure that 
the chip used is a silicon tamper resistant chip to be able to reduce the possibility 
of invasive attacks taking place.  
To prevent side channel attacks, suggested countermeasures by [100] are 
randomness of behaviour, which is achieved by manipulating data in a way that 
the value presented in the memory is always masked with a random value to 
prevent interpretation of leaked information. Other countermeasures are 
memory layout scrambling, memory address bus encryption, noise generation, 
traffic adding/padding, time disturbance and algorithmic process masking. In 
addition, redundancy and protecting the values stored in the memory with a 
checksum may also contribute to preventing fault analysis. 
To be able to defend the smart card systems against DOS attacks, 
countermeasures like identifying high frequency of login attempts from a source 
and denying service to the source of such attack is an effective way, another way 
is to limit the number of login attempts a user is allowed at a time. 
To conclude, the executable model can give the designer the opportunity to 
simulate countermeasures that are programmable by SystemC and TLM. 
Nonetheless, changing the design of the integrated circuits is not within the 
capabilities of the executable model and it is outside the scope of this study. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
The e-business environment is expanding quickly; a large portion of 
government and business offices in advanced countries are adopting the 
paperless office concept. The smart card is the latest trend in the e-business 
environment, particularly within the e-government and e-banking systems. 
Along with the advances and benefits of each technology there are associated 
risks that may have a negative impact on the system, which may lead to system 
failure. Today, governments that deploy the smart card system are having 
various applications activated in the e-government system and accessed by 
number of users through smart identification cards. This raises a huge security 
responsibility that the management of the whole information system has to fulfil. 
In addition, other types of organisations are also employing the smart card 
for different usages; these cards are being used as banking cards, loyalty cards, 
prepaid cards, etc. Applying the risk management programme is imperative to be 
able to effectively manage the system. Such risk management programme 
provides governments and organisations with a clear idea about the assets of the 
system along with their values, threats identification, vulnerability 
identification, the required security issues and goals like (confidentiality, 
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mitigation. The final and very important step of the programme is concerned 
about applying the best safe-guards that will mitigate the associated risks in 
addition to number of controls to allow better management and backup to the 
system.  
Each of the various types of the smart card system determines its unique 
probability of attacks and severity of related consequences. Taking the risk 
analysis into consideration, it is notable that the results indicate that using the 
smart card as a banking card or an identification card is extremely risky due to 
the sensitivity of information and value of transaction being processed. The 
probability of attacks and the severity of the attacks to this type of cards may 
cause severe harm to the system and its users. Governments and organisations 
must therefore focus on reducing potential risks to the system by applying the 
best technology to secure the system assets. Thus, going through the risk 
management programme will assist governments and organisations to avoid 
negative impacts on the system along with reducing the risks to an acceptable 
level by employing the best available safe-guards such as PKI and Biometrics. 
This in turn will lead to gaining users’ trust, loyalty, and confidence, which will 
boost usage and adoption of smart card system beyond its current boundaries. 
The risk analysis in this study focuses on the smart card system, which is 
something that has never been done before. Most risk management programmes 
are concerned about information technology security in general, but there has 
been no risk analysis study or guide that is conducted specifically on smart 
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Data storage in the smart card system must be properly and effectively 
managed. Additionally, the security methods or safeguards employed must also 
be divided into levels bearing in mind that each type of smart card requires 
different security methods at different levels and stages. As a result, designing 
the smart card, deciding what types of applications the card is serving, and 
employing the security methods are critical stages in the smart card life cycle. 
From a modelling and design perspective, modelling provides ways to join 
security engineering with software engineering; this manages the complexity of 
the systems by offering a visualised way of looking at systems entities and 
functions. Modelling each transaction that occurs while using a smart card is 
very important; it assists the designer of the system to identify the occurrences 
where security properties must be activated to avoid potential system attacks. 
After designing the model, testing was carried out to be able to determine the 
weaknesses of the model and to exploit the vulnerabilities of the proposed 
system. Determining the vulnerabilities in the design phase of the system 
reduces the risks that may occur during the system implementation. 
The UML diagrams along with their extensions are an ideal form of 
modelling the systems; they have features that enable the designer to visualise 
the whole process and its sub-transactions. UML diagrams were used to model 
the smart card system protocol and processes, and present the transactions that 
take place while messages are exchanged during the registration and verification 
processes. In addition, the UML diagrams allowed the designer to identify areas 
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conference paper in the 2010 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Embedded 
and Ubiquitous Computing; please refer to Appendix (B). 
One of the drawbacks of UML, however, is that it does not allow the designer 
to see what happens if something goes wrong with the system; it only 
demonstrates the way things should work. Therefore, the importance of 
simulation arises to enable the designer to oversee the whole process and repair 
any issues or problems that occur. By creating an executable model of a smart 
card system, including the security protocols and transactions, it is possible to 
examine the strengths and determine the weaknesses by running tests on the 
model. 
SystemC TLM was used to provide a simulation tool; it transformed the UML 
static model into an executable model. The executable model provided the 
opportunity to see the transactions flow within the system objects in an 
animated manner. It also gave the designer the ability to carry out tests to be 
able to examine the authentication methods that are proposed by the designer to 
be employed in the smart card system; this work has also been published in the 
conference paper presented in the 2010 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on 
Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing. The tests’ results demonstrated the 
number of failure attempts in each authentication method, which helped the 
designer identify the strengths and weaknesses of the employed methods. It also 
indicated that the order of the authentication methods that are used determines 
the level of security provided by the system, which is a critical point to be looked 
at. After having tested the proposed models that include two authentication 
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submitted the Biometrics evidence before the PIN. Additionally, there were less 
smart cards banned during this test, which gives a clear indication that this 
mechanism should be adopted to ensure confidence and security for both the 
smart card user and system administrator.  
The executable model allowed the simulation of different types of attacks in 
different parts of the system. The results showed that number of security 
objectives like confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and availability were 
violated; hence, identification of the system weaknesses and vulnerabilities can 
be pointed out. As such, the benefits of building an executable model include 
allowing the designers to have a clear view of the weaknesses in the security 
requirements, methods, and protocols used in the smart card system. This, in 
turn, allows adaptation of various usages of the smart card system in different 
business environments where security and authenticity requirements vary. This 
executable model is a new way of modelling the smart card system, which has 
not been done before, this in turn is considered as an additional contribution that 
supports bridging the gap between the design and implementation phases of the 
smart cards systems’ development. 
 
6.2 Future Work 
The future work at this point is going to look at the current problem from 
different angles. According to the in-depth reading and data gathering of how the 
data are stored in the smart card, where the data are stored, the ways to have 
access to these data, and the way these data are secured. It appears that each 
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accessed, and protected. After carrying out the risk management program, the 
results came out with different levels of risk associated with each type of smart 
card. It really depends on the applications that the smart card is responsible of 
handling. Each application requires different amount of information to be stored 
in the smart card; therefore, requires different types of security methods to be 
implemented to better secure the information stored. The results show that the 
banking card has an undesirable level of risk, besides, the identification smart 
card also scored a high risk rate among other types, the risk associated with this 
type of card is considered to be undesirable also. This indicates that these 
particular types of smart cards require more attention than others.  
Building a prototype out of the proposed models, and examining the usability 
of the system, the people’s acceptance of using this type of technology, and their 
willingness of having it on their daily routine is a valuable idea. People’s 
perception and willingness to use the better secured technology that requires 
more effort and time to be given by the user is something important to look at. It 
brings in mind the question of: what if we are trying to come up with the best 
way of securing the smart card but this way can end up being rejected by the 
actual users? This result will affect the technology in a very bad way. It simply 
means that if the users have not appreciated the new way of using the smart 
card, then there is no use of applying the proposed security methods. Evaluating 
the usability of the smart card with more security procedures, where the user 
must go through more authentication steps while using the smart card is the 
next step. In computer science and human-computer interaction, usability is a 
term that is used to indicate the ease of employment of a particular computer Chapter  Conclusion               184 
       
program, interface, or device. It is concerned with how efficient, easy to learn, 
satisfying, and less error contained the technology is. Thus, in order to evaluate 
the usability of the proposed model and the prototype built, a sample of users 
have to be picked and use the demonstrated prototype, then their opinions and 
reflections towards the usage of this model have to be examined by distributing a 
questionnaire that contains number of questions, which are concerned with the 
usability and acceptability of the model.  In fact, it is quite imperative that the 
users perceive the smart card with more sophisticated security methods to be 
usable, acceptable and reliable.  
Also, future work can utilise the executable model produced in this study; it is 
a very useful simulation tool because it is automated, flexible, allows high speed 
simulation, and is easy to use. It allows the designers to run more tests and 
examine more authentication methods and key exchange mechanisms, or 
practice more types of attacks and record the results. The designers can even 
suggest new controls and safeguards and add them to the executable model, then 
run some tests to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the suggested 
controls and safeguards.  Chapter 7 References                185 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Information Security Risk Analysis Tables 
 
 
 
Table (A.19): Loss Impact Table 
Source: [124] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Time 
Sensitivity 
Intangible Loss 
(dollar loss difficult to estimate) 
Tangible 
Loss 
Impact 
Value 
Longest 
Tolerable 
Outage 
Period 
during 
Peak 
Health and 
Safety 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
(dissatisfied 
customers) 
Embarrassment 
(comes to the 
attention of) 
Financial 
Very 
High 
24 hours or 
Less 
Loss of 
multiple 
lives 
More than 
500,000 
National or 
International 
  Press 
  Organisation 
More 
than 
$10M 
High  25-72 hours  Loss of life  100,001 - 
500K 
Local or State 
  Press 
  Organisation 
$1,000,00
1 - $10M 
Mediu
m 
73 hours-
5days 
Serious 
injury 
10,001 - 
100K 
Company 
Organisation 
$100,001 
– 1M 
Low  6-9 days  Major 
exposure to 
unsafe 
work 
environme
nt 
1001 – 10K  Company Division  $50,001 - 
$100K 
Very 
Low 
10 days or 
more 
Little or no 
negative 
impact 
0 – 1K  Few if anyone or 
company group 
$0 - $50K Appendix A Information Security Risk Analysis Tables        200 
 
 
 
   
Impact 
Value 
Information Classification  Longest 
Tolerable 
Outage 
Very 
High 
Top Secret- Information that, if disclosed, could 
cause severe impact to the company’s competitive 
advantage or business strategies 
24 hours or less 
High  Confidential- Information that, if disclosed, could 
violate the privacy of individuals, reduce 
competitive advantage, or damage the company 
25-72 hours 
Medium  Restricted- Information that is available to a 
specific subset of the employee population when 
conducting company business 
73 hours-5 days 
Low  Internal use- Information that is intended for use 
by all employees when conducting business 
6-9 days 
Very 
Low 
Public- Information that has been made available 
to the public through authorised company channels 
10 days or more 
Table (A.20): Information Classification Table 
Source: [124] Appendix B Publications                201 
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